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ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL 
AND INSTUTIONAL REALITY
Editors’ introduction
ne important consequence of ihe emergence of
m odern natural science was that lor the first time 
a clear line was drawn between the natural and the ar- 
tificial, or man-made, parts of the World. In the Aristo- 
telian world-view the tamily, the law, the p o l i s , and lan- 
guage were natural entities; in the modern world-view 
they were seen as instituted, as products of intentional 
human action. The 17th century theorists often used the 
contract terminology to mark the difference, as did 
Rousseau and Kant in the next century The thinkers of 
the Scottish Enlightment, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and 
in Germany especially Hegel, replaced the idea of an 
explicit contract with the notion oi a conventional ar- 
rangement arising as an unintended consequence of 
separate hut interrelated sequences oi human actions. 
Human institutions were seen as products ot human 
action but not oi human design. The modern notion of 
"the social” had entered the stage.
lt is a fact that the ontology of the social has yet to 
establish itsell as a well-delined and recognized subject 
of research. We can easily see this il we compare social 
ontology with, say, the ontology of mathematical ob- 
jects. Issues related to the ontology of the social have 
emerged in different contexts. The participants of the
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disputes have usually been only dimly aware oi the fact 
that the same or similar issues have been taken up  else- 
where, in other disciplines and philosophical traditions. 
During the past century, we can recognize at least four 
separate contexts in which the issues related to the na­
ture of social reality have been focused upon.
First, the nature oi the social has been one of the Cen­
tral topics of theoretical sociology since D urkheim  and 
his ”scandalous” postulation of social lacts aschoses. Onto- 
logical issues have appeared vvearing a num ber of dis- 
guises: as questions about w hether social collectives can 
be reduced  to individuals, w hether the proper way to 
proceed in the social Sciences is to explain collective 
phenom ena in terms ot individual properties or vice versa, 
or about the question of what the relationship betw een 
s tructural causal forces and individual agency is.
Second, in legal theory the ontology oi institutions 
and  institutionally defined entities, properties and re- 
lations has been one of the main theoretical problems, 
particularly  in the Continental positivist and Scand­
inavian realist traditions. In the analytical tradition, these 
issues have recently been discussed and reformulated 
by Ota Weinberger and Neil MacCormick. While in 
the sociological disputes the main focus has been on 
the explanation, the discussions in legal theory have 
been penetrated by the problem  of the allegedly nor- 
mative nature of lavv.
Third, in phenomenology, the constitu tion  oi the 
intersubjective World is a problem that has been the 
subject of m uch  discussion an d  is exemplified by the 
w ork of Alfred Schulz. More recently, this problem has 
been reformulated in various versions oi social con- 
structivism, often drawing iheir inspiration from the 
writings of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann -  
two of Schutz’s students. The work of Jurgen Habermas 
also draws from these phenomenological sources.
The recent developm ent in linguistically oriented
5
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analytic philosophy has initiated a fourth fruitful dis- 
cussion on the nature of "the social". Due to the Inde­
pendent bu t parallel w orks  of such  philosophers  as 
Philip Pettit (1993), David Bloor (1997), Margaret Gil­
bert (1989) and Jo h n  Searle (1995), the ontology of 
the social World has established itself as a partly inde- 
penden t b ranch  oi philosophy. While clearly related to 
the earlier discussions, social ontology -  or, using John  
Searles terminology in this volume, “the philosophy of 
Society" -  is not just a reflection of the methodological 
d isputes w ith in  the Special Sciences. As the philosophy 
of language, or political philosophy have their own iden- 
tity, which  is not reducible to the m ethodologies of 
empirical linguistics or positive political science, social 
ontology could he seen as a separate discipline.
The following questions can be posed in the context 
of this discussion: "How do things like money, rnar- 
riage, property or governm ent exist?” ”How are they 
related to individual h u m a n  actions, propositional atti- 
tudes, or physical things?” ”H ow  are they created and 
maintained?” "Are they inherently normative?” "Are they 
to be explained in terrns of rules?” ”W hat is the nature 
oi social rules?” "What is the nature of collective ac­
tions?" ”How are they constitu ted  by the actions per- 
lormed by the participating individuals?” "Can collec- 
tives like groups or institutions have intentions in the 
proper sense oi the word?"
Hence there are several types oi questions posed in 
social ontology. As we have seen, there is no single means 
of discussing these issues, but, rather, many separate 
and partly linked directions ot discussion. Such a situ- 
ation is com m on  in the history ot h u m an  thought. Nev- 
ertheless, it is unsatisfactory. W hen  arranging an inter­
national meeting on the nature  of social and  institu- 
tional reality in the sum m er of 1999, the aim of both 
the Departm ent of Social Sciences and Philosophy at 
the University of Jyväskylä and its partners was to open
6
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a possibility for Communication betvveen the different 
traditions of social ontology. Several well-known phi- 
losophers, legal theorists, and methodologists of social 
science were invited. Almost ali were able to attend, 
and almost ali oi those who did attend contributed to 
this volume. According to our personal judgment, the 
meeting was a success. Hovvever, the final judgment, oi 
course, belongs to the reader.
The natural starting point of our discussion was the 
recent work o [Joh n  R. Searle. As one of the leading spe- 
cialists in the philosophy of language and the philoso- 
phy of mind, Professor Searle (Berkeley) has set the 
agenda for a branch of philosophy more than once. No 
one doing serious work in the philosophy oi language 
could ignore his work. As we mentioned, several recent 
works in social philosophy are either parallel to or com- 
plementary of his The C ons truc t ion  oi Social Reality . Nev- 
ertheless, in his book, the basic issues of social ontology 
have found such a clear, accessible and challenging lor- 
mulation that it is bound to acquire the status of a clas- 
sic. Therefore, we found it suitable to begin this collec- 
tion with an essay written by Searle. In it he provides a 
concise explanation oi the main theses oi his book.
Our two Finnish contributors have developed views 
which are in many senses parallel, yet clearly distin- 
guishable, from the theory practiced by Searle. (On their 
agreements and disagreetnents with Searle, see Tuomela 
1999, Lagerspetz 1999.) The contribution of R a im o  
T u o m e la  (Helsinki) is part of a project he has developed 
over the past twenty years in several books and in in- 
numerable articles. Combining the traditional Finnish 
interest in action theory with rigorous analysis, Tuomela 
has attempted to develop a theory ot collective actions 
and attitudes that would serve as a basis for a general 
science of human action. E erik  L a g e r s p e t z  (Jyväskylä) 
re-states soine Central theses already formulated in his 
dissertation (1989) and his book T h e  O p p o s i te  M irrors .
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An E ssa y  o n  the  C o n v e n t io n a l i s t  T h e o r y  o f  I n s t i tu t io n s  
(1995). His key concept is the notion of conventional 
laet, derived and modified from David Lewis’ classic 
C o n v e n t io n  (1969). In his essay, Lagerspetz also tries to 
link the recent discussions of social ontology with the 
earlier debates m entioned above.
M a r g a r e t  G i lb e r t s  (Connecticut) seminal O n  Socia l  
Faets (1989) first appeared some years before Searles 
book. Again, there are interesting similarities and dis- 
similarities between her approach and those of our other 
contributors. Similarly to Lagerspetz, she is interested 
in the existence conditions of social rules, but her no­
tion of a ”joint com m itm ent” may have more in com ­
mon with Searle’s ”w e-intentions” than with Lagerspetz’ 
"conventional facts” based on ”mutual beliefs’’. Tuomelas 
careful classification seems to make some room for ali 
these phenom ena as different forms oi "collective ac- 
ceptance”. Ali four authors seem to he widely in agree- 
ment that (a) social entities and properties are sui generis ,  
not reducible to mental and/or physical entities an d 
properties, (b) their existence conditions should be 
partly analysed m terms oi rules, and (c) their existence 
is also related to beliels and/or com m itm ents prevail- 
ing in relevant social groups.
Searle’s account has, oi course, been the subject oi a 
certain am ount ot criticism. In this collection, M ichae l  
Q u a n te  (Mtinster) formulates some critical points. In his 
essay he discusses the naturalistic and individualistic 
nature oi Searles project. As Quante remarks, naturalism 
and individualism are conceptually separate positions. 
Of the contributors of this volume, both Searle and 
Tuomela have naturalist aspirations, while Lagerspetz and 
Gilbert could be classified as anti-naturalists. "Individu­
alism” has several meanings. Lagerspetzs and Tuomelas 
accounts are, at least in some sense ot the term, indi­
vidualistic, while Searles ”we-intentions” and Gilbert’s 
"joint commitments” seem to have an irreducibly non-
8
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individualistic com ponent. The essence of Q uantes criti- 
cism seems to he that ali constructivist accounts are nev- 
ertheless bound to make uneasy com prom ises w ith a 
basically individualistic world-view, and this tends to 
make them  ultimately incoherent or unstable. Individu- 
alists attem pt to ask the question: H ow  do individuals 
and  their interactions constitute social reality? They tend, 
however, to forget the com plem entary question: How 
does social reality constitute individuals?
A nother im portant issue discussed in Q uantes article 
is the ethical aspect of the constructivist account oi so­
cial reality. At least two issues are relevant in this con- 
text. First, our position on individualism-collectivism axis 
may have some ethical consequences. Although our sup- 
port of methodological or ontological theory does not 
com m it us to an ethical view vvithout additional premises 
-fo rex am p le , a methodological individualist (say, Hobbes 
or Pareto) is not autom atically a supporter of moral indi- 
vidualism  -  some views certainly fit together better than 
others. A view about the ethical status of social collec- 
tives (say, of nations) is naturally com bined w ith a view 
about their ontological status.
Second, there is the question oi the norm ativity vs. 
non-norm ativity of social facts. Ali (our authors (Searle, 
Gilbert, Tuomela, and Lagerspetz) agree that statem ents 
such as ”X is money in C” are true only il people in- 
volved in the context C som ehow  accept that X is money. 
Moral, or, more broadly, norm ative and evaluative, state- 
m ents do not belong to this type. Most importantly, while 
the fact that X is accepted as m oney in C is, for us, a 
reason to accept X as money (as a m eans of exchange), 
the laet that Y is accepted as a moral reason or standard 
in C does not seem to constitute a reason to share this 
acceptance. The fact that eating meat is generally per- 
m itted in our Society is not an argum ent against veg- 
etarianism  -  or, at least, if we accept it as an argum ent, 
we have to lace ali the problem s related to normative
9
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relativism. But if we, while rejecting moral constructivism 
or conventionalism, nevertheless accept a constructivist 
account of social ontology, we have to develop some other 
theory of the normative aspects of social reality. Interest- 
ingly, Searle, in his account on the is-ought question in 
his earlier works, seems to argue for the irreducible nor­
mative character of institutional facts.
The problem of normativity is relevant in law as well 
as in ethics. As we noted, some important questions of 
social ontology have also been discussed in legal theory. 
Our collection reflects this fact. Of the philosophers, both 
Gilbert and Lagerspetz refer extensively to the works of 
legal theorists. Conversely, the two contributors hailing 
from the tield of legal science, Paolo C om anducci and M aria  
C ristina Rcdondo, are interested in Searle’s account. VVhile 
seeing the Iruitfulness of his approach, and while draw- 
ing interesting parallels between Searles work and the 
earlier work done in legal theory, both are troubled by 
the problem peculiar to their own field, law. In his essay, 
Paolo Comanducci (Genova) compares Searle’s project 
with that ot Hans Kelsen, perhaps the most influential oi 
ali 20th century legal theorists. His somevvhat sceptical 
conclusion is that the projects have a lot in common, 
including many oi their problems. Law is often consid- 
ered as inherently normative, yet it is undeniably a part 
oi our social and institutional reality. Unless we accept a 
strong version oi natural law theory, we have to admit 
that one necessary condition oi something being a valid 
legal rule is that it is accepted as a valid legal rule and 
treated as one in the relevant jurisdiction. Here we can 
see a clear connection between social constructivism and 
20th century legal positivism (Kelsen, Ross, and Hart), 
which views legal lacts essentially as social facts. Never­
theless, laws are normative in the sense that they are not 
m erely dem ands backed  by a physical th rea t. As 
Lagerspetz remarks, the laet that something is a legal rule 
may be dependent on the existence oi another rule, but
1 0
O n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i a l  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e a l i t y
this regress cannot go on ad  in f in i tu m .  Legal postivists 
hait the regress by presupposing an ultimate rule or rules 
(Kelsens G r u n d n o n n , Harts ”rules of recognitiön”), which 
are supposed to give other mies their normative torce. 
How can social ontology account for normativity? Mod- 
ern legal positivism, unlike its Benthamite and Austinian 
predecessors, does not try to reduce normativity to ”habits 
of obedience”. But can legal normativity be reduced to 
something else, e.g. to beliefs about normativity?
M a r ia  C r is t in a  R cd on do  (Genova) tries explicitly to 
apply the Searlian analysis to legal institutions. Indeed, 
she sees it as the only coherent foundation for a positiv- 
ist theory of legal normativity. But she also raises sonre 
interesting questions about the epistemological status of 
sentences like ”X is a valid legal ru le”. Generally, a 
constructivist account of Searles work is committed to a 
certatn form of monistic realism. Although the con­
structivist account does not accept the standard realist 
dogma that external reality is completely independent 
trom our beliefs about that reality, the truth of sentences 
like ”X is a valid rule” can be analysed in terms of corre- 
spondence betvveen a linguistic entity and a laet. But the 
truth ot such sentences is olten controversial: there need 
be no unanimously shared belief (even among legal ex- 
perts) as to vvhether X actually is a valid rule. If its truth 
is a m atter oi controversy, and if the existence of the cor- 
responding laet is dependent on the existence of shared 
belief in its truth, should we say that the sentence in 
question is untrue, or that it has no truth value? Redondo 
also reminds us that there exists a competing realist ac­
count oi legal normativity namely the view which pre- 
supposes an independent moral reality and sees legal 
normativity as a part of moral normativity.
In the lield of legal theory, Professor O ta  W e in b e r g e r  
(Graz) is certainly one of the most im portant and most 
productive theorists of the ontology oi norms. In his 
A n  In s t i tu t ion a l  T h e o ry  o f  Law  (1986), vvritten jointly with
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Neil MacCormick (whose lecture is unfortunately not 
included in the present volume), he applies the nolion 
of institution, w hich  is partly derived from Seaiies ear- 
lier work. However, his con tribu tion  to this volume has 
a directly normative character. He critically discusses 
certain theories oi democracy, especially the discursive 
theory  pui forth by Jurgen H aberm as in his celebrated 
Faktizität und Geltung (1992). W einberger’s critical es- 
say illustrates the com plex relationship between social 
ontology and  substantive ethical judgments. In demo- 
cratic theories, expressions like ”the general will” or ”the 
will oi the people” abound. In the writings ot Rousseau 
or of the Anglo-ldealists, they are assigned a clearly 
holistic meaning. For this reason, bo th  moral and meth- 
odological individualists tend to view them  with suspi- 
cion. They may agree w ith  W  H. Auden: ”We cannot 
postulate a General Will /  For w hat we are, we have 
ourselves to b lam e”. In W einbergers view, ostensibly 
holistic taik about the will of the people should  he ana- 
lysed in terms oi institutional processes. In saying that 
the will oi the people is X, we rnay, for example, mean 
that in the relevant community, or some procedure (say, 
the majority rule) is generally accepted as hinding, and, 
by using this procedure, we have p roduced  the pre- 
scription X. In Gilberts terms, the people become a plu- 
ral subject. OI course, not any procedure will do. Only 
some procedures can plausibly be interpreted as the 
democratic  means oi wi 11 formation.
H aberm as w ou ld  in ali likelihood agree with Wein- 
berger on this issue, as both theorists share a procedural- 
istic conception of dem ocracy Hovvever, W einberger’s 
com plaint is against the role of consensus in H aberm as’ 
theory. O n one hand, the theory is too demanding: there 
is no assurance in real life that political discourses could 
approxim ate  the ideal consensus. W hat it produces is 
som ething like a reasonable com prom ise backed by a 
sullicient majority  Thus, a theory  that makes consen-
1 2
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s i i s  or general acceptability a necessary condition  of 
legitimacy is simply unrealistic. On the o ther hand, a 
consensus is never, not even in ideal conditions, a suf- 
ficient guarantee of tru th  or moral validity -  unless it is 
m ade as tautologically sufficient by defining the ideal 
conditions so that they imply tru th  or moral validity It 
may be possible to start from institutional premises simi- 
lar to those used by Weinberger and  to end up  with a 
m ore positive judgm ent. But certainly VVeinberger is 
correct in insisting that a philosophical theory  of de- 
mocracy should be based on the analysis of concrete 
institutions, and that there is no reason to suppose a 
quasi-automatic harm ony  between dem ocracy and in- 
dividual rights.
As the organizers oi the Jyväskylä m eeting and the 
editors oi this volume, we w ant to express o u r  grati- 
tude  to ali w ho have helped us in our  vvork. VVe want to 
thank  our partners, Tampere Institute of Social Research; 
the Department oi Philosophy, and the Faculty of Law 
at the University oi Turku; The Academy of Finland; 
The Otto Brusiin Foundation; and the Faculty of Social 
Sciences at the University of Jyväskylä, for their  finan- 
cial support.  VVe would  also like to thank  the repre- 
sentatives oi these institutions as individuals, particu- 
larly Professors Aulis Aarnio, Juhan i  Pietarinen, Hannu 
Tolonen, and Kauko W ickström , for their active co- 
operation; Ms. Sinikka Hakala for her superb  organisa- 
tional work; and the num erous  s tudents and  the mem- 
bers oi the Department of Social Sciences and Philoso­
phy for their help, attentive interest, and participation.
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I. Some puzzling features of social reality
N ow  w ith  ali tha t  by  way of in t ro d u c t io n ,  here is m y  
p rob lem . If you  look at o u r  social life it is a r em arkab le  
fact tha t  the re  is a class o f  en t i t ie s  th a t  have a ve ty  
im p o r ta n t  role in o u r  lives, b u t  they  on ly  are w h a t  they  
are, because  we believe tha t  tha t is w h a t  they  are. I will 
take an  obv ious  eco n o m ic  exam ple : I carry  a r o u n d  in 
m y  wallet these so rd id  bits of paper. A n d  they  are really 
no t very  im p o r ta n t  as physical ob jects ,  b u t  they m a tte r  
to us. They  are exam ples  of ‘m o n e y ’. N ow  here is m y  
puzzle: It is only  money, because  w e believe tha t  it is 
money, a n d  yet it is an  objective fact tha t  it is money. 
T hat is, w h e n  I go in to  a store a n d  I give them  on e  of 
these, they  d o n ’t say: “Weil, m aybe  y o u  th in k  it’s m o ­
ney, b u t  w h y  sh o u ld  we care w h a t  y o u  th in k ? ”. They  
accep t it as money. So, here  is the  initial lo rm u la t io n  oi 
my puzzle: H ow  can there be an  im p o r ta n t  an d  objective 
class of entit ies tha t only exist because  w e th in k  they  
exist?
1 believe that w h en  you  start a ph ilo soph ica l  investi- 
gat ion  you  have to start naively an d  I am  just go ing  
naively to teli you  som e ot the p u z z l in g  features a b o u t  
social an d  institutional reality Aiter h a v in g g o n e  th rough  
a stage of naivete we m ust b ecom e im m ense ly  soph is t i-  
ca te d  in g iving answ ers  lo ou t  puzzles. I have never  
lo u n d  the a lgo ri thm  for d ec id ing  w h e n  you  have to s top  
b e in g  d u m b  and  naive and  w h e n  you  start being  sm art  
a n d  soph is t ica ted .  We shall just play it by ear  as we go 
along. Anyway, here goes w ith  hali a do ze n  puzz l ing  
leatures  oi social reality.
P roblem  n u m b e r  one  is tha t  the re  is a k ind  of self- 
re fe ren t ia l i ty  in social c o n c e p t s .  S o m e th in g  is o n ly  
m o n e y  if w e believe it is money, a n d  it is on ly  property, 
m arriage,  g o v e rn m e n t ,  a cockta il  party, tenu re ,  a s u m ­
m er  vacat ion ,  if that s w ha t  we believe it is. But now, if
17
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money is partly defined as that w hich  is believed to be 
money, then ph ilosophers are going to get worried. If it 
has to be believed to be m oney in order to be money, 
what is the content of the belief? lt looks like you are 
going to have circularity or infmite regress, because il 
part of the ontology of money is believed to be money, 
then part of the definition of ‘m oney’ is believed to be 
money, and consequently  the beliel that som ething is 
money, has to be in part the beliel, that it s believed to 
be money. And that means, you are in trouble, because 
then the content of that beliel is that it is believed to be 
believed to be money, and  so on. So thats  the puzzle: 
how  do we avoid circularity or infinite regress in the 
definition oi ‘m oney’ il the concept has this self refer- 
ential com ponent?  And what goes for money, also goes 
tor property, marriage, government, and  ali sorts oi other 
social and  institutional phenom ena .
Now that leads to a second question, and  that is, 
what is the role oi language in the constitu tion  of social 
and institutional reality? It looks as if in the case oi 
these institutional p h en o m en a  language d o e sn ’t just 
describe a pre-existing reality, b u t  is partly constitutive 
of the reality that it describes. lt looks like the vocabu- 
lary of m oney and  governm ent and property and mar­
riage and football games and cocktail parties is partly 
constitutive oi the phenom ena. Otherwise, how do we 
account tor the differences between animals that are 
incapable of language and  consequently  incapable oi 
this sort of institutional ontology, and language-using 
animals like ourselves, where the words, in some sense 
we need to explain, seem to be partly constitutive of 
the social and institutional reality? Let me naii that down 
with an example. My dog Ludwig is very intelligent, 
but there are limits to his intelligence. Suppose 1 give 
him a pile ot dollar bills and 1 train h im  to bring  me a 
dollar bill whenever he wants to be led. Ali the same, 
he is not buying anything, an d  it s not really m oney to
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hiin. His b r ing ing  me the m o n e y  is n o t  an e c o n o m ic  
transac t ion .  W h y  not?
Let me naii d ow n  the p rob lem  abou t  self-referentiality 
a little m o re  closely as well. I said, i ts  o n ly  money, p rop-  
erty, m arr iage ,  g o v e rn m e n t  etc. if we th in k  that tha t  is 
w h a t  it is. This actually  has im p o r ta n t  consequences .  
S uppose ,  we dec ide we are go ing  to give a cockta il par ty  
a n d  we invite the w ho le  p o p u la t io n  ot W ilm ersdo rf ,  
a n d  w e have a hell of a great cocktail  party. But su p p o se  
th in g s  get ou t of h a n d  a n d  the casualty  rate is w orse  
th a n  the battle  of G ettysburg .  Ali the  sam e, its no t  a 
war. its  no t  a war, unless peop le  th in k  its a war. As 
long  as they  th in k  its  a cocktail party, th e n  its a cocktail  
party, i ts  ju s t  a hell of a cocktail party. This fea ture  of 
se lf-referentiality  is ac tually  of som e historical im por-  
tance. I have ahvays w o n d e re d ,  h o w  c o u ld  C ortez  w ith  
150 o r  so b ew ild e red  S pan ia rds  bea t the  entire  Aztec 
arm y? N ot to m e n t io n  Toltec, Mixtec, A ra n h u ac  an d  
o th e r  assem bled  tribes. Weil, part  ot the an sw e r  is, they 
had  a different def in i t ion  of w h a t  they  w ere  doing.  You 
see, the  Aztecs w ere fighting  a w ar  ac co rd in g  to the ir  
defin ition .  That m eans  you  get close e n o u g h  to an  en- 
em y  so th a t  you can  h o ld  hi m w i th o u t  b ru is ing  h im  
a n d  l a t e r  o n  y o u  sa c r i l ic e  h im  to  th e  G re a t  G o d  
Q u e tzacoa t l  by c u t t in g  ou t his living hear t  w ith an  ob- 
sid ian  knife on  the to p  oi a py ram id .  Weil, tha t  m ay he 
a great defin ition  ot w arfare for Central A m erican  tribes; 
bu t it is very  ineffective against E u ropeans  on  horses  
w ith  m etal w eapons .  So the sorts  of  p h e n o m e n a  I’m  
ta lk ing  a b o u t  actually  have historical conseq u e n ces .  It 
isn't ju s t  tha t  we are dea ling  w ith  ph ilo soph ica l  puz-  
zles.
So far I have covered two sources  of pu zz le m en t .  The 
cons t i tu t ive  role of language a n d  self-referentiality, A 
th i rd  re la ted  source  oi p u z z le m e n t  lor  me (and  th is  has 
a Special in te rest  to me) is the Special role of perfo rm a-  
tives in the  creation  oi social an d  in s t i tu tional  reality.
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For a very large number of institu tional facts you can 
create the (act just by saying you are creating it, pro- 
vided you have the appropriate authority in the appro- 
priate situation and the context is correct. So, you can 
adjourn the meeting by saying “ I adjourn the meeting” . 
You can declare war by saying “We declare war” . You 
can pronounce somebody husband and wife by saying 
“1 pronounce you husband and w ife” , and so 011 w ith a 
large number of cases. Now why is that? How can you 
create institutional reality just by saying you are creat­
ing it? You cannot do it w ith everything. You cannot 
score a goal in  football by saying AI score a goal” , or 
even “We hereby score a goal". So what is the differ- 
ence? YVhat is going on here?
Weil, I w ill give you a couple of more of these puz- 
zles and then we wi 11 start to try  to solve them. Another 
puzzling feature of social reality is the complex mterre- 
lations among the elements. They seem to be system- 
atic. So you don’t just have money, but in order to have 
money you have to have a system oi exchange, ovvner- 
ship, payment, debts and in general you have to have a 
system oi rights and obligations. It m ight seem that 
games are an exception because games are self-enclosed 
in a way that money and property and marriage are 
not. But even in the game you understand the position 
of a batter and the position of a pitcher only in terms ot 
understanding the notions oi rights and obligations. And 
that already involves you in more general social and 
institutional notions. So 1 am struck by the pervasive 
interlocking character of the kinds oi social and insti­
tutional phenomena that 111 be talking about.
There is one last puzzle 1 w ill mention. We could go 
on ali night iisting puzzles, but let’s settie for live. The 
lilth  puzzle that interests me is: though there exists a 
real institutional reality oi elections, wars, property ex- 
changes, stock markets and so on, nonetheless you can’t 
have an institutional reality w ithout an underlying brute
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physical reality. Here is an interesting fact. Money can 
lake a very large num ber  of forms. It can be in the form 
of gold or silver or paper or copper, it can be in the 
form of credit cards, and some primitive tribes use 
w am pum  or sea shells. By the way, rnost of your m oney 
underw ent a dramatic physical change in the past 10 
or 20 years that you d id n ’t even notice. It happened  in 
the mielelle oi the night. Most of your money is now  
representeel by magnetic traces on com pu te r  discs in 
banks, and it cloesn't make a bit of difference: You d id n ’t 
lose any sleep at ali over this, though  there was a revo- 
lutionary change in the physical representation of your 
money. Now, here is the point. Almost anything can be 
m oney bu t at some point it has to have some physical 
reality. There has to be som ething w hether it be gold or 
magnetic traces that counts or could count as money. 
YVhy is that? W hy is the physical necessary and why is 
there a primacy of the brute physical fact over the insti- 
tutional fact?
II. Conceptual tools necessary to 
account for social reality
Now we have a problem. Lets go to work to solve it. In 
order to solve it, 1 vvant to make another distinction 
tha t  1 have been p re su p p o s in g  and that 1 th in k  is 
absolutely essential for understanding  our position in 
the world.
There  are classes of objective facts in the World w h ich  
have to be d is t in g u ish e d  f rom  ce r ta in  o th e r  objective 
facts in the  lollowing regard. M any th ings  tha t  we th in k  
of as real nonethe less  only exist relative to observers ,  in 
the fo rm  of reality tha t  they have. We need  to d is t in -  
gu ish  those  features of the World tha t  we m ig h t  call 
‘o b se rv e r - in d e p e n d e n t ’ from  those  features tha t  are ob-
2 1
J o h n  R. S earle
server dependent. Observer independen t features are 
those that, so to speak, d o n t  give a dam n  about hum an  
observers, and here 1 am  th ink ing  ot things like m oun- 
tains and  molecules and  galaxies and processes like 
photosynthesis and mitosis and meiosis. Ali oi those 
phenom ena  are observer-independent . But in addition 
to them, there are lots oi o ther phenom ena  in the World 
whose exislence depends  on  being treated or regarded 
in a certain way by h u m a n  agents. Observer dependen t 
phenom ena  w ould  include such things as chairs and 
tables and glasses and m oney and  property and mar- 
riage. So, we need a general distinction between those 
phenom ena  that are observer-independent and those 
\vhose existence is observer-relative.
Typically an observer-relative entity will have both 
sorts of features. So this object, w hich  I carry a round  in 
my pocket, has a certain weight and that it has the weight 
that it has is observer-independent. It doesiVt depend  
on me or anyone else, it depends  on the gravitational 
reiätlons between the object and the center of the earth. 
But this object is also a Swiss arm y knife and  the fea­
ture of being a Swiss army knife is observer-relative. So 
we need a general distinction between those p h e n o m ­
ena that are observer-independent and those that are 
observer-relative. Typically the natural Sciences deal with 
phenom ena that are observer-independent, phenom ena  
like m o u n ta in sa n d  molecules and tectonic plates. Typi­
cally the social Sciences such as economics, sociology, 
and  political science, deal with phenom ena  that are 
observer-relative. And here 1 am th inking  of such things 
as political parties, elections, social classes and money. 
The question  for this evening we can now state a little 
bit more precisely: we are discussing the ontology oi a 
certain class oi observer-relative social and institutional 
reality. For the analysis oi this social reality 1 need ex- 
actly three devices, three tools to try to analyze that 
ontology.
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Here is the  first one. VVe need  to call a t ten t io n  to the 
class of en t it ies  to w h ich  we have ass igned  functions.  
Many of the tnost c o m m o n  co n c ep ts  tha t  we use in deal- 
ing  w ith  the  w orld ,  for ex am ple  co n c e p ts  Itke “ca rs” 
an d  “b a t h tu b s ” a n d  “tables” an d  “ch a i r s” a n d  “h o u se s”, 
involve the  a s s ignm en t  of function .  It is a rem arkab le  
capacity  th a t  h u m a n s  an d  ce r ta in  an im als  have, tha t  
they can assign functions  to objects ,  w h e re  the ob ject 
does no t  have tha t  function  in d e p e n d e n t ly  of the as ­
s ignm ent.  A nd  I w an t to m ake  a s t rong  c la im  a h o u t  this 
a s s ig n m e n t  of function .  I w a n t  to say: Ali functions  are 
observer-rela tive . It is only relative to agen ts ,  on ly  rela- 
tive to obse rve rs  that so m e th in g  can be said to have a 
certain  function .
We are b l in d e d  to this fact by  the  prac tice  in bio logy 
oi ta lk ing  a b o u t  lunc t ions  in te rch an g eab ly  vvith ta lk ing  
ab o u t  causa tion .  But there  is a sub tle  difference. We do  
indeed  d iscover  such  facts as the fact tha t  the func tion  
oi the h ea r t  is to p u m p  b lood . VVe d o  indeed  discover, 
that the fu n c t io n  oi the ves t ibu la r  o cu la r  reflex is to 
stabilize the  retinal image. But we d iscover  those  fu n c ­
tions on ly  against the b a c k g ro u n d  p re s u p p o s i t io n  of 
certa in  no rm s .  VVe have to a s sum e tha t  life a n d  survival 
have a value, an d  it is against the  p re su p p o s i t io n  of the 
no rm , aga ins t  the a s su m p tio n  tha t  life an d  survival a n d  
r ep ro d u c t io n  are valuable , tha t we can  say such  th ings  
as that the  func t ion  of the hear t  is to p u m p  b lood . If we 
though t th a t  life an d  survival w ere  w orth less ,  tha t  the 
only th in g  tha t  really m a tte red  was d e a th  a n d  ex tinc-  
tion, then  h ea r ts  w o u ld  he d ysfunc t iona l ,  an d  cance r  
w ou ld  have a uselul function ,  it w o u ld  has ten  extinc-  
tion. VVe d o n ’t th in k  these th ings  a n d  it is crucial to ou t 
ass ignm en ts  of func tion  that we d o n ’t. But it is on ly  
a g a in s t  th e  b a c k g r o u n d  oi th e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  o f  
normativity, tha t we can  d iscover  su c h  facts as the fact 
that the func tion  of the hear t  is to p u m p  blood.
One w ay  to pu t  this  po in t  is to ask: w h a t  is the differ-
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ence b e tw e e n  saying tha t  the hea r t  causes the  p u m p in g  
of b lo o d ,  o n  the one  h a n d ,  a n d  say ing  tha t  the function 
of the  hear t  is to p u m p  b lood ,  on  the  other. A n d  it seems 
to m e the re  is a cruc ia l  d is t in c t io n ,  b ecause  once  you 
i n t r o d u c e  th e  n o t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n  y o u  i n t r o d u c e  
normativ ity . O nce  you  in t ro d u c e  the  n o t io n  of fu n c ­
tion ,  y o u  ca n  taik a b o u t  such  th in g s  as h ea r t  disease, 
m a lfu n c t io n in g  hearts ,  h ea r ts  tha t  func tion  b e t te r  th a n  
o th e r  hear ts .  N otice ,  w e d o n ’t ta ik  a b o u t  b e t te r  and  
w orse  Stones, un less  w e assign a fu n c t io n  to the  stone. 
lf yo u  th in k  this  s tone  will m a k e  a g o o d  pro jec tile ,  then  
you  can  evaluate  it. You ca n  say th is  one  is b e t te r  than  
that one.  O r  if y o u  assign it an  es the t ic  fu n c t io n  you  
can  say th is  s tone  is an o lje t d ’art trouve, a n d  w ith  such  
an ass ig n m e n t  of fu n c t io n ,  y o u  m ay  th in k  the  s tone  has 
so m e artistic value. So th a t ’s the  first po in t ,  we assign 
fu n c t io n s  a n d  ali fu nc t ions  are Observer relative. The 
s e co n d  n o t io n  1 neecl is tha t  of coflective intentionality. 
Ali g en u in e ly  social b e h a v io r  co n ta in s  collective in ten- 
tiona lity  o n  the par t  of the  pa r t ic ipan ts .  You c a n  see the 
ce n tra l i ty  o f  collec tive  in te n t io n a l i ty  it y o u  c o n t ra s t  
g e n u in e  c o o p e ra t iv e  b e h a v io r  f ro m  b e h a v io r  w h ic h  
m ere ly  h a p p e n s  to be co -o rd in a ted  w ith  o th e r  behavior.  
S u p p o se  for exam ple  tha t  we are p lay ing  in a S ym phony  
orches tra .  S uppose  I a m  p lay ing  the  violin  p a r t  a n d  you  
are s ing ing  the s o p ra n o  part,  a n d  to g e th e r  w e are pa r t  
oi the  p e r fo rm an ce  oi B eethovens  9 th  S ym phony. We 
have to be able to m a k e  the  d is t in c t io n  betvveen me 
saw ing  aw ay  on the  v iolin  a n d  you  in d e p e n d e n t ly  bu t  
by  c h a n c e  s im u l ta n e o u s ly  s in g in g  “F re u d e ,  s c h ö n e r  
G ö t te r lu n k e n ”, a n d  us d o in g  th is  in ten t io n a l ly  toge ther  
in concer t .  So a basic on to log ica l  laet a b o u t  social a n d  
collective b eh a v io r  seem s to be collective o r  sh a re d  in ­
ten t iona l i ty  in  the  fo rm  of collective beliefs, des ires  an d  
in ten t ions .  But in m y in te l lectual  t rad i t io n  th e  exist- 
ence  ot collective in ten t iona l i ty  crea tes  a real p ro b lem . 
lf ali the  in ten tiona li ty  1 have, is in  m y  h ead ,  a n d  ali the
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in te n t io n a l i ty  you  have is in y o u r  h ead ,  h o w  can there  
b e  su c h  a th in g  as collective in ten tiona li ty?  T here  are a 
lo t of in g e n io u s  efforts to  try  to solve th is  p rob lem  in 
ph ilosophy . Basically they  try to do  it by r e d u c in g  co l­
lective in ten tiona li ty  to ind iv idual  o r  s ingu lar  in te n t io n ­
al i ty  T hey  try to reduce  w e- in te n d ,  we-believe etc. to I- 
in te n d  p lus  I-believe tha t  yo u  have su c h  a n d  su c h  an  
in te n t io n .  A nd  then  on  y o u r  par t  it is 1- in tend p lu s  1- 
believe th a t  you  have su c h  a n d  such  an  in ten tion .  O n  
th e  v iew th a t  I am  o p p o s e d  to, the  a s s u m p t io n  is, We- 
m te n t io n a l i ty  m us t  reduce  to 1-intentionality. C ollec­
tive in ten t iona l i ty  m us t  red u c e  to ind iv idual  in te n t io n ­
ality. Othervvise you  w o u ld  have v io la ted  the “p r inc ip le  
of m ethodo log ica l  in d iv id u a l i sm ”. If y o u  say tha t  c o l ­
lective in ten t iona l i ty  is p r im itive ,  then  it seem s you  are 
in very  b a d  com pany. It seem s tha t  you  are pos tu la t ing  
so m e  k in d  of  Hegelian  W eltgeist tha t  is f loating  a ro u n d  
o ve rh e ad ,  or  so m e th in g  lilce that. W h e re  1 live you  d o n ’t 
w a n t  to be c a u g h t  d o in g  tha t ,  o the rw ise  y o u ’11 lose a lot 
of friends. G iven tha t  puzz le  -  h o w  can there  be  co l lec­
tive in tentionality , w h e n  ali in ten tiona li ty  is ind iv idual?  
-  it looks  like we have to red u c e  collective in te n t io n a l­
ity to ind iv idua l  in tentionality . An e n o r tn o u s  a m o u n t  
o f  in te l lec tual  e f f o rt has been  sp e n t ,  in my view w asted ,  
t ry in g  to d o  that.  The analysis  tha t  co m es  o u t  involves 
s o m e th in g  called “m u tua l  belief”.
For exam ple ,  co n s id e r  a case w h ere  we are p u s h in g  a 
ca r  to g e th e r  to try to get it s tarted .  N ow  tha t  is a case of 
collective intentionality. So h o w  is th a t  su p p o s e d  to be 
ana lyzed?  The  idea is this. W h e n  we are p u sh in g  the 
ca r  toge ther ,  th e n  1 in te n d  to p u sh  the  car  a n d  yo u  in- 
t e n d  to p u sh  the car. A nd I believe th a t  y ou  believe tha t  
1 in te n d ,  a n d  1 believe that you  believe tha t  1 believe 
th a t  you  believe that I in te n d  a n d  so on  u p  in an  infi- 
n ite hierarchy.
A nd  for you  it is the sam e. I ts  “1 believe th a t  you  
be l ieve ,” etc. on  up. N o w  1 th in k  m y  p o o r  bra in  will
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not carry thai many beliefs and 1 want to suggest there 
is a very simple way out of this puzzle. The puzzle is, 
assuming that ali intentionality is in the heads of ind i- 
vidual human and animal agents, how can it be the 
case that it s ali in our individua l brains, if  it is irreduc- 
ibly collective? And the answer is, that we can have 
intentionality in your brain and my brain, which is in 
the form oi the lirst person plural as much as we can 
have it in the form oi the first person singular.
On my view there is a triv ia l notational solution to 
the puzzle. The irreducible form of the intentionality 
in my head, when we are doing something collectively 
is, ‘we intend’. And 1 don’t have to reduce that to an ‘1 
intend’ and a set of mutual beliefs. On the contrary, 1 
have the ‘1-intends’ that 1 do have, precisely because I 
have an irreducible we-intend. To naii that down to 
cases, I am indeed playing the v io lin  and you are sing- 
ing the soprano part, but 1 am only doing what 1 am 
doing and you are doing what you are doing, because 
we together are collectively playing the chorale move- 
ment of Beethoven s 9th Symphony. 1 hope everybody 
sees that point.
As 1 said, the problem 1 am discussing has a tradi- 
tional name. lt ’s called “the problem oi methodological 
individualism ” . And the assumption has always been: 
either you reduce collective intentionality to the lirst 
person singular, to ‘1 intend’, or else you have to postu- 
late a collective World spirit and ali sorts oi other per- 
fectly dreadful metaphysical excrescences. But 1 reject 
the assumption that in order to have ali my intentional­
ity in my head, it must be expressible in the first person 
singular torm. 1 have a great deal oi intentionality, which 
is in the lirst person plural.
Nothing comes w ithout a price and we do pay a price 
for the solution that I am proposing to this puzzle. The 
price is this. It turns out that 1 can be mistaken, not 
only in what is happening in the World, but 1 can be
2 6
S o c i a l  o n t o l o g y  a n d  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  s o c i e t y
mistaken about the very mental State that I have. That 
violates the Cartesian assum ption that we cannot he 
mistaken about ou t  intentions. But I th ink  that is the 
right way to think of it. Suppose in the case vvhere we 
are pushing the car 1 discover that you w eren’t in fact 
pushing? You were just going along for a ride, l was 
doing ali the pushing. Weil, then I was not only mis­
taken in one of my beliefs, bu t it tu rns  out that in a way 
1 also was mistaken about what I was doing. I thought 
l was pushing as part oi our pushing  and  in fact thats 
not w hat was happening. I was doing ali the pushing, 
you were just pretending. So that is a price that we 
have to pay. You can be mistaken about the nature  oi 
the activity you are engaged in, if you have an assum p­
tion about the collective intentionality, which is not 
shared by your apparent cooperators. But that seems to 
be the situation we are in real life.
The third tool is this. Years ago, w hen  1 first started 
working on speech acts 1 made a distinction between 
brute facts and institutional facts. Those lacts that 1 said 
were ‘institutional lacts’ presuppose a hu m an  institu­
tion for their existence, for example such lacts as that 
som ebody  is checkm ated  in chess, or som ebody  is 
elected President oi the United States. 1 wanted to dis- 
tinguish those lacts, which are called institutional (acts, 
from ‘brute facts’ whose existence does not require a 
hum an institution, the fact, for example, that the earth 
is 93 million miles away from the sun. You need an 
institution in order to state or describe that brute laet; 
you need the institution of language and  the institution 
of measurement in mileage, e.g. French and kilometers, 
to describe it that way and you could state the same 
brute fact using different institutions. But the point l’m 
m aking is, the fact of distance betw een the earth and 
the sun does not depend on a hum an  institution, though 
of course you have to have institutions in order to d e ­
scribe or state the fact. Now here is the point. There is
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a class of lacts that are insiitutional facts and  another 
class of facts thai are ‘brute  facts’, because they cfo not 
require hum an institutions. And then, the question is, 
how  are institutional facts possible?
1 also made the claim that you need a distinction 
between two kinds of rules. One sort of rule regulates 
antecedently existing forms of behavior. A nother sort 
of rule doesiTt ju s t  regulate antecedently  existing forms 
of behavior, but creates the possibility of new forms of 
behavior. 1 call the difference between these two sorts 
of rules -  using a Kantian terminology here -  ‘regula- 
tive’ rules, that regulate antecedently existing forms of 
behavior, and ‘constitu tive’ rules that constitute new 
forms of behavior. Examples are obvious: The rule “drive 
on the right hand  side oi the road” doesn ’t create the 
possibility of driving. Driving can exist w ithout that 
rule. That is a rule to regulate the already existing ac- 
tivity of driving. But the rules of chess are no t like that. 
It w asn ’t the case that there were a loi oi people push- 
ing bits of wood a round  on boards and som ebody said: 
“Look fellows, we have to gel some rules so we d o n ’t 
keep bashing into each other. You slay on the right with 
your knight and 1 go on the left w ith  my bishop!” Rather 
the rules oi chess are constitutive in the sense that they 
create the possibility of the activity in question. Playing 
chess is constituted by acting in accordance with at least 
a certain large subset of the rules of chess.
Novv here is the bo ttom  line of this discussion. Those 
rules have a typical form. The form is ‘X counts  as Y’ or 
‘X counts  as Y in context C’. That is, such and such a 
move counts  as a ‘legal kn ight-m ove’. Such and such a 
position counts  as “you being in check’. Such and such 
a position counts as ‘checkm ate’, and checkmate counts 
as ‘w inn ing ’ or lo s in g  the game. And w hat goes for 
chess goes for m uch  more elaborate institutions: such 
and such noises coun t as ‘making a prom ise’, such and 
such m arks on the paper count as ‘voting’ in an elec-
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tion , such and such num ber  votes counts as ‘vvinning’ 
an election, and so on with a large n u m b er  of institu- 
tional structures.
III. Status functions
We now  have three tools to solve our problems. These 
are, first, the assignment o( lunction, second, collective 
intentionality, and, third, constitutive rules, rules of the 
form ‘X counts as Y\ W ith ali this apparatus assembled, 
lets go to vvork. I will now try to put it ali together. I 
w ant you to imagine a simple com m unity  of (lets call 
them ) hominids, beasts more or less like ourselves. Now 
it s very easy to imagine that such organism s, such 
primates can assign functions to objects. 11 s easy to 
imagine that they use a stick to dig with, or they use a 
s tum p  to sit on. They can assign a function of being a 
digging tool or a stool to sit on. But novv it s not a big 
step to imagine that they do  that collectively. That 
collectively they have a very big stick that they use as a 
lever, or they have a big log that they use as a bench  to 
sit on  collectively. So its very easy to tie collective 
intentionality to the assignment oi function.
But novv 1 want you to imagine the next step: Imagine 
-  to take an example -  our group oi hominids live in a 
series oi huts, and they build a wall arounci the huts. 
Imagine that they build a wall to keep intruders out and 
to keep their own members in. And novv this is a case oi 
the collective assignment oi lunction, vvhere the func­
tion is performed in virtue of the physics of the ohjeet on 
vvhich the lunction is assigned. We just assume the vvall 
is too big to climb over easily. But novv imagine that the 
vvall gradually decays to the point, vvhere it is no longer 
able to keep the members ot the com m unity in, in virtue 
of its physical structure, nor to keep intruders out in 
virtue of its physical structure. But novv lets suppose that,
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out of habit or whatever, the people involved continue 
to recognize the wall as a boundary  -  i.e. they continue 
to acknowledge or accept that you are not supposed to 
cross the boundary. It is important to notice the vocabu- 
lary we use of ‘acknowledge’, ‘accept’, and ‘recognize’. 
That is we imagine that the wall continues to servre its 
function, but no longer in virtue of its physical struc- 
ture. It serves its function in virtue oi the fact that it has 
a certain recognized status.
Now I wanted that to sound  innocent, bu t 1 think 
that the move I just described is the basic move by which 
we create institutional reality of a specifically hum an 
sort. W hat happened  vvas this. We imagine that an en- 
tity is used to perform a function, but it cannot per- 
form the function in virtue of its physical structure. It 
can only perform the function in virtue of the collec- 
tive recognition or acceptance oi the entity in question 
as having that function.
And 1 want to say that is the underly ing  idea behind 
‘X counts  as Y\ This line of Stones, which  is ali that is 
left of the wall, now counts as a boundary. It now has a 
deontic status, it now  has a form of power, which it 
exercises not in virtue of its physical structure, but in 
virtue of the assignment of function.
And I want to introduce a name for this sort of func­
tion -  lets call these “status functions”. A status func­
tion is a function that an entity performs not in virtue 
of its physical structure alone, bu t in virtue oi the col- 
lective imposition or recognition of the entity in ques­
tion as having a certain status, and  with that status a 
function. And the structure of that - logically speaking 
-  is the collective im position  of a function of the form 
‘this entity X counts as having this status and therefore 
this function as Y in this context C ’. Now, Tm making a 
s trong claim: this little device is the foundation stone 
of ali institutional reality. So lets go to w ork  and ex- 
plain that claim
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I w an t to extend this account to the case of money. 
And just to naii it down to historical examples I want to 
taik briefly about the evolution of paper currency in 
Medieval Europe. (1 love the Middle Ages, because it is, 
in a sense, the childhood of our  civilization. In M edi­
eval Europe, you see institutional forms that are grow- 
ing an d  decaying, and the development of paper money 
is a very good example.) Initially people carried around 
gold and  Silver coins and the use of gold and Silver was 
a form of barter. It was a form of barter, because the 
value of the coin was exactly equal to the value of the 
gold or silver contained in the coin, and  the valuable 
coin was exchanged for other things. Now  if you look 
in the text books they teli us, there are three kinds of 
m oney  There is ‘com m odity m oney’, there is ‘contract 
m oney’ and there is l ia t  m oney’. But w hat they d o n ’t 
teli you is, w hat’s the relation between them? The ini- 
tial case we are talking about, where people actually 
had gold and silver, is a case of com m odity  money. Bar­
ter in gold and silver is both dangerous and inefficient, 
so people lound they could leave the gold and silver 
with  a group of people who w orked on benches, and 
they were called “bankers”, and the bankers would give 
them bits of paper on which it was said “we will pay 
the bearer of this note a piece of gold on d em an d ”.
With the introduction of the bits of paper we have 
now moved from commodity money to contract money, 
because the hit of paper is a contract to pay in gold or 
silver on demand. Later some genius discovered that you 
can actually increase the supply of money in circulation 
if you are out more bits of paper than you actually have 
gold in the bank. And as long as not everybody runs to 
the bank at once, it works. The bits of paper are still as 
good as gold. Much later on some genius discovered -  
and it took a long tirne to make this discovery: you can 
forget about the gold, and just have the paper. And that’s 
the situation we are in now. We moved from commodity
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money, which is barter, to contract money, to f iät money. 
If you look at these bits ot paper that I was waving around 
earlier, they seem to me good examples ot the form ‘X 
counts as Y’, that is such and such bits oi paper count as 
“currency”. As it says on the piece oi paper that hm hold­
ing here, “This note is legal tender for ali debts public 
and private”. It counts as money in the United States. 
But that it counts as money, is a matter oi collective ac- 
ceptance of the status function in accordance with the 
structure: ‘Such and such counts as so and so\ These bits 
of paper count as legal currency in the United States, just 
as some other bits of paper count as legal currency in an 
other country.
Novv notice, that once you have got that structure ‘X 
counts as Y’, then automatically certain torms oi abuse 
become possible. Il I go in my basem ent and produce a 
lot oi things that look like these bits of paper, I will be 
p roduc ing  counterfeit money. Thus m oney  isn’t just 
anything that looks like this but it has to be issued by 
the Bureau oi Engraving and Printing un d er  the au- 
thority oi the Treasury. So one form oi abuse is counter- 
feiting. The structure automatically m akes it possible 
to have abuses, because you can present som eth ing  as 
satisfying the X term even il it d o esn ’t in fact, and thats  
counterleit. Another form oi abuse is if you get too many 
oi the entities in question. Then you have inllation and 
in hyper-inflation the entities are no longer able to func­
tion as money. And what goes for money, goes for o ther 
lorms oi social institutions. You can have counterleit 
lavvyers and  counterfeit doctors, that is, people w ho 
d o n ’t actually satisfy the conditions, bu t w ho  masquer- 
ade as lawyers and doctors. 1 d o n ’t know  how  elsewhere, 
but in the State of Calitornia we novv have so many 
lavvyers that there is a k ind of inllation.
Novv here is a puzzling question. II 1 am correct in 
describing the logical structure of status functions, il it 
is just a matter of im posing a status and  vvith it a lunc-
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tion, then how can the system be so powerful? How 
can these structures have such an enorm ous effect on 
our  lives, when, as 1 have described it, il ali seems so 
fragile? There are two parts to the ansvver to that. One 
is this: the structure can be iterated indefinitely Let me 
give an example. 1 tnake noises th rough  my m outh, I 
just emit this acoustic blast. But these count as sen- 
tences oi English. And in a certain context making noises 
of that sort, uttering those sentences of English, counts 
as making a promise. Making that kind oi promise in 
that k ind  oi context counts as m aking  a contract. No- 
tice how we are going up in the hierarchy. The X-term 
at one level will have been the Y-term at an earlier level 
and you keep going with it. Making that sort of co n ­
tract, counts as getting married. And in the State of 
Calilornia once you get m arried , ali k inds of things 
happen. You are entitled spousal benefits, income tax 
deductions, ali sorts oi rights concerning property, taxes, 
and  so on. So you get an indefinite iteration.
The seconcl point is that you get interlocking s truc­
tures. I d o n ’t just have money, but I have money in my 
bank account at the Bank of America, which is put there 
by my employer, the State of Calilornia and which 1 
use to pay my debts to the Pacific Gas and Electric C om ­
pany as well as my federal, State and  local taxes. Now, 
just about every word I uttered in that litany was an 
institutional notion. We are talking about interlocking 
institutional facts. The whole point oi the institutional 
is often to structure the brute. For example, recently 1 
went and stood in front oi a wom an at a counter. 1 made 
noises and she made noises, 1 gave her a plastic card, 
she gave me sheets oi paper, and the next thing is 1 was 
on an airplane on my way to Europe. The m ovem enl oi 
my body  was a brute fact. My body  moved from Cali- 
fornia to Europe. But the institutional tacts made the 
brute fact possible. VVe are talking about a structure 
whose point is nol just to em pow er o ther institutional
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structures, but to control brute  reality.
However, the structure is also fairly fragile and  the 
atnazing thing is how rapidly lt can collapse. I will never 
forget the m om ent,  w hen  1 saw the people climbing 
over the Berlin wall on  television, lt was an amazing 
m om ent, because 1 was ot a generation that thought 
the tw o-pow er division oi the World w ould  go on  in- 
definitely. But there came a point, w hen  the system oi 
institutional reality was simply no longer acceptable and 
it just collapsed quite suddenly. So you can have a col­
lapse of the institutional s tructure, il it’s no longer ac- 
cepted, and you can have a decay oi the institutional 
s tructure of the sort that I have been describing.
IV Solutions to the puzzles
We have a couple of minutes left, so 1 am going to show 
you how  we solve these puzzles 1 began with. First, 
hovv can there be seif-referentiality w ithout circularity 
or infinite regress? Weil, the answer is, you d o n ’t have 
to use the word “m oney” in order to define money. The 
word “m oney” functions as a sum m ary term or as a place 
holder for be inga  medium  of exchange, a store of value, 
a payment for Services rendered, a measure of value of 
o ther currencies and so on. And if som ething peiiorm s 
ali of those functions, then it’s m oney  So we do not 
have a vicious circularity or infinite regress. II 1 say in 
order for som ething to be money, people have to believe 
that it’s money, there is no circularity because they can 
have that beliel w ithout having the word “m oney”. The 
word “m oney” here just is a place holder for a large 
n u m b er  oi other functional expressions.
Now, w hat about our  second and  th ird  points, the 
role of language and  especially performatives, how can 
performatives create institutional reality? And the an- 
swer to that is, that where the X-term is itsell a speech-
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act, then typically you can create the reality by per- 
forming that speech-act. So you can make som ebody 
h u sb an d  and wife by saying “I p ronounce you husband  
and wife”, or you can find som ebody guilty in a court if 
you are a judge by saying “I iind you guilty as charged”. 
And the creation of the institutional fact need not even 
take the performative form. It says on this 20 dollar bill 
“This note is legal tender for ali debts public and pri- 
vate”. Now, 1 am an epistemologist and my natural worry 
is “how  do you know?”, and  I want to write to the Treas- 
u ry  and  say “How do you guys really know  that it s 
legal tender? Have you done a survey, have you done 
an empirical study?” And the answer is, it isn’t an em- 
pirical claim. They make it legal tender by declaring 
that it s legal tender.
O u r  next point -  and this is the most im portant -  is 
the constitutive role of language. YVhy is language con- 
stitutive of institutional reality, in a way that it is not 
constitutive ot o ther forms oi reality? YVhy is it that 
money and property and marriage and governm ent re- 
quire a vocabulary in a vvay that tectonic plates and 
gravitational attraction and  galaxies do not require a 
vocabulary tor their existence? That is in fact a very 
hard question to answer and  1 spent a whole chapter on 
it in the book on which this lecture is based, but now 1 
wi 11 just summarize the answer in one sentence: lor in­
stitutional facts there has to be some form of sym bol­
isin because there isn’t anything else to m ark the transi- 
tion from X to Y. We just count the X term as having a 
Y status. But if \ve so count it, there must be some vvay 
to represent that counting feature. My dog can see som e­
body cross the line while carrying a hali, but can’t see 
him  score a ‘touch d o w n ’. YVhy not? Because in order 
to see him score touch dow n you have to have some 
way to represent the extra status function and that re- 
quires language.
Now you might ask “well why do you need words?”
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And the answer is in some cases you do not. Suppose 
we kept score in a soccer m atch by piling up  Stones. I 
score a goal so 1 get a white Stone to put on my side and 
you score a goal so you pu t a white Stone on your side, 
and these are points. 1 got a point and you got a point. 
But now  here is the ‘p o in t’: These Stones now play a 
linguistic role. They are now  symbolic. They now play 
the role oi symbolizing scoring in the game. So the lan- 
guage or some other symbolismi has to be constitutive 
because there isn’t an independen t ontology. The move 
from X to Y is itself a symbolizing linguistic move and 
there has to be some way for us to represent lt, other- 
vvise it doesn’t function.
Weil, ou r  last questions had to do with systematic 
relations oi institutional reality and also with the prior- 
ity of the brute over the institutional facts. The answer 
to the first of these questions is this: The reason we 
have ali this institutional ontology is to organize and 
regulate our  lives. So there has to be a set of interlock- 
ing institutions. W hat 1 haven’t had time to teli you is, 
ali of this at bottom  is about power. We are talking about 
how  society organizes power relations. lt normally does 
it through the institution of status functions. Somebody 
is the boss and  som ebody else an employee, som ebody 
is an elected president, som ebody is deleated and  so 
on. And ali of this is designed precisely to intersect with 
o ther elements of the society. So, in order to have money 
you have to have a system of rights and obligations. 
You have to have the ability to buy and to sell, to store 
value in the form of money, to receive money as pay- 
m en t for Services rendered. So, that is the reason for 
the in terlocking complexity. That s what we have the 
system for. lt is designed and has developed to enable 
people to cope in complex social groups, in pow er re ­
lations .
The final question was, why is there this priority of 
brute facts over institutional facts? And the ansvver to
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th a t  is, because  the iteratecl s t ru c tu re  o f ‘X c o u n t s  as Y’ 
has to b o t to m  ou t somevvhere. For in s tance ,  m y  m ak-  
ing  a co n t ra c t  can  be der ived  from my s ign ing  m y  nam e,  
an d  m y  s ign ing  my n am e can  be a m a t te r  of ce r ta in  
w o rd s  b e in g  vvritten on  a page. But th e n  you  reach the  
p o in t  w h e re  there  isn ’t any  m o re  ‘X c o u n ts  as Y\ You 
just have the  b ru te  laet, e.g. the  m a rk s  o n  the page, as 
X -term . So inst i tu t ional  reality of o w n e r s h ip  a n d  obli-  
ga t ions  is built  on  top  of  physical reality, it has  to b o t ­
to m  ou t in physical rea lity
Novv to con c lu d e ,  I said I w o u ld  like us  to t h in k  of 
the possib ili ty  ot crea ting  a p h i lo so p h y  o f  Society, w here  
o u r  first task  w o u ld  be to get an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  of s o ­
cial o n to lo g y  11 we got tha t ,  then ,  I th in k ,  it w o u ld  give 
different east to o u r  political a n d  social theories .  1 th in k  
tha t polit ical p h i lo so p h y  in the W est co n ta in s  a large 
fantasy  e lem e n t  a b o u t  h o w  we m a k e  social c o n t ra c ts  
w ith  each  o th e r  an d  a b o u t  vvhen peop le  can v iolate o r  
n o t  violate the social con trac t .  But in real life it i s n ’t like 
that,  in real life it s a m a tte r  of ac ce p t in g  o r  rejecting ,  o r  
fu r th e r in g  o r  f ighting aga inst  in s t i tu t ional  reality. A n d  
one  way to create in s t i tu t iona l  reality often is to act as if 
it a l ready  existed. This is h o w  the  U n i te d  S tates was 
crea ted .  T here  was no w ay  that a g r o u p  of p eop le  c o u ld  
get to g e th e r  in P h ilade lph ia ,  ali of th e m  sub jec ts  o f  the 
British C r o w n  in a British C ro w n  C o lony  a n d  dec la re  
th em se lves  to be an in d e p e n d e n t  na t ion .  T here  was no 
in s t i tu tiona l  s t ru c tu re  to enab le  th e m  to do  that.  Weil 
they  just d id  it. They  d id  it an d  they  got aw ay w i th  it. It 
h e lp ed  tha t  they  h ad  an a rm y  a n d  h a d  the  s u p p o r t  of 
the  F re n c h  an d  so on. But you  can  do  th is  if you  can  get 
aw ay  w ith  it. You can create  an in s t i tu t ional  reality just 
by  ac ting  as if it a lready  existed.
O ne  last th o u g h t  I w a n t  to leave you  w ith  a n d  th a ts  
this. In o rd e r  to a r ticula te  th is  l have m a d e  it look  m u c h  
m ore  co n s c io u s  than  it really is. Most of these  th ings  
dev e lo p  q u i te  unconsciously , a n d  in d e ed  peop le  typi-
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cally are not even aware of the structure  of institutional 
reality. It often works best when they have false beliefs 
about it. So there are a lot of people in the United States, 
\vho still believe that a dollar is only really money be- 
cause it is backed by ali that gold in Fort Knox. It s the 
gold in Fort Knox that makes the dollar money. This is 
a total fantasy, oi course. The gold has noth ing  to do 
with it. And people hold o ther false beliefs. They be ­
lieve som eone is king only because he is divinely in- 
spired, or they believe that marriages have to be made 
by God in heaven, and  so on. 1 am not trying to dis- 
courage them in these beliefs because often the institu­
tion (unctions best when  people hold false beliefs about 
it But I th ink  as philosophers we must, as a first step in 
unders tand ing  social reality, and as our  first step in cre- 
ating a philosophy oi Society, unders tand  the basic on- 
tology of social reality.
Note
1 A version of this text has appeared in A n a l y s e  &  K r i t i k  20 
(2/1998), pp. 143-158. Reprinted by permission.
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SOCIAL RULES AS PLURAL 
SUBJECT PHENOMENA
s we shall see, investigation of the nature of social
rules is a good way into some deep questions about 
social reality. These questions have to do with what one 
might call the b a sic  s tr u c tu re  of the social world. It is 
generally agreed that social rules are pervasive and con- 
sequential social phenomena.1 What, though, is a so­
cial rule? I take it that a so c ia l ru le  is th e  ru le  o f  a socia l 
g r o u p .2 Precisely what this amounts to, according to our 
everyday understanding, is the topic of this article.
Perhaps the most famous account of social rules to 
date is that proposed by the late K. L. A. Hart in his 
classic work T h e  C o n c e p t o f L a w .3According to Hart, 
social rules underlieone of the most important and clis- 
tinctive of human institutions, the institution of law.4
Hart s account of social rules is a rich one, incorpo- 
rating a variety of feature s h In this paper 1 first revievv 
Hart’s account of social rules. 1 then articulate three sig- 
nificant problems for it. Finally I sketch an alternative 
account that avoids the problems. This account involves 
a kind of hölisin that is lacking in Harts and related 
accounts.6
I. Introduction
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II. Hart on social rules
a. H a r t’s discussion
Hart asks: ‘What is the difference between saying oi a 
group that they have the habit, e.g. oi going to the ein­
einä on Saturday nights, and saying that it is the rule 
with them that the male head is to he bared on entering 
a church?’. 7 He goes on to describe a variety of fea- 
tures that he suggests must be present when there is a 
social rule. He can be construed as proposing at least a 
partial analysis of ‘the statement that a group has a cer- 
tain rule’ in common parlance.8
In his discussion of the nature of social rules in gen­
eral Hart focuses on rules of a particular and central 
type, and l shall do so as well. First, such rules are 
p re s c r ip t iv e .  That is, they can be formulated in terms of 
what is ‘to be done’. Second, they are basic  or p r i m a r y  
at least in the sense that they do not exist by virtue of 
the operation of any special rule-generating rules such 
as ‘We are to do vvhatever Rex tells us to do’.
Hart s discussion is relatively mformal. For present 
purposes I shall characterize his account oi social rules 
in terms of four central features. The account runs as 
follows.
There is a perfect case oi a socia l ru le  in a g ro u p  G  that 
action A is to be done in circumstances C, il and only il 
every member oi Gg :
(1) regularly does A in C (this behavior need not be 
invariable).10 (Call this the re g u la r i ty  feature.)
(2) regards doing A in C as a ‘standard of criticism’ 
tor the behavior of members of G .11 (The s t a n d a r d  of  
cr i t ic ism  feature)
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(3) criticizes any member of G who does not do A in 
C and puts pressure to conform on members of G 
vvho threaten not to do A in G.12 (The cr i t ic ism  a n d  
p r e s s u r c  feature)
(4) believes that such criticism and pressure is legiti- 
mate or justified in the following sense: non-perform- 
ance of A in C by any member of G provides any 
member of G (either the defector or any other m em ­
ber) with a goocl reason to express criticism and ex- 
ert pressure. 13 (The cr i t ic ism  a n d  p r e ss u re  th o u g h t  ju s -  
t i f ied  feature)
One further aspect of Harts view of social rules may be 
mentioned at this point. Hart is at pains to avoid the 
idea that the significant internal or psychological as­
pect of social rules is ‘a mere matter of Teelings”. 14 
He does allow, however, that when there is a social 
rule members of the relevant group typically feel  th a t  
th e y  a re  in s o m e  sense  ‘b o u n d ’ to b e h a v e  a cco r d in g  to the  
ru le .  15 Though he does not make much of this, and it 
should not be placed at the core of his account, we 
might add to the above list that every member of G:
(5) leels in some sense ‘bound’ to conform to the 
pattern: doing A in circumstances C .10 (The J e l t  
b in d in g n e s s  feature.)
\Vhatever else might be said about these live features, 
it is plausible to claim that they are commonly present 
in those contexts vvhere we deem there to be a social 
rule according to our everyday understanding. It is 
therefore worth considering them carefully. Are some 
of the listed features more fundamental than others, 
clearly deeper or more basic? Is the list incomplete in 
some way? Does it call for amplification?
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b. A key element in I la r ts  account: punitive pressure
Feature (3) -  the criticism and pressure feature —in- 
volves certain actions and utterances, while feature (4) 
involves the belief that these actions and utterances are 
ju s t i j ie d .  It seems that feature (4) is the fundamental 
feature here, for it will presumably underpin the ac­
tions and utterances in question. 17
In any case feature (4) -  criticism and pressure 
thought ]ustified — is oi the first importance. We shoulcl 
be clear about what it amounts to. W hen this feature is 
present group members believe that they are justified 
in doing more than simply j u d g in g  deviants adversely. 
Indeed, they believe that they are justified in doing more 
than dispassionately c o m m u n ic a t in g  a judgement oi er- 
ror. Hart implies that the criticism he has in mind here 
is a closer cousin to p re ssu re  fo r  c o n f o r m i t y  than is a mere 
Comm unica tion  o) error.
I take it that the type of criticism in question is a 
matter of reproojs, rebukes ,  and the like, directed at those 
who deviate from the pattern oi behavior at issue. In 
other words, it is a matter of something that can be 
argued to have a p u n i t i v e  element. it constitutes a form 
of p u n i s h m e n t .  18
So as to keep the kind of criticism at issue here clearly 
in mind, 1 shall refer to it as p u n i t i v e  c r i t i c i s m ,ly It con- 
trasts with what we might call d e s c r ip t i v e  criticism, 
which merely notes or points out an error.
Hart stresses that vvhere there is a social rule it will be 
considered legitimate to pressure w o u ld -b e  d ev ia n ts  to 
conlorm. He speaks of ‘d e m a n d s  fo r  c o m p l ia n c e ’ in this 
context. Presumably any such ‘demands’ will be ‘b a c k e d  
by th re a ts ’ at least insofar as punitive criticism can be 
expected should the deviant act after ali be performed.
To characterize feature (4) succinctly I shall now say 
that it involves the belief that it is justifiable to meet 
deviance with p u n i t i v e  pressure . This is to be understood
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to include both punitive criticism (reproofs and the like) 
and such pressure as demands for conformity (backed 
by threats of punitive action).20
Hart was right, I believe, to separate out and to stress 
feature (4). Any account of our everyday concept of a 
social rule that neither includes nor implies the exist- 
ence of feature (4) will be importantly lacking.21
III. A s t ructura l  feature of social rules
How could punitive pressure be justilied in the context 
of a social rule? And vvhat type of justification is at is- 
sue?
At one point Hart speaks of justification in terms of 
‘having a good reason’. 22 Now someone could have a 
good reason to p r e s s u r e  another to do a certain thing, 
without being in a position to p u n i s h  them for not do- 
ing it. What one does cannot c o u n t  as punishment un- 
less one has a certain standing. (One can, of course, act 
in  a  p u n i t i v e  f a s h i o n  or ‘punishingly’ wilhout any Special 
standing.) One who is j u s t i f i e d  in i tn p o s i n g  p u n i s h m e n t  
as s u c h ,  then, requires the standing or entitlernent to 
punish. In other words, to judge oneself justified in 
punishing is (in the first instance) to judge oneself en- 
titled to punish.
Now consider the following dialogue betvveen a 
mother, Becky, and her daughter, Phoebe:
Becky (reprovingly): ‘Phoebe! YouVe brought the cat 
in!’ Phoebe: ‘You’re telling me oli -  again!’
Becky: ‘I should think so! We’ve a rule against bring- 
ing the cat in!’ or, ‘Weil, you’ve broken one of our 
rules -  again!’23
Becky s response to Phoebe appears to be perfectly in 
order from a logical point of view. That this is so sug-
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gests the fcllowing about our everyday understanding 
oi what it is for a group to have a rule: if a given rule is 
the rule oi a particular group, this entitles group mem- 
bers to impose a form of punishment on members who 
deviate from the rule. Recky’s appeal to th e ir  rule is evi- 
dently seen to explain, in the sense of justifying, the 
imposition of a form ot punishment (involved in re- 
proving Phoebe or, as Phoebe puts it, ‘telling me off’). 
Any such justilication presupposes an entitlement to 
impose such punishment.
Can \ve be somewhat more precise about the pre- 
sumed hasis for this entitlement? Consider a slightly 
dilferent dialogue.
Becky (speaking as if Phoebe has somehow o f fe n d e d  
a g a in s t  h e r ): ‘YouVe brought the cat in!’.
Phoebe: ‘YVhats that to you?’.
Becky: ‘It’s against our rule!1
Once again, 1 take it that there is nothing untoward in 
Becky’s responses, including her oftended surprise.24
This  suggcsts  tha t  a g r o u p  s h a v in g  a ru le  g r o u n d s  a c la im  
fo r  each  m e m b e r  a g a in s t  e v e r y  m e m b e r  fo r  c o n jo r m i ty  to  
the rule. Here Becky regards herself as having been of­
fended against by Phoebe’s non-conlormity citing their 
rule as the grounds for her implied claim on Phoehe.
YVe might now add the lollovving feature to Harts 
list: (There is a social rule in group G that action A is to 
be done in circumstances C il and only il every nient- 
ber of G]
(4’) believes that: every group member has a c la im  
ag a ins t  every other group member for the pertorm- 
ance ot A in C, a n d  a c o n s e q u e n t  tit le to e x e r t  p u n i t i v e  
pressure  on any other group member in favor oi do- 
tng A in C.
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In describing feature (4’) I have written that every mem- 
ber of G believes  certain things. Now, we ourselves have 
social rules and vve take ourselves not simply to believe 
but rather to kno iv  or (in that sense) u n d e r s ta n d  that 
these  r u le s , in a n d  of th e m se lv e s ,  g r o u n d  c la im s  a n d  en t i t le -  
m e n ts  of the  sort in q u es t io n .  Rather than altering feature 
(4’), 1 suggest that vve now simply add to Harts list:
(A) The existence oi a social rule in a group, in and 
oi itself, gives group members a title to exert puni- 
tive pressure on one another for conformity to the 
relevant pattern, in the appropriate circumstances. lt 
does this by virtue of grounding a claitn for each 
group member on every other group member for 
conformity
(A) might be said to describe a ‘structural feature’ oi 
social rules. We understand that it is because of the 
truth of (A) that feature (4’) is present when there is a 
social rule in some group Members believe that they 
have a claim on one another, and so on, because they 
do  have a claim. More precisely, members knovv, rather 
than believe, these things. Analogous points can be made 
for feature (4).
IV A problem  for Harts account
Let us now set apart features (4) and (4’) as features 
i n v a r ia b ly  co rre la ted  vvith social rules that can be ex- 
plained by the existence of a social rule. Once vve do 
this, the key features remaining on Harts original list 
are (1), the regularity feature, and (2), the standard of 
criticism feature.
I want novv to press the follovving question vvith re- 
spect to each of these features (and, eventually, vvith 
respect to their conjunction). Is it the case that, by vir-
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tue of the presence of the feature in question, a n d  th a t  
a lo n e ,  members of the relevant group have a claim on 
other members for conformity to the pattern in ques­
tion, and a consequent title to exert punitive pressure 
for conformity in the appropriate circumstances?
I am supposing that according to our everyday un- 
derstanding it is our having a given rule, a n d  th a t  a lo n e ,  
that grounds the claim in question. We need to ask, 
therefore, whether there is what 1 shall call a d irect ar- 
gument from one of the features in question, or from 
their conjunction, to the claim. No new information 
should be introduced.
a. The regularity feature
It is surely implausible to claim that feature (1), the 
regularity feature, itselfgives members the relevant type 
of claim on one another for performance. As it stands, 
the laet that The members of group G regularly do A in 
C  is not enough to give members of G a claim on one 
another for the performance of A in C. 25
It is worth considering two kinds oi argument which 
introduce additional assumptions beyond the assump- 
tion of a regularity in behavior. These assumptions in- 
voke what may be plausible additions to the regularity 
feature.
The lirst kind of argument invokes an ‘entitlement 
to expect’ conlormity. With or without preamble, it sup- 
poses that: ( l )  M e m b e r s  of G  h a v e  reason  to h e l ieve  th a t  
m e m b e r s  of G  will c o n t in u o  to do  A  in C  in the  f u t u r e .2ö li 
proceeds as follows. Given (l): (2) Members of G are 
entitled to expect luture performance from one another. 
Given (2): (3) each member of G has a claim on other 
members for the performance ot A in G.
There is the following intransigent problem vvith this 
argument. The sense in which the argument undoubt-
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edly shows members of G to he ‘entitled to expect’ per- 
formance is a matter of their being entitled to p re d ic t  
that performance will be forthcoming. Such an entitle- 
ment, however, is not in itself sufficient to ground a  
c la im  on o th crs  fo r  th e ir  p e r fo rm a n c e .
The second kind of argument involves implicit ap- 
peal to a general moral principle. Various such argu- 
ments are possible.
Thus consider an argument making use of the assump- 
tion that ali persons have a moral claim against ali per- 
sons not to be put in a position where they may detri-  
m e n ta lly  rcly on a reasonable but unfulf illed expectation. 
Given that members of G reasonably believe that other 
members of G vvill do A in C in the future, this argu­
ment, also, concludes that members of G have a claim 
on one another for the performance of A in C. This is an 
indirect argument on at least one count: it appeals to a 
moral principle.27 The same can be said, evidently, of ali 
arguments from the regularity or expectation feature 
which appeal to moral principles in this way.
b. The s tan dard  o f  criticism  fea ture
1 now turn to feature (2) -  the standard of criticism 
feature. I construe this as follows: g ro u p  m e m b e r s  regard  
a c e r ta in  p a tte r n  of ac tion  as a  s ta n d a r d  in re la tion  to w h ich  
th e ir  b e h a v io r  m a y  be ju d g e d  as co rrec t o r  incorrcc t. What 
kind of standard is at issue?
Are correctness and incorrectness, here, matters of 
moral rightness or wrongness? Harts few examples of 
social rules suggest that, in his view, this is not so. The 
example rule ‘YVhatever Rex 1 enacts is law’28 does not 
look like a moral rule and surely need not be so viewed. 
The example rule that ‘the male head is to be bared on 
entering a church’29 is similar. It could apparently be 
understood without the application of any moral un-
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derstanding, whether or not moral ideas of some kind 
in tact led to its adoption.30
Harts  example of baring the head in church is 
couched in the specific form oi a simple f iat: such-and- 
such is to be  d o n e .  No reasons are given, or obviously 
implied. And he vvrites: ‘...if a social rule is to exist some 
at least must look upon the behavior in question as a 
general standard to be fo l l o w e d  by the group as a whole' 
(my emphasis).31
lt seems, then, that we should construe regarding a 
pattern as a s ta n d a r d  of c r i t ic is m  for ones group as re­
garding the pattern as, simply, a pattern that is to be 
conformed to, so that members are in error if they fail 
to conform to it, ali else being equal. The nature ot the 
error, and the provenance of the fiat are not specified. 
Thisaccords with intuitive judgements. Intuitively, there 
can be a social rule which is not itself at the same time 
a moral rule.32 Something seen as a rule is, meanvvhile, 
something seen as ‘to be conformed to’.
Does Harts feature (2) of itself ground mutual claims 
for performance, claims that entitle the claimant to ex- 
ert punitive pressure in favor of conformity? The laet 
that 1 personally regard this pattern as a standard for ali 
members of a certain group, including myself, does not 
seem to give me any Special title to exert pressure in 
lavor oi performance.53
What of the presumed fact that e v e r y o n e  in our group 
regards this pattern as a standard? Does that directly 
ground the right type of claim in each mernber oi the 
group? lt is hard to see how a direct argument Irom a 
standard ‘shared’ in th is  way can be lound. Perhaps a 
standard ‘shared’ or ‘com m on’ in some o t h e r  sense is at 
issue. I shall shortly argue that this is indeed so. Much 
more needs to be said, however, than is given in Hart’s 
text.
1 conclude that Harts features (1) and (2) are not 
singly such as to directly ground the relevant type of
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mutual claims for performance or the corresponding 
rights to exert punitive pressure. Nor would they ap- 
pear to be more powerful in conjunction. Hart’s account 
of social rules is therefore problematic.
V Three issues for any account of social rules
My discussion oi Hart so far has brought the following 
issue into focus: vvhat is it about a social rule that im- 
mediately grounds claims for performance and corre­
sponding rights to exert punitive pressure -  something 
that we believe our social rules to do?34 Call this the 
g r o u n d in g  problem (for a short label). It is a problem 
any tully adequate account of social rules must solve.
At least tw o  o th e r  im  porte in  t p ro b le m s  are raised by 
Harts account. The lirst can be brought into focus by 
once again considering Harts feature (2). According to 
Hart when there is a social rule in a group the indi- 
vidual group members personally ‘regard such-and-such 
as a standard that ali should follow’. 1 have construed 
this in terms of the personal endorsement of a certain 
fiat. This construal raises the question whether indi- 
vidual members of the group are conceived of, and con- 
ceive of themselves as, in effect, issu in g  the relevant fiat. 
If so, it seems reasonable to ask: by what righ t o r a u th o r -  
ity  o r  title  do they take themselves to do so?
Paradoxically enough, there is here a problem analo- 
gous to that of Harts imaginary Rex I, who specifies 
what is to be done by the members of a certain popula- 
tion, but lacks the authority to do so.35 Hart proposes 
that Rex’s problem (lack of authority) would be solved 
if there were a socia l ru le  in the relevant population pre- 
cisely g ra n tin g  h im  a u th o r i ty  to ‘introduce new stand- 
ards of behavior into the lile of the group’.36 Hart vvrites: 
Tn its simplest form this rule will be to the effect that 
whatever actions Rex specities (perhaps in certain for-
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mal ways) are to be done.’37 I propose that Rex’s prob- 
lem recurs at the core of Harts account of social rules.
Suppose that ali we know about the members oi a 
population is that each member of the population re- 
gards obeying Rex as a standard to be adhered to by the 
members ot the population, and so on. By what right 
do any oi them issue prescriptions for the population 
as a whole, with respect to who may give them orders 
or anything else? Each can have a view on such mat- 
ters, oi course, but such views have an air oi irrelevance. 
The fact that they ali have the same view does not seem 
to make a diflerence. There may be sa fe ty , but it is by 
no means clear that there is a u th o r i ty ,  in mere numbers.
Rex’s problem was this: how can he achieve a righ t to 
specity what is to be done for the group as a whole? 
Harts solution -  in terms of social rules as he character- 
izes them -  re -ra ises  th is  p ro b le m  a t th e  leve l o f  socia l 
ru les 38 Assuming that social rules involve the issuing 
of a fia t by someone or something, we have what 1 shall 
call the g ro u p  s ta n d a r d  problem: w h o  o r  w h a t can  a p p ro -  
p r ia te ly  issue a fia t fo r  a xvhole g ro u p ? 39 In order to solve 
this problem, 1 believe that we must go beyond the in- 
dividualism oi Harts account oi social rules (and of many 
related accounts).
Finally, there is the b in d in g n c ss  problem. Though he 
dovvnplays its importance, Hart himseli observes that 
in the context oi a social rule people ‘say they ‘feel bound’ 
to act in certain \vays’.40
The following question arises: Is there an appropri- 
ate basis lor this leeling of being ‘bound?  Where there 
are social rules are group members indeed bound to 
perform in some relevant sense, perhaps in a sense con- 
nected with the justified reprimands of others?
Hart himselt may be willing to side at least to some 
extent with those who take the ‘feelings of being bound’ 
to be illusory. In any case, vvhenever someone claims 
that a prevalent sense of things is in whole or in part
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‘illusory’ this ahvays leaves open the possibility that one 
has missed the correct explanation -  unless one shows 
that there must he an illusion in this case.41 The 
b in d in g n e ss  p ro b le m  is the problem of finding a warrant 
for the leit bindingness of social rules -  or demonstrat- 
ing the im possibility oi such a solution.
In the next tvvo sections I sketch an account of social 
rules that surmounts each oi the three problems just 
noted.
VI. The plural subject account of social rules
a. Joint c o m m i tm e n t  a n d  ob liga tion
In my book O n  Social Facts  (1989) I argued at some 
length that underlying many of our Central social or 
collectivity concepts is an important concept of jo in t  
c o m m i t m e n t ,42 1 there proposed43 that the concept oi a 
social rule is one of the social concepts in qucstion.
In this section I say something about joint commit­
ment with an eye to showing, in particular, how this 
type oi account takes care of the problems.44
I take a personal decision to be a paradigmatic case 
of a c o m m i t m e n t  in some intuitive sense. One who de- 
cides to do A is now committed to doing A, so long as 
hisor her decision stands. A personal decision is also a 
paradigmatic case oi a w h o l ly  in d iv id u a l  commitment: 
as far as the concept oi a personal decision goes, I can 
com e b y  such a commitment alone, \vithout the inter­
vention of any other party. I can also revisc my commit­
ment or rcvohc  it altogether vvithout the involvement oi 
anyone else. In short, a wholly individual commitment 
is niine to crea te  a n d  m in e  to g ive  up . It is also mine to 
break: no one else can violate a vvholly individual com- 
mit.nent.45
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Those who are subject lo a jo in t  commitment may be 
said to have ensuing ‘individual’ commitments in a 
sense: each of the individual parties will indeed be com- 
mitted. But an ‘individual’ commitment of this sort is 
significantly different from what 1 have called a \vholly 
individual’ commitment.
A joint commitment is, precisely, joint. It is the com­
mitment of more than one person. This has conse- 
quences for the ‘individual’ commitments that derive 
from a joint commitment: 1 cannot be subject to such 
an ‘individual’ commitment independently of ali other 
people, and 1 cannot unilaterally rescind such a com­
mitment. lt stands or falls only with the underlyingjoint 
commitment, which itsell can only be rescinded by us 
(the parties to it).40
YVith respect to the content oi a joint commitment, 
in general a joint commitment is a commitment of cer- 
tain parties to do something as a b o d y . (lt may some- 
times be less awkward to speak oi being jointly com- 
mitted to do somethingjoindy, or togc thcr .)  ‘Doing some­
thing’ here must be interpreted broadly. 1 have elsewhere 
argued that a standard interpretation oi ‘We believe that 
such-and-such’ is in terms oi a joint commitment to 
believe that such-and-such as a body.47
I have elsevvhere used the term ‘plural subject’ to re- 
fer to those who are jointly committed to doing some­
thing as a body.48 They will then constitute the ‘plural 
subject’ oi the ‘doing’ in question.
We should distinguish between basic  or ‘ground-level’ 
joint commitments andderivedjoint commitments, since 
the conditions under which these conre to be are difler- 
ent. Suppose \ve are jointly committed jointly to accept 
that whatever Jones tells us to do is to be done. 11 Jones 
now tells us to do something, we presumably have a 
(derived) joint commitment jointly to accept that we 
are to do that thing. The derived joint commitment 
comes about on the basis of the original basic joint com-
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mitment plus Joness telling us to do something.
How do basic joint com m itm ents  come about? 
Roughly, individuals must openly express their readi- 
ness to be jointly committed iu the relevant way along 
with the relevant others.49
The parties to a joint commitment need not know of 
one another as particular individuals, though of course 
they may. One may be party to a joint commitment be- 
tween oneselt as this p a r t icu la r  person a n d  ano ther  par­
ticu lar  person  or o ther p a r t icu la r  people. But one may also 
be party to a joint commitment betvveen oneself and 
another or others under  s o m e p a r t ic u la r  description, such 
as ‘friend oi Joe’ or ‘person living on this island’.
In many populations, particularly large ones, the par­
ties do not know of one another as particular individu­
als. For instance, they know that many people live around 
them on a particular island but they do not know each of 
these people personally or know oi them as particular 
individuals. Nonetheless the island dwellers can partici- 
pate in a population-wide joint commitment; the parties 
to the commitment would understand themselves to be 
jointly committed insofar as they are living on the island 
or q u a  island-dwellers. One important aspect of this type 
of joint commitment is, evidently, that should the rel­
evant description cease to apply to a given person, they 
will automatically be freed from the commitment.50
A final point about joint commitment in general.51 A 
joint commitment -  like any other -  may be said to 
require that the participants act (or refrain from acting) 
in certain ways, ali else being equal. However, this case 
has a special feature that is not present in ali cases of 
commitment. A joint commitment is not the creation 
of any one of those who are subject to it, nor can it be 
removed at the pleasure of any one person. There is a 
clear sense in which the parties are tied or bound  to one 
another with respect to their personal subjection to the 
requirement in question. Once the commitment is in
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place thanks to the action of ali, each is subject to it, 
absent the concurrence of ali (as long as it applies to 
them).
Let us say that one who is party to a joint commit- 
ment has an ob liga tion  to perform the relevant act or acts. 
Such an obligation is clearly an obligation oi a Special 
type. Among other things, it essentially involves at least 
two people, the person with the obligation and one or 
more others. 11 we call the person with the obligation the 
ob ligor (on the model of promisor) we may call the rel­
evant others theobligees (on the model of promisee). These 
are the (other) people to whom the obligor is tied with 
respect to his commitment to a certain course of action. 
Given that we speak of the ob liga tion s  ot the obligor, it 
seems that we can speak oi the correlative c la im s  or rights 
of the obligees: they have a claim on the obligor lor per- 
formance of the act in question/2
I suggest the sense of ‘obligation’ (and ‘right’) intro- 
duced here is not a novel one. Much oi our everyday 
taik of obligations and rights is plausibly vievved as a 
matter of relerence to a joint commitment. I include in 
this class the obligations oi agreements and promises.53
h. The p lu ra l  su b jec t  a c c o u n t  of soc ia l  rules
1 can now sketch an account of social rules, according 
to our everyday underslanding oi what such rules are. 
More specifically, it is an account of when a population 
has a tule to the eflect that members oi that population 
are to perform a certain action in certain circumstances.
1 do not aim to give a full defense oi this account 
here, to consider possible objections, or to concern 
mysell with ali possible matters oi detail. 1 take the ac­
count to have soine initial plausibility, and want to show 
that it avoids the problems noted for Hart s account. It 
has rnerit at least to that extern, and to that extent is
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superior to a variety of accounts more or less approxi- 
mating to Harts. 1 am inclined to think that il or some- 
thing like it is a worthy heir to Harts account. The ac- 
count -  which might be dubbed the p l u r a l  s u b j e c t  or 
j o in t  c o m m i t m e n t  account -  runs roughly follows:
There is a soc ia l  r u le  if and only il the members of 
some population P are jointly committed to accept- 
ing as a body a requirement of the follovving form: 
members of P are to do A in C. (Some reason for 
doing A in C may be specified, or it may not.)
Il we want a somewhat shorter version, we might say, 
first, that members oi a population P j o in t l y  a c c e p t  a  
r e q u i r e m e n t  if and only il they are jointly committed to 
accepting that requirement as a body Given that ‘joint 
acceptance' is so understood, we can now write, alter- 
natively (and equivalently):
There is a soc ia l  ru le  if and only if the members oi 
some population P jointly accept a requirement of 
the following lorm: members of P are to do A in C. 
(Some reason for doing A in C may be specified, or it 
may not.)54
Some comments are in order:
1) In vvriting that members ‘jointly accept a require­
ment of the follovving lorm: they are to do A in C’ I 
mean to capture the idea that such joint acceptance 
amounts to the imposition of a requirement. One might, 
therefore, also vvrite that they ‘jointly require that mem­
bers are to do A in C .55
2) The phrase ‘accept (require) as a body’ is just one of 
the possible phrases with vvhich the relevant idea might 
best be indicated. One might also vvrite ‘accept as a unit’,
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for instance, or ‘accept as a single person’. The relevant 
joint commitment is a commitment, if you like, to con- 
stitute, as tar as is possible, a single entity with a certain 
psychological property (in this case accepting or requir- 
ing something).
3) As ordinarily understood, a joint commitment jointly 
to accept something does not involve a commitment 
personally to accept vvhat is jointly accepted. In other 
words, that members of a population jointly accept: ‘We 
are ali to do A in C  does not imply that they personally 
accept this.
As 1 have argued in discussing the group standard 
problem, it is not clearly i n t e l l i g i b le  -  without some Spe­
cial stage-setting -  that a given individual personally 
accept ‘We are ali to do A in C  in the sense at issue 
here, that is, in the sense that he or she Tequires’ that 
we are ali to do A in C. That it does make sense that as 
a body wc require that wc are ali to do A in C is one way 
of arguing that ‘We require...’ does not imply ‘1 require’.
4) It is striking that this account corresponds to (ew if 
any oi Hart’s listed features. However, it can be argued 
that if something approximating to this account is cor- 
rect, then ali ot Harts conditions will be salisiied, one 
way or another. Some oi these features vvill be deriv- 
able more or less as a matter of logic. Others will be 
such that, in standard circumstances, one can expect 
them to resuit from the existence of social rules as char- 
acterized here.
Thus it does not follow from the fact that one is party 
to a joint commitment that one vvill conform to it. One 
may be swept away by blind passion, or have vveighty 
moral reasons forbidding one to contorm. Nonetheless, 
in the absence of these things, one is likely to lind one 
has reason enough to conform. On the one hand there 
is the simple fact that one is subject to a commitment.
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On the other hand, one knows that should one default, 
one has otfended against other people, who have the 
standing to rebuke one for it.56
5) There is a holism in this account, which is, absent 
from that of Hart. The holism here is essentially the 
holism of the concept of a j o i n t  commitment.
6) Relation to agreements. No appeal is made in this 
account to an agreement. As I understand it, an agree- 
ment amounts to a joint decision, founded in a joint 
commitment to accept as a body a certain decision. 
Given this understanding, an account oi social rules in 
terms of agreements would have soine oi the virtues oi 
the account proposed. The three problems for Harts 
account, the grounding, group standard, and binding- 
ness problems, would ali be solved. An account in terms 
oi agreements would be flavved by lack oi realism, how- 
ever. An agreement on a rule for the group seems not to 
be present in many contexts in which we allow that 
there are social rules in the sense in question.
A joint commitment can arise more informally than an 
agreement can, through a more gradual process. One 
way in which this can happen is that someone in the 
relevant population speaks o f ‘our rule’.
I believe that a standard interpretation of such phrases 
is in terms oi an underlying joint commitment. In the 
present case, ‘our rule’ would be interpreted as ‘a re- 
quirement we jointly accept’. 11 what this person says is 
not rejected the practice of so referring to the rule may 
spread until it is clear to everyone that everyone is ready 
to be party to the relevant joint commitment. The ini- 
tial reference to our rule’ may be tendentious, but once 
this way of talking is generally accepted, it may be 
deemed to have lound a genuine basis.57
In any case, these uses of language do not stand alone.
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Olher things people say, and things that they do, will 
help to confirm the plural subject interpretation o f ‘our 
rule’. In particular, the kind of behavior Hart alludes to 
(the irnposition and acceptance of punitive pressure) 
will help confirm this interpretation as will dialogues 
oi the kind discussed in this article.58
c. R ela tion  o f  the p lu ra l  subject  a ccou n t to 
the three p rob lem s
1. Relation to the grounding problem
By virtue of the joint commitment present when there 
is a social rule, each member of the population in ques- 
tion has a claim on every other member for conformity 
to the rule. These claims are correlates of the obliga- 
tions joint commitment creates. Each member is obli- 
gated to every member to conform to the rule. Each 
member has the standing or right to rebuke any m em ­
ber who does not conform.
The exercise of any such right will ahvavs be subject 
to moral and prudential constraints. In some circurn- 
stances it rnay not be appropriate to do anything. Should 
one party rebuke another for nonconformity, hovvever, 
his standing in the matter will be perfectly clear. That 
he is, in the relevant sense, in a p o s i t io n  to r e b u k e  will 
not be in question.
Members of the population will understand this, since 
ali are party to the relevant joint commitment and un­
derstand the structure of such commitments. Thus the 
grounding problem linds a solution here.
2. Relation to the group standard problem
On this account a social rules existence is a matter ot a 
joint commitment through which each party becomes
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obligated to the others to support a certain standard as 
a standard for the population as a whole. Here, vve ac- 
cept a standard for us.59
The proposed account is couched in terms of a ‘popu- 
lation’ rather than a ‘social group’. 1 argued in O n Socia l  
F acts  that any population in which the members are 
linked through a joint commitment will count as a ‘so­
cial group' on one s tandard understanding  of that 
phrase.60
1 prefer to define a social rule in terms of a popula­
tion insofar as a given population may in principle con- 
stitute a social group by virtue of having a given rule, 
and within the consciousness of the people concerned 
the extent of the group may be determined by some 
description such as ‘friencl of Sally’ or ‘person living by 
Lake VVoebegone’. In other words, they understand their 
rule to be the rule of the population so specified, a popu­
lation that they will at least now reasonably see as a 
social group in the relevant sense, given that the mem­
bers are, as such, party to a joint commitment.
A joint commitment creates, in effect, a new subject 
oi psychological attributes, a p lu r a l  subject. These at- 
tributes are not yours, or rnine, or mine-and-yours, but 
rather ours:  our beliefs, our goals, our acceptance of 
rules. To put the point more carefully, these attributes 
are attributable to the body we lorm by virtue of our 
joint commitment. In a clear way, that commitment 
unilies our agency, providing a new source of action. Il 
you like, it constitutes a new entity -  an ‘us’ or ‘we’.M If 
anything or anyone has the authority to impose its will 
upon us it is surely precisely us. Hence the group stand­
ard problem is solved also.
3. Relation to the bindingness problem
A joint commitment by its nature involves obligations 
of a Special sort, and clearly could underlie a sense of
59
M a r g a r e t  G ilb ert
being ‘b o u n d ’ to conform to a rule. This account, then, 
provides a solmion to the bindingness problem.
In this case one is ‘b ound ' both  horizontally and ver- 
tically, so to speak: b o u n d  to others, and  bound  (ali 
else being equal) to conform. One is b ound  (ali else 
being equal) to conform  unless and until the o ther par- 
ties to the joint com m itm en t are willing to accept ones 
freedom.
The sense oi being b o u n d  that is g rounded  in a joint 
com m itm ent is not, clearly, a matter simply of power- 
tul Teelings of con tpu ls ion’.62 Nor is it w hat some tnay 
feel is the alternative, a matter of (in Harts w o rd s ) ‘some- 
thing external, some invisible part of the labric of the 
universe gu id in g an d  con tro llingus in these activities.'03O  O  O
It is g rounded , bu t it is not grounded  in the fabric of 
the universe. It is of our  own making. 11 there is a type 
of obligation that is not of our oven making then, as 1 
see it, the obligations associated with social rules are 
not oi that type.
VII. Summary
Careful critical consideration of Harts account of social 
rules has led to ano ther  account, the plural subject ac­
count. Hart’s account brings into locus the laet that when 
there is a social rule punitive pressure on deviants and 
w ould -be  deviants is generally accepted as justilied. 
From this starting point 1 argued in favor oi the plural 
subject account. Punishm ent presupposes entitlement 
and it seems that we regard our g roups  rules as them- 
selves g ro u n d in g  c la im s for p e rfo rm an ce  and  cor- 
responding  entitlements to punish for deviance. This 
argues against Harts ow n account oi social rules and in 
favor of the plural subject account. H a social rule is a 
jointly accepted s tandard  we can expect many oi Hart’s 
features to be present vvhenever a group has a rule. Thus,
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though  this discussion rejects H art’s account of social 
rules in favor of an account distinct in every particular, 
it remains quite close to Harts of social rules and, if 
correct, goes some way to confirm it .h4
Notes
1 Social th eo ris ts  often  use the  te rm  ‘social n o rm ’ as an  a lte rna-
tive to  ‘social ru le ’. R elated p h e n o m e n a  in c lu d e  (social) con- 
v en tio n s, cu stom s, and  trad itio n s , ali o f w h ich  ap p ea r to  bear 
som e re la tion , p e rh ap s  o f su b su m p tio n , to  the  ca teg o ry  oi 
social ru les. O n  th is see G ilbert, 1989, 4 0 3 -4 0 7 . 1 d iscu ss 
social co n v en tio n s (w ith  p a rticu la r  reference to  D avid Lewis’s 
vvork) in C h ap te r 6.
In the  sociological classic Suicide, Em ile D u rk h e im  fa- 
m ously  a rgued  that an o m ie ’ o r the  p au city  o f social ru les 
c o n tr ib u te d  to  h ig h er ra tes of su ic ide  in h u m a n  societies.
2 Cf. Raz, 1975, 52: ‘A social rule is a rule o f a certa in  Society o r
c o m m u n ity ’.
3 H art, 1961. It has been  said th a t the ‘cen tra l an d  d is tin c tiv e  
e lem en t of H arts c o n tr ib u tio n  to  d esc rip tive  ju r isp ru d e n c e ’ 
is h is ‘e lu c id a tio n  of the idea of a social rule an d  the m e th o d - 
ology he app lies in that e lu c id a tio n ’ (M acC orm ick, 1981, 43). 
The ex tensive  lite ra tu re  on  H art’s p h ilo so p h y  o f law in c lu d es 
m o n o g rap h s  by Bayles (1 9 9 2 ) , M acC o rm ick  (1 9 8 1 ) , and  
M artin  (1987).
4  T his p a p er will largely ignore  the  role of H a rts  a cco u n t o f 
social ru les in his th eo ry  o f law. H art m akes an d  em p h asizes 
a d is tin c tio n  be tw een  w hat he calls ‘p rim a ry ’ an d  ‘se c o n d a ry ’ 
ru les , an d  claim s th at ‘The u n io n  o f p rim ary  an d  seco n d ary  
ru les is at the cen ter of a legal sy s te m ...’ (H art, 96). S eco n d ­
a ry  rules include ru les en ab lin g  the p ro m u lg a tio n  of new  rules 
by p a rticu la r p eop le  o r specific  bod ies. A sim ple  ru le o f  th is 
k in d  w ou ld  be ‘w ha tev er ac tio n s Rex (som e p a r tic u la r  p e r­
son) specifies are to be d o n e ’ (H art, 56). T here has been  m u ch  
d iscu ssio n  and  q u e stio n in g  of the way H art d is tin g u ish e s  
be tw een  p rim a ry  and  seco n d ary  rules. See, for in stan ce , Sar- 
to riu s , 1966.
5 H a rts  acco u n t o f social ru les has been  c ritiq u ed  from  m any  
ang les by n u m ero u s  a u th o rs . Im p o rta n t reflections are to  be
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found in Raz (1975), Dvvorkin (1977), MacCormick (1978), 
MacCormick (1981), Sartorius (1987), and Bayles (1992) 
among others. See also Harts own ‘Postscript’ to The C oncep t 
o f  L aw , (second edition, 19947 1 do not attempt a review of 
this literature here I focus on Hart’s original discussion and 
move directly to concerns of my own.
6 Cf. Cotterrell, 1995, 222-230, who sees Harts legal philoso-
phy as expressive of an individualistic conception of lavv.
7 Hart, 54.
8 Hart, 55. Some may vvonder at the idea of characterizing Harts
project as ‘analytic’, given his own caveats about what he 
thinks can be done for the concept of lavv itsell. On reading 
what he vvrites on social rules, hovvever, it is easy to see him 
as engaged in a form of semantic analysis. Thus at (Hart, 9) 
we find: T he account vvhich we are at lirst perhaps naturally 
tempted to give.. .is that to s a y  th a t a n ä e  e x  is t s m ca n s  on ly  
th a t . . . .Plainly this is not enough, even though it conveys  p a r t  
o f  w h a t is m e a n t. [My emphasis]’ And his later discussion is 
conducted in such terms as ‘There is no co n tra d ic tio n  in sa y in g  
th a t people accept certain rules but experience no feelings of 
compulsion (Hart, 36; my emphasis). One way of taking his 
account of social rules is therefore to interpret such terms as 
‘m ust’ and is enough’ in terms of logical (or conceptual) ne- 
cessity and sufliciency.
9 Hart suggests that it is alvvays possible that there be a minority
of members vvho do not share the attitudes involved m the 
listed features (Hart, 55). We can thus consider the account 
given here (in terms of ‘every mernber of G’) as listing condi- 
uons for a ‘perfect- case oi a groups having a social rule. Com- 
pare David Levviss procedure in his discussion oi convention 
(Lewis, I 9o9).
10 Hart, 54.
1 1 55.
12 ibid.
13 54 (good reason), 55 (any member of G).
14 ibid. This (important) negative aspect of Harts account ot 
social rules is emphasized in the summary in MacCormick, 
1981, 29.
15 56-7. Later in the book, when he focuses on what he calls 
‘rules of obligation’ (see especially 84-5), Hart seems to deny 
that ‘bindingness’ is a feature or perceived feature oi ali so­
cial rules. See the text belovv.
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16 56.
17 Cl. M acCorm icks query as to w hether ‘expressions of de- 
m ands and criticism s’ are ‘constitutive of, or merely eviden- 
t ia ry  of, th e  c r i t ic a l  re f le c tiv e  a t t i tu d e  e n v is a g e d ’ 
(M acCormick, 1978, 285). Hart hitnself distinguishes the 
existence of the ‘critical reflective a ttitude’ he regards as fun- 
dam ental from its ‘display’ in overt actions and utterances 
including criticisms and dem ands for conformity. See 56.
18 Cl. Hari, 10-11, \vhere H art refers to ‘informal reproofs ad- 
ministered for the breach of non-legal rules’. Informal reproofs 
are seen here as the functional equivalent of legal punish- 
ment. For some discussion of the punitive nature of a rebuke 
see Gilbert, 1994a.
19 The criticisms involved in feature (3), also, will include those 
of the punitive type.
20 Hart uses the phrase ‘coercive pressure’ in the postscript to 
the second edition of The C o n cep t o f  Law, 1994. There is a 
distinction between coercive’ and 'punitive' pressure. ‘P uni­
tive’ pressure, or the Lhreat of it, may ahvays be coercive. But 
coercion need not be, or be seen as, p u n itiv e -a  form of pun- 
ishment.
21 As is, therefore, what 1 lart calls the ‘predictive account’ (lOff). 
According to this, to say a group has a rule is simply to say 
that the reproofs and pum shm ents oi o ther m em bers are pre-  
dictab le  i! m em bers deviate from a certain pattern of con- 
duct
22. Hart, 54. Elsewhere he writes of our taking a given non- 
legal rule as a reason and ju s ti f ic a tio n ’ for reproofs (H art’s 
em phasis, 10-11).
23 Interpret Beckys use of we' and ‘o u r’ as inclusive here, rather 
than exclusive. That is, she includes Phoebe vvithin the ‘we’. 
That it is inclusive is not self-evident from the dialogue as 
vvritten: that seems to be equally well open to either interpre- 
tation.
24 Cf. my discussion ol olfended rebukes’ in Gilbert, 1994.
25 Com pare w hat Hart himself says: habits [se. of obedience] 
are not ‘norm ative’; they cannot confer rights or authority  on 
anyone’ (58).
26 Is to say that ‘m em bers of G regularly do A in C’ already to 
imply that m em bers of G will do A in C (cc tcris p a r ib u s )’? lf 
so, then of course m em bers of G have reason to bclieve there 
will be futurc conform ity if they ‘know  of' the existence of
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the ‘regularity’. Perhaps, though , the regularity condition  
should be in terpre ted  in term s of w hat people have done up 
until now. 1 have argued elsewhere that il vve are contem - 
plating rational agents conceived of in a particular rather strin- 
gent way, a (prior) regularity tn behavior does not of itself 
im ply that there is reason to expect its continuance (Gilbert 
1989, C hapter 6, and 1990a.) If we restrict ourselves to ac- 
tual hum an  betngs, it is not always true that a (prior) regular­
ity legitimates expectations of continued conformity. There 
could be Special circum stances vvhich (as is know n) wtll soon 
cease to produce conformity, for instance, the past behavior 
was coerced but the coercion is about to stop. Perhaps a prior 
regularity tn behavior legitimates expectations of future con­
formity, ce teris  p a rib u s .
27 It can also be argued that the conclusion of this type of argu- 
ment is not the desired conclusion, sinee it concerns the wrong 
type of claim  or right. The type of m oral prem ise used in this 
argum ent -  alluding to the moral claims of ali persons against 
ali persons -  \vill then quite generally fail to lead to the de­
sired conclusion. 1 shall not pursue this argum ent here.
28 Hart, 56.
29 54. also 9.
30 This is not the place to explore w hat distinguishes a moral 
standard from o ther types of standard 1 rely here on a cer- 
tain intuitive understanding  on the matter.
31 55. The word ‘standard ’ could presum ably be replaced by 
‘pa tte rn ’ w ithout loss of content to this sentence, since the 
im plied norm ativity of the terin ‘a s tandard ’ is made explicit 
by the phrase ‘to be followed’.
32 Cf. G ilbert, 1989, on morality and convention, 392-396.
33 The same seem s to go for the f ac t, if il is a faet, that 1 prefer  
that others conform . Recall that we are eschew ing appeal to 
m oral aspects of the situation. Thus even if it could be ar­
gued that it is morally required that one conform  to existing 
preferences, ali else being equal, this w ould be considered 
extraneous to the preference condition  itself.
34 Similar problem s arise for o ther social phenom ena. Cf. Gil­
bert, 1990b on shared action, and 1987 and 1994 on group 
belief.
35 See espeeially Hart, 56-57.
36 Hart, 57.
37 56.
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38  I believe that th is  also ap p lies to  H a rts  m ore  recent d iscus- 
sion  of the  a u th o rity  o f a ‘c o m m a n d e r’ in H art, 1982.
39 Sonte vvould d isp u te  the v iability  o f any ‘im perative  th eo ry  
o f n o rm s ’, in o th e r w o rd s , they  vvould q u e s tio n  the assu m p - 
tion at issue in the text abovc. See Raz, 1975 , 51. 1 believe 
hovvever, that it can be m ade good. See sec tio n  V (iii) belovv.
4 0  ibid.
41 Cf. G ilbert, 1989 C h ap te r  3, vvhere 1 argue th at to  critieize an 
in tu itiv e  doc trin e  as m y ste rio u s’, is n o th in g  like the p resen - 
ta tio n  o f a knock-dovvn a rg u m e n t against it
42 1 c o n tin u e  to exp lore  the  de ta ils of th is  co n cep t. Som e lur- 
th e r  references are given in su b seq u e n t notes.
43  G ilbert, 405.
44  T his d iscu ssio n  is inev itab ly  som evvhat rough. For m y in itial 
qu ite  leng thy  in tro d u c tio n  o f th is  co n cep t see G ilbert, 1989, 
especially  C h ap te rs 4 an d  7. I have e x p lo red  th is  idea lu r th e r  
in su b seq u e n t vvritings, m any  of vvhich are co llected  to g e th e r 
in  G ilb ert, 1996. See also the  In tro d u c tio n  to  th a t book.
45 W h at o f a father w ho says to  h is d a u g h te r ‘Fve dec id ed  th at 
you'11 go to college’ ? If the d a u g h te r  is n o t th e re b y  co m m it- 
ted , she does not (failing som e o th e r re lev an t c o m m itm en t 
on  h e r p a rt)  v iolate any  co m m itm e n t by lailing  to go to  co l­
lege. She does p reven t the  fu lfillm ent of h e r fa th e rs  c o m m it­
m en t, b u t that is a n o th e r m atter.
46  1 c o n n ec t use of the p ro n o u n  ‘w e’ an d  jo in t co m m itm en t in 
G ilbert, 1989, C h ap te r  4. See also C h a p te r  7.
47 See G ilbert, 1987, 1989, C h a p te r  5, 1994a, 1994b, an d  the 
In tro d u c tio n  to  1996. I o rig ina lly  vvrote of ‘accep tin g  as a 
body ' in th is  con tex t. ‘A ccep tin g ’ is one sy n o n y m  of ‘believ- 
ing ’, an d  I see n o  obv io u s reason  not to  take it in that sense 
here.
4 8  First in G ilbert, 1989.
49  ‘O p e n ly ’ here  is a rough  w ay of in d ica tin g  the  re levan t c o n ­
text S o m eth in g  like ‘co m m o n  knovvledge’ in the sense of 
Lewis (1 9 6 9 ) w o u ld  seem  to be a req u irem en t. See G ilbert, 
1989, C h a p te r  4, on hovv p lu ral sub jec ts  are form ed.
50 T his is by no m eans a f ui 1 d iscu ssio n  of th is  type o f case. For 
som e fu r th e r  d iscussion  of jo in t co m m itm en t in large g ro u p s  
see G ilbert, 1989, especially  2 1 2 -3 ,  1993a, 1994, an d  1999.
51 See a lso G ilbert, 1993b, an d  1999.
52 Hart h im self, w ritin g  on righ ts , ex p la in s o u r  ta ik  of righ ts in  
co n n ec tio n  vvith p rom ises in term s of the  p ro m isee ’s h av ing
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the  ‘p o w er to  re lease’ the p rom iso r. T h u s  o u r in tu itio n s  in 
th is  m atte r have som e affinity. 1 g ro u n d  th is p o w er o f release 
tn an  u n d e rly in g  jo in t c o m m itm en t. H art d oes not. See H art, 
1955. O n p ro m is in g a s  a jo in t  co m m itm e n t p h e n o m e n o n  see 
G ilb ert, 1993c.
53 T his is no t the  p lace to argue th is, b u t see m y articles G ilbert, 
199 3 b  and  1993c.
54 Cf. G ilbert, 1989 , 40 5  H ere m em b ers of P a re ’ replaces ‘one 
is’.
55 In G ilbert, 1989 , 1 s tip u la ted  th a t T o  accep t a p rin c ip le  of 
the fo rm  d o  A in C ’ is to su b jec t onese lf to lt in d iscu ssin g  
social co n v en tio n . In the  su b seq u e n t (an d  in ten d ed ly  deriva- 
tive) d iscu ss io n  of social ru les 1 w rote o f 'a ccep tm g  that one 
is to  d o  A in C ’ w h ich  fo rm u la tio n  p e rh ap s  m akes it less c lear 
th a t th is  is a m a tte r  o f im p o s in g  o r issu ing  a req u irem en t.
56 S arto riu s , G avison . ed .,5 1 . argues th at ‘co n tra ry  to  w h a t 
seem s to  he a v irtua lly  u n iv ersa l a ssu m p tio n  am o n g  p h ilo -  
so p h e rs , it m ak es  perfect sense to  sp eak  o f a social ru le  as 
ex is tin g  in a c o m m u n ity ’ in w h ich  it is n o t generally  con- 
fo rm ed  to. In h is ‘C o m m e n t’ on  S arto riu s , Jo h n  F inn is agrees 
(G avison, ed ., 66 , 53n). T he issue is d iscussed  at som e leng th  
by H an ina  B en-M enachem  in h e r  ‘C o m m e n t’ on  S arto riu s  
(G avison , ed ., 7 6 -8 0 ) . See also W oozley (1 9 6 7 ), 72. For a 
re la ted  d iscu ssio n  oi social co n v en tio n , in w hich  1 argue c o n ­
tra  D avid Lewis th at regu lar co n fo rm ity  is no t a re q u ire m e n t, 
see G ilbert (1 9 8 9 ) C h a p te r  6, an d  e lsew here .
57 See G ilb ert, 1989 , C h a p te r 4 , w h ere  there  is a leng thy  d is ­
c u ssio n  of th e  first perso n  p lu ral p ro n o u n  and  its re la tio n - 
sh ip  to p lu ral su b jects. See also C h a p te r  7 on  in ferences from  
p rem ises o f the  fo rm  ‘We are d o in g  s u c h -a n d -su c h ’.
58 Section  11
59 II the  p lural sub jec t acco u n t o f social ru les is co rrec t it ex- 
p la in s, in effect, how  ‘cu sto m ary  ru les can  be reg ard ed  as 
im p era tiv es issued  by a Society to itse lf ', th u s  c o n s titu tin g  a 
v ersion  of the ‘im perative  theory  oi n o rm s’. The q u o ted  w o rd s 
in th is  n o te  are from  Raz, 1975, 51 , w h o  there  assu m es the  
lalsity  of th e  im pera tiv e  theory. T his acco u n t also sh o w s h ow  
it can  be th a t, in W oozley’s te rm s, ‘...a social rule is a ru le  to  
th e  ex ten t th a t it has the a u th o rity  o f Society b e h in d  it’ (ib id ).
60  See G ilbert, 1989, especially  C h a p te r  4.
61 Cf. Em ile D u rk h e im : T h is  sui generis sy n thesis, w h ich  c o n - 
s tttu te s  every  Society’, The Rules o f Sociological M ethod  (orig . 
1895). M any o th e rs  tn igh t be q u o te d  to  the  sam e elfect.
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62 Cf. Hart, 11.
63 Ibid, 11-12. John Mackie makes a similar (skeptical) character- 
ization of the everyday conception of the way m orality is 
grounded, w hich he sees as an obvious error. H ow  can any- 
thing that is ‘intrinsically action-guiding’ be part of the ‘fur- 
niture of the W orld?
64 This paper is a shorter version of Gilbert 1999c. The longer 
essay also appears in my forthcom ing book S o c ia l i ty  a n d  R e-  
sp o n s ib il ity :  N e w  E ssa ys  in P lu ra l S u b je c t  T h eo  r v , (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman and l.ittlefield, 2000. Many thanks to Heikki Ikä­
heim o for help in preparing this version and to the conven- 
ors of the Jyväskylä Social Reality conlerence for their wel- 
come invitation to participate. I am  also grateful to classes 
and colloquium  audiences who have heard and discussed 
various versions of this material at the University of C on­
necticut, Princeton University, Kings College London, the 
London School of Economics, and Stirling University, and to 
Michael Cook and A rthur Kuflik for relevant discussion.
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Eerik Lagerspetz
ON THE EXISTENCE OF 
INSTITUTIONS
I. The problem  of institutions
Term s w hich  are useel to refer to institu tions are in som e sense like theoretical term s. The w ord ‘sta te’, 
for exam ple, does not refer to anyth ing  directly  observ- 
able. We say tha t ‘the sta te’ has som e p roperties, or even 
that it does som ething. But ali we can perceive are just 
people and  their doings (p lus certain  physical objects). 
‘sta te’ seem s to have som eth ing  in com m on w ith , say, 
‘e lectron’ or ‘eco-system ’, vvhich are theoretical term s 
having a m eaning only as parts of Scientific theories. 
However, it is not only political scientists or legal theo- 
rists w ho use term s like ‘sta te’. O rd inary  people have to 
deal w ith  the state alm ost daily, and w hen referring to 
it, they do not usually suppose the tru th  oi any Scien­
tific theory.
As institutions form a pan  of our everyday life, the 
tenns referring to them  belong to our everyday vocabu- 
lary. N either can these term s be rem oved from our vo- 
cabulary. A scientist could claim that the extension of an 
established theoretical term  is enrpty. There was no th ing 
corresponding to the term  ‘phlogiston’. But ‘state’ is clearly 
different. The state as an institution could perhaps w hither 
away, bu t it cannot be proved to be non-exislent.
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These lerms -  I will call them  institutional terms -  
have another interesting property. Som ehow they are 
connec ted  with no rm s and rules. W h e n  we refer to 
som ething as ‘a legislature’, we suppose that its exist- 
ence as a legislature is based on some norms which 
m ake it what it is: a legislature is not just a group  of 
people having the habit of gathering together in a big 
building. These norms form a part of a larger norma- 
live structure, and the actions of a legislature and even 
the fact that some actions are ascribed to it can be un- 
derstood only by grasping the content oi this structure. 
Besides entities, some acts and properties seem to have 
this inherently normative nature, too. ‘Cashinga  cheque’ 
or ‘having a legal right’ are understandable  only in a 
pre-existing normative context. In this sense they have 
som ething in com m on with expressions like ‘vvrongdo- 
ing’ or ‘having a moral right’. These are meaningful only 
in a context of a p resupposed  system of moral norms. 
But nevertheless, it seems that we can speak about in- 
stitutions or institutional ly defined properties and acts 
w ithout committing ourselves to any substantial moral 
position.
Hence, there seems to be som ething mysterious in 
the existence ot institutions. Heidegger, for example, 
was puzzled by it:
A State -  is. By virtue of the fact that the State police 
arrest a suspect, or that so-and-so-m any typevvriters 
are clattering in a governm ent building, taking down 
the word of ministers and State secretaries? O r “is” 
the state in a conversation between the chancellor 
and the British foreign minister? The state is. But 
where it is being situated? Is it situated anywhere at 
ali? (Heidegger 1959, 35)
Institutional terms seem to refer to real things. There 
are States and legal rights, lor example. By saying that
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there are such things we mean that they are not fictions 
or illusions. But they are conceptually connected with 
actions and interactions of individual people. A state 
can do something only if particular individuals do some- 
thing.
Statements about institutions and institulionally de- 
fined actions and properties are not statements about 
peoples mental States or physical movements. They have 
something to do with norms and rules which are not 
physical things. Nevertheless, it is possible to speak 
about institutions without committing oneself to the 
acceptance of a system oi norms or rules. To say that 
something is ‘a state’ is to express a descriptive and not 
a prescriptive judgement. Thus, there seems to he at 
least three different problems involved. First: how in­
stitutions are related to individuals? Second: how insti- 
tutional facts are related to natural facts? Three: how 
descriptive judgernents about institutional rules are re­
lated to prescriptive judgernents?
In his classic Speech A cts John Searle makes the dis- 
tinction between ‘brute’ and ‘institutional’ lacts. The 
former are characterized in this way:
One might say that they share the feature that the 
concepts which make up  the knowledge are essent- 
ially physical, or in its dualistic version, either physi­
cal or mental. The model for systematic knowledge 
of this kind is the natural Sciences, and the hasis for 
ali knovvledge is generally supposed to be ernpirical 
observation recording sense experiences. (Searle 
1974 , 50 )
Institutional lacts are different:
They are indeed lacts; but their existence, unlike the 
existence of brute facts, presupposes the existence of 
certain human institutions. (...) These ‘institutions’
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are systems of constitutive rules. Every institutional 
laet is underlain  by (a system of) rule(s) of the form 
‘X counts  as Y in context C’. (Searle 1974, 51-2)
This characterization oi institutional facts has inspired 
m any social and  legal theorists. Most notably, Mac- 
Corm ick and YVeinberger (1986) base their institutional 
legal theory on it. Searles distinction betw een institu­
tional and brute facts is, 1 think, sufficiently clear. In ­
stitutional facts: ‘X cashes a cheque’, ‘Y has a legal r ight’, 
makes a move in chess’ -  are inherently  dependen t 
on rules which exist in some community. But what kinci 
of fact, then, is the laet that these rules do exist in rel- 
evant communities? Obviously, a fact about the exist- 
ence of a rule cannot be a brute laet in Searles sense: it 
is not a laet on the furniture oi the physical World, nei- 
ther are the statements expressing it subjects of direct 
perceptual control. If Searle’s classification is meant to 
be an exhaustive one, facts about rules must themselves 
be institutional facts. Therefore, they are inherently de­
pendent on the existence of further rules: som eth ing  is 
a rule only il there is a rule with  the effect that it is 
counted  as a rule. We are in an infinite regress. This 
m ight be called as the logical regress of rules.
My solution to these problems is to develop a notion 
of non-bru te  fact which is not inherently  ru le -depend-  
ent. The basic idea behind the solution is the follow- 
ing: There are things which exist and facts which  hold 
only if the relevant individuals believe that they exist 
or hold and act according to these beliefs. W hat we call 
institutions and institutional facts fall u n d e r  this de- 
scription. Descriptions of these things and  facts are im- 
plicitly circular or self-referential, but the circle in ques- 
tion is not a vicious one. In the descriptions, institu­
tional terms reappear only in the scopes of propositional 
operators describing the attitudes of relevant ind iv idu­
als. Moreover, the existence of the related beliefs is only
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a necessary condition  for the things being there. Here 
are sorne examples:
W hat the international com m unity  accepts as a State 
is a state. (van Maarseveen and van der Tung 1978, 
234)
Money is whatever is generally accepted in exchange. 
(D ornbusch  and  Fischer 1978, 209)
A nation exists when a signilicant num ber of people 
in a com m unity  consider themselves to form a nation, 
or behave as il they formed one. (Seton-Watson 1977, 
5)
A w ork  of art is an artifact of a k ind created to he 
presented to an artworld public. (Dickie 1984, 80)
A social class is a quasi-group oi people whose links 
are that they th ink  they have similar interests, and 
w ho share com m on  beliefs about the system ot so­
cial class, their own position in that system, and simi­
lar dispositions as to their behaviour approppria te  to 
their position in that system. (Järvie 1972, 120)
I am not claiming that these descriptions are necessar- 
ily correct: only that they are oi the right type (the fourth 
one becomes m ore transparent when  we try to describe 
“an artvvorld public”). Ali the descriptions are functional 
in the sense that any ohjeet w hich  can be a subject oi 
the relevant a tt i tudes and  actions may satisfy them. 
There are functional limitations. Items which are ac­
cepted  as m oney  m ust be d istinguishable , relatively 
durable, relatively scarce, not too difficult to use etc. 
But inside these constraints anything, inc lud ing  cows, 
furs, shells, and bits of information in a co m p u te r  can 
be used as money. And almost anything can w ork  as an
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artw ork . In tliis sense, these terms behave like, say, 
‘w eap o n \  Anything used or in tended  to be used as a 
w eapon satisiies the term. But unlike the existence oi a 
w eapon, the existence of money, or a State, or art is a 
social or conventional and  not a private matter. Private 
m oney is as impossible as private language. Money is 
som ethingexisting  in a community. Neither is it enough 
that m em bers oi a com m unity  just happen  to believe 
that some objects are money: they m ust also knovv that 
this belief is generally shared by other members. Moreo- 
ver, the attitudes must be shared by relevant individu- 
als. And lastly, these attitudes must be related to ac- 
tions. They must appear as (at least partly) reasons for 
the m em bers of the respective societies to do certain 
things. Il som ething is money, it is generally used as a 
means ot exchange and as a measure and store of value. 
The shared belief is a necessary but not a sufficient con- 
dition for the existence of institutional entities and prop- 
erties. (Cf. Searle 1991, 339)
The idea that institutions and  institutional facts exist 
by the virtue of shared beliefs in their existence is called 
here conventionalism. Institutional terms are normally 
used in expressions w hich  can be analysed in this con- 
ventionalist way. Such sta tem ents express conventional 
facts. This solves the puzzle created by Searles distinc- 
tion. As my examples show, there is no th ing  new in 
this idea. However, there m ight be some new elements 
in my attempt to explicate the idea in a more precise 
way and to connect it to o ther  theories and issues.
II. O n m utual beliefs
The self-referential nature  of conv en t iona l  facts is not  
an anomaly,  for there are things in the World which are 
capable  for self-reference a n d  for c ro ss-re fe rence . 
Propositional attitudes -  bel ieving,  knowing, hop ing.
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fearing etc. -  have this capability. We can have beliefs 
about other peoples beliefs, while they have at the same 
time beliefs about our beliefs. This gives rise to the 
phenornenon called mutual or shared belief, or com ­
mon or mutual knowledge (the terminology is not well 
established).
This phenornenon is especially visible in strategic 
situations. In the seventies, a Soviet diplomat, Juri Derj­
abin, wrote several books with the pseudonym ‘Juri 
Komissarov’. The purpose of the books was to influ- 
ence on the Finnish foreign policy without openly in- 
tervening to it. In an interview, Mr. Keijo Korhonen, 
the former Under-Secretary of the State, recalled the 
debate aroused by ‘Komissarovs’ books:
We knew there [in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 
quite well what the real issue was. We knew that 
Komissarov knew what the issue was. And we knew 
that Komissarov knew that we knew that he knew. 
(Helsingin  S a n o m a t  J9. 7. 1991)
Obviously, reiterated beliefs of this type can be oi ex- 
treme practical importance in strategic situations, e.g. 
in diplomacy, economy or war. Uncertainty at some level 
may aflect the behaviour of the parties, and for this rea- 
son the parties not only engage in intelligence activities 
in order to find out each others beliefs, they also try to 
find methods to convince the other side. But reiterated 
beliefs appear also in less exciting contexts. flere is a 
nice list of possible examples: “Shaking hands is an 
everyday example, and so is rowing a boat, speaking 
and listening, driving down a highway, signalling a 
Morse code, walking in a crowrd oi people, meeting, 
and dancing”. (Clark and Carlson 1982, 2) In ali the 
cases certain beliefs are normally shared by the partici- 
pants. People become more conscious of these beliels 
when there is some room lor uncertainty, when it is not
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self-evident that ali participants oi an activity master 
the same rules oi language, traffic or dancing. Sociolo- 
gists have coined phrases like “taking the role of the 
generalized other” (Mead), “interpenetration of perspec- 
tives” (Dewey) or “reciprocity of perspectives” (Schutz), 
but it seems that they ali are talking about situations in 
which we not only believe something but also expect 
others to have the same beliefs, including this belief 
about others’ beliefs (Bach 1975, 191). Consider, for 
example, Schutz’ analysis of the face-lo-face relation- 
ship:
as 1 watch you, 1 shall see that you are oriented to 
me, that you are seeking the subjective meaning of 
my words, my actions, and what 1 have in mind in- 
solar as you are concerned. And 1 will in turn take 
account oi the laet that you are thus oriented to me, 
and this vvill influence both my intentions with re- 
spect to you and how I act tovvard you. This again 
you will see, 1 will see that you have seen it, and so 
on. This interlocking of glances, this thousand-laceted 
mirroring of each other, is one of the unique features 
of the face-to-lace situation. (Schutz 1967, 170. See 
also the fascinating examples in Lacan 1966, 1 1-61, 
197-213. )
The standard notion oi m u l u a l  b e l i e j includes a series oi 
reiterated beliefs like (l)-(5) ascending to infinity:
(MB) It is mutually believed in a population S 
that p iff
(1) everyone in S believes that p;
(2) everyone in S believes that everyone in S
believes that p;
and so on ad infinitum.
This analysis supposes that luiman beings can have in-
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finite sets of beliefs in their minds. However, the Hil­
man m ind  seems to be an apparatus w ith  a limited ca- 
pacity. The defenders oi (MB) can argue in the follow- 
ing way. A lthough people can possess only a finite 
nu m b er  oi propositions as contents oi their m inds at 
any one time, they can have an access to inlinite sets oi 
propositions: they can believe them  in a dispositional 
or potential sense. For example, I could w ork  out the 
tru th , and  form the respective beliefs, of an infinite 
n u m b e r  oi a r i thm etica l  p roposit ions ,  if 1 only had  
enough time. Similarly, if 1 know  the syntactical rules 
of English, I can in principle form an inlinite n um ber 
of judgem ents  on the grammaticality of different ex- 
pressions (on this defence, see Tuomela 1984, 210). 
Schutz may m ean som ething like that when  he says 
that in a lace-to-face relationship the m irror images are 
not grasped rellectively bu t lived through (Schutz 1967, 
170).
Jane Heal (1978) has shown two llaws in this d e ­
fence. Firstly, we are interested in mutual beliefs that 
have an effect in interaction situations. These beliefs 
are able to guide peoples actions. A belief with, say 
1030 iterations (“1 believe that she believes that 1 be­
lieve...”) cannot possibly occur in my practical reason- 
ing under  any circumstances (Fleal 1978, 119-20). The 
supposition that I “dispositionally” have this kind oi 
belief has no explanatory role whatsoever. Secondly, the 
analogy with arithmetic or syntax does not hold. 1 can 
“dispositionally” have an infinite n um ber  of beliefs about 
the tru ths oi arithmetical propositions in the sense that 
1 know  the rules of arithm etic  and  can apply them  
recursively. But my beliefs about the beliefs of sonie 
o ther person are empirical. 1 cannot mechanically inter 
the contents  of anybodys m ind (Heal 1978, 121) And 
in any case, it is not clear what it means to have dispo- 
sitions which cannot actualize themselves in any physi- 
cally possible circumstances.
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Another solution would simply he to cut off the re- 
gress. Thus, Kent Bach (1975, 192) proposes that only 
the first two iterations are needed; we get an adequate 
definition simply by deleting the a d  i n f i n i tu m  -clause 
from (MB). But this proposal seems to he a d  hoc. It may 
be true that in the most common cases we have only 
beliefs of the second order; but even il beliefs oi a higher 
order are unusual, they certainly can exist -  as in the 
case of ‘Komissarov’ and the Finnish Ministry oi For­
eign Atfairs.
Clark and Carlson (1982) remark that in order to 
torni a mutual belief, people need not have separate 
pieces of evidence for ali component beliefs: they can 
make inductive interences from a single or a few pieces. 
in the acquisition of mutual beliefs, this claim is rel- 
evant. Messrs. Korhonen and Derjabin could not safely 
infer that beliefs were distributed symmetrically betvveen 
them, but normally we can make such inferences. VVe 
form new mutual beliefs by using the earlier ones as 
premises. As members of the human species, and as 
members of various human communities, we already 
believe that individuals being in an interaction with us 
have similar inductive, practical, linguistic, perceptual, 
etc. capacities, and that they also share with us some 
background beliefs and standards. From this we can 
inler that certain properties oi a situation are generally 
taken as evidence for certain beliefs, and therefore we 
can in such a situation relatively safely make inferences 
about other peoples beliels, including their beliefs about 
our beliefs. Thus, il 1 see you looking at me while I am 
sitting at a table, 1 have evidence that you know that 
there is a table, that you know that 1 know that there is 
a table and that you know that 1 know that you know 
that there is a table... Only under special circumstances 
(e. g. I recognize that you are heavily intoxicated) are 
there reasons not to make such an inlerence automati- 
cally.
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The question is how these beliefs should be repre- 
sented in a formal definition. (See the discussions in 
Tuomela 1995, in Clark 1996, 93-5 and in Itkonen 
1997, 54-9) 1 am not going to solve the problem here. 
But the phenomenon itself is fundamental.
lii. Conventional facts
Mutual beliefs, hovvever defined, form the basis oi what 
l have called conventional facts. We inay recall that there 
are certain facts which hold because relevant individu- 
als believe that they hold. This belief must be mutual 
in the relevant group. Let us give an example. Suppose 
that the relevant population S consists of ali the inhabit- 
ants of a certain village -  S-ville. From time immemo- 
rial, the S-villeans have held their meetings under a tree 
growing near the village. It is a mutual belief among 
S-villeans that there is a meeting place under the tree. 
That there is a meeting-place under the tree is a c o n v e n t ­
ional  f a c t  in S. The definition of a conventional laet is 
the follovving:
(CF) ‘a is F’ expresses a conventional fact itf it isä 
necessary and a sufficient condition for as being 
F that
(1) it is a mutual belief (of at least the second 
order) in the relevant population S that a 
is F, and
(2) in the situations of the relevant type, (1) is 
at least partly a reason for the members of 
S to perform actions which are meaning- 
ful because a is F
For example, because the S-villeans believe that meet­
ings are held under the tree, and because they believe
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ihat the others believe it, too, they have a reason to go 
under the tree, provided that they want to attend the 
meetings. For those S-villeans vvanting to avoid the 
meetings it is a reason not to go there; for a woodcutter 
it is a reason not to cut that particular tree down, and 
so on.
It is a peculiar property of conventional facts that 
propositions expressing them cannot be false if they 
are generally believed to be true and if this belief plays 
a relevant role in the behaviour of relevant persons. The 
sentence ‘There is a meeting-place under the tree near 
S-vilie” cannot be true if the S-villeans do not believe it. 
But if they do, the sentence is true simply by virtue of 
the mutual belief. While any individual S-villean can 
be mistaken in his beliels (and act inappropriately), 
c o l l e c t i v e l y  the S-villeans cannot be wrong in their be­
lief: their meeting-place is there il they say so. Simi- 
larly, any individual speaker of a language can have 
mistaken beliefs about the grammaticality of a sentence. 
But the whole 1 inguistic community cannot collectively 
be mistaken. Beliefs about conventional facts are col­
lectively non-corrigible.(cf. Itkonen 1974) This belief- 
dependency makes conventional facts quite extraordi- 
nary. Nevertheless, l cannot see any reason to deny that 
they are indeed facts. They form an important part oi 
our environment. The fact that shops close their doors 
at eight is a conventional fact in my society. As a laet, it 
is at least as reliable and as important for me as the 
natural fact that the darkness will fall at eight this time 
oi the year, and it equally constrains my actions. From 
my point oi view, it could as well be a law of nature. 
Here we may quote Berger and Luckmann:
The institutions, as historical and objective factities,
confront the individual as undeniable lacts. The in­
stitutions are th e r e ,  external to him, whether he likes
it or not. (...) Since institutions exist as external real-
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ity, ihe individual canno t unders tand  them by intro- 
spection. He m ust ‘go out' and learn about them, just 
as he must learn about nature. This remains true even 
though the social World, as hum anly  produced  real- 
ity, is potentially understandable  in a way not possi- 
ble in the case of the natural World. (...) The institu- 
tional world is objectivated hu m an  activity, and so is 
every single institution. In o ther  words, despite the 
objectivity that m arks the social World in hum an  ex- 
perience, tt does not thereby acquire an ontological 
status apart from the hu m an  activity that produced  
it. (Berger and Luckm ann 1966, 57)
Conventional facts are like natural facts in the sense 
that they are not d ep en d en t  on the beliefs and actions 
of any particular individual. They are unlike natural 
facts in the sense that they are dependen t on the beliefs 
and actions oi ali relevant individuals. Berger and Luck­
m ann speak about the paradox that hu m an  beings are 
capable of p roducing  a World they then  experience as 
som ething o ther than  a h u m a n  product. The source oi 
this experienced paradox is that while we ali contrib- 
ute to the existence of institutions, and in that sense 
they are our products, none of them  can be my  or your  
product.
Consequently, there are acts which are possible for 
any one individual w ithou t being possible for ali indi­
viduals. An individual may w ithdraw  his deposit from 
a bank, or break the law, or the rules a game, w ithout 
causing the change or collapse of the institutions con- 
cerned. Such an action w ould  not be possible for ali 
individuals acting as a collective. Conversely, there are 
acts which  are possible only lor ali individuals, bu t not 
for any single individual. Changing, creating, maintain- 
ing or destroying institutions are examples of this. In 
institutional contexts, ali individuals, taken as a collec­
tive, can be tree, while the possible actions oi any one
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individual are stricdy constrained. Only  groups and 
com m unities  can establish or change laws, monies or 
symbol systems. The laet that the options open for any 
individual are not the same as the options open  for ali 
individuals is not a contingent matter; rather, it lollows 
conceptually Irom the nature of institutions.
Three things should  be noticed. First, by saying that 
som eth ing  has merely a conventional existence, we do 
not imply that it is some kind of an illusion or ideologi- 
cal delusion. For example, by saying that ‘nationality’ 
is a conventional property, we do not ntean that it is 
therefore less real than some other properties; it is just 
different. Second, if som ething exists conventionally, it 
does not follovv that it can be changed at will. Some 
conventions are almost impossible to change. Third, 
there is no reason to suppose that conventional p roper­
ties or entities are morally less relevant than  ‘natura l’ 
properties and entities. For example, some authors have 
inferred that national differences are morally irrelevant, 
because they are merely ‘constructed’ or ‘imagined’ prop­
erties. But there is no a priori reason to make this inler- 
ence.
(CF) says that conventional lacts exist by virtue of 
beliefs of “relevant populations”. How is the relevancy 
to be determined? Intuitively, if the S-villeans generally 
believe that some place is their meeting-place, it is their 
meeting-place, while il the R-villeans believe that some 
other place is the meeting-place of S-villeans, that place 
is not necessarily a .meeting-place. But if we want to 
test the statement that some place is the meeting- place 
of the S-villeans, we have to determine which people 
are S-villeans and which are not.
Populations relevant to the existence of conventional 
lacts can normally be identified by other conventional 
facts. 11, for example, som ething is a conventional fact 
in the Finnish Society, the relevant population  is de- 
fined by the legal facts vvhich define the territory of
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Fin land  and  set the criteria of citizenship  -  and  these 
legal lacts are based on explicit conventions. In the case 
of S-ville the m atter may be m ore com plicated . Perhaps 
there are no explicit rules defining the borders of S-ville. 
There may be som e d isagreem ent on w h e th e r some 
person really is an S-villean or not. But there are crite­
ria, how ever inexact, and  these criteria exist because 
they are usecl by the S-villeans them selves. Thus, “rel- 
evant popu la tions” define them selves. H um an  beings 
live and act in groups, and  these groups -  families, clubs. 
neighbourhoods, com m unities, tribes, churches, par- 
ties, nations and  alliances -  detine them selves by refer- 
ring som e criteria of m em bersh ip . They grant citizen­
ship rights, baptisize proselytes, and  deliver m em ber 
cards. Q uite often, these criteria are recognized by out- 
stders, by the State, for exam ple. Som etim es this o u t­
side recognition is fundam ental. The statelets (“ban tu  - 
stans”) created by the w hite South African governm ent 
were not States because the in ternational com m unity  
d id not recognize them  as States.
IV Ontological worries
One claim which has been m ade against the idea oi con- 
ventionality oi social lacts is that it is just an instance of 
conceptual relativism or subjectivism . For exam ple, Al­
exander Peczenik argues against Tore Strömholm!? con- 
ventionalist theory oi law in the follovving way:
Ström holm ... claims that the concept “valid law ” does 
not refer to anything extant. The reason is that valid 
legal rules w ould disapper had  people not thought 
about legal rules. However, cannot one say the same 
about material things? The fact that one now  and  here 
sees a forest depends not only on the forest but also 
on the eyes and m ind of the Observer. (...) Had people
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not interpreted the “data” as a forest, the forest vvould 
disappear, precisely as valid law. Ali concepts are con- 
ventional. Yet, it is absurd to claim that no concepts 
refer to anything extant. (Peczenik, 1989, 262)
This criticism does not apply to my version of conven- 
tionalism. According to my version, the concept “valid 
law” refers to something extant, namely to conventional 
entities of certain kind. These entities do exist, in their 
own peculiar vvay. Nevertheless, it is true that they would 
necessarily disappear if people ceased to use the con­
cept, and in this sense they are not like forests. The 
claim is not that our concepts are just conventionally 
agreed ways of classifying our perceptual vvorld. The 
claim is that the en tities them selves  are created by con- 
ventions. The conventions are not about the use ot the 
language, but about the proper vvay to act. This claim is 
neutral in respect of the ontological realism-antirealism 
issue. A realist vvould say that there vvere forests before 
humans entered the scene, and, hopefully, there may 
be some forests leit vvhen they leave it. But there vvere 
no valid lavvs before the emergence of human societies.
Another charge raised against conventionalism is that 
it seems to move in circles. A necessary condition for 
the existence of a conventional entity is, that it is be- 
lieved to exist. Then, the term vvhich appears in a n a lys-  
andu tn  also appears in a n a lysa n s. IsiVt this an obvious 
logical defect? It vvould be, if my purpose vvere to give 
a reductive definition oi the analysed notions (“Instead 
of saying T ’ you may say ‘Q &r R'.”). But this is not the 
aim of my analysis. By analysing ‘money’ as something 
vvhich is believed to be money in the relevant commu- 
nity, 1 try to point otit a connection betvveen the use of 
the concept and a condition vvhich holds in respect vvith 
'money’ but not in respect vvith some other concepts 
(like 'forest’). While a circular or reflexive analysis of 
this kind does not give us the meaning of the vvord
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‘m o n ey ’, it provides us som e In fo rmat ion  w hich  may 
help us to determine the extension of the concept (On 
a defence of circular analyses of this kind, see H um ber- 
stone 1997).
The w ork  of David-Hillel Ruben (1985) provides us 
an excellent example ot a criticism based on the circu- 
larity charge. At the same time, his analysis on the hasis 
ot w hat he calls “social p roperties” very similar to my 
notion of conventional facts (Ruben 1985, 114-15). 
Ruben claims that a reductive or “non-reductive illu- 
m inative” identilication oi social entities or social p rop­
erties w ith  individual entities or properties is impossi- 
ble. This is an ontological thesis. He also claims that 
individualistic explanations elo not enjoy any priority 
over non-individualistic ones: this is his methodologi- 
cal thesis.
W hy does Ruben th ink  that irreducible social enti­
ties exist? His example ot such an entity is France, lt 
seems that we ascribe several properties to the entity 
called ‘France’, and that there is no set ot individual 
facts and entities vvhich w ould  be identical w ith  that 
social entity  Only the last of the candidates rejected by 
hitu, “reduction oi France to beliefs and atti tudes” (p. 
30), is relevant here. His counter-argum ent is this: The 
set of relevant beliefs can be described only if the name 
‘France’ itselt appear inside the scope of belief-operators. 
But it som ebody has an intelligible singular beliet about 
an entity, then the entity m ust exist. In that case the 
Identification ot France with beliefs about France be- 
comes circular:
A necessary condition for there to be persons with 
singular beliefs about France is that France exists. 
(...) Nor, for that matter could  the identity be even 
non-reductive bu t illuminative, since the circularity 
is so obvious. (Ruben 1985, 35-6)
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H is a rg u m e n t  in respec t  to the iden tif ica tion  of  social 
p ro p e r t ie s  w ith  system s of beliefs is just the  same:
W h a te v e r  the p roper t ie s  are, if there  is an  intelligible
beliel tha t  x is P, the re  m u s t  be the p ro p e r ty  oi be ing
P (ibid. p. 1 24)
Now, the p rob lem , a d m it te d  by Ruben himself ,  is tha t  
the  a r g u m e n t  implies th a t  fictional en tit ies  like Santa 
Claus o r  the alleged p lanet Vulcanus also exist (cf. Ruben 
1985, 35).  And the sam e ho lds  w ith  fictional p ro p e r ­
ties, like ‘hav ing  a m agical p o w e r \  An onto log ica l  indi-  
v idualist  is not likely to be m u c h  afraid oi a theo ry  vvhich 
c laim s tha t  social entit ies  or  p roper t ie s  have the  sam e 
onto log ica l  s ta tus  as Santa C laus has. The basic disa- 
g ree m en t  be tw een  R uben  and  m e is, hovvever, n o t  on  
the issue oi ind iv idualism , b u t  on  the  issue of circular- 
ity. Ruben believes tha t  the circularity, ob v io u s  in my 
def in i t ion  of  conven tiona l  (acts (CF), m a k es  the analy-  
sis com ple te ly  trivial,  w hile  I find it i l lum ina ting .  For 
m e, the circularity  is s im ply  a m a tte r  ot laet. A may 
believe tha t  ce r ta in  objects  have the p ro p e r ty  of  b e in g  
money. She may be w rong  in h e r  beliel. But il h e r  belief 
is g e n e ra l ly  s h a re d ,  it is n e c e s sa r t ly  co r re c t .  Il the  
conventionalist ic  analysis of m oney  is generally accep ted  
in the  com m unity ,  eve ry b o d y  also believes tha t  m o n e y  
is on ly  m o n e y  because it is the  ob ject  of  a general  belief 
that it is money. The analysis is circular, o r  reflexive, 
because  the  th ings  referred  to in the ana lysans,  beliefs, 
are them se lves  reflexive.
S u p p o se  tha t  we can analyse R u b e n s  ex am ple  entity, 
France, in this  vvay. More exactly, su p p o se  tha t  the  n a ­
t ion of France is identical ( reductive ly  o r  n o n - re d u c t -  
ively) w ith  a system  of a t t i tudes  c o n c e rn in g  the n a t io n  
of F rance.  This analysis is i l lum inative ,  for n u m e ro u s  
a t te m p ts  to identify  the n a t io n  w ith  som e racial,  lin- 
guistic, cu l tu ra l ,  m etaphys ica l ,  etc. p roper t ie s  o r  en ti-
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ties are inconsistent with it. Indeed, il the convention- 
alist analysis is accepted, a substantial part oi the ideol- 
ogy of m odern  nationalism has to be rejected. Accord- 
ing to the conventionalist analysis, a nation com es into 
existence just w hen  sufficiently many people, for some 
reason or other, do iorm the relevant shared attitudes. 
Thus, the analysis, in spite of its circularity, does help 
us to determ ine the extension of the concept. Notice 
that it does not follow from my analysis that nations 
like France are som ehow  irreal or “merely fictional”. 
They are as real as their constituting parts: beliefs, in- 
tentions and  actions.
Ruben also denies that social facts could be explained 
in terms of individual beliefs, a ttitudes and actions His 
argum ent is basically the same as before:
In the case of rationally held true belief, we d o n ’t 
explain the social lacts by m eans oi agents’ beliefs 
about social facts: we explain the beliefs abou t social 
facts in part by the social lacts. (Ruben 1985, 168)
Thus, he accuses methodological individualists oi re- 
versing the correct order of explanation. In norm al cases, 
a laet is part of the explanation of the belief about the 
fact, not the o ther  way round.
1 th ink that beliets about social facts can be partially 
explained by these lacts. Il we ask: “W hy does A be- 
lieve that certain objects are money?”, the natural an- 
swer seems to be: uThey are money in the Society in 
which she lives”. This answer refers to a social laet which 
exists independently  oi any particular beliefs abou t the 
fact. But how has A learned this fact? Weil, the others -  
B,C,D and  so on -  have told her that the objects are 
money, and she has seen that B,C,D etc. behave in a 
way which becomes understandable  by supposing  that 
the objects are money. B,C,D etc. have formed their simi- 
lar beliefs in the same way: by learning from others, A
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am ong  them. The continual existence of the belief is 
partially explained by mutual reinforcement: the be- 
liefs of individuals support  each other. Every individual 
sees the behaviour oi ali others as a part of his environ- 
m ent \vith vvhich he or she has to cope. From ind iv idu­
als’ point of view, the fact is jus t  there: others use cer- 
tain objects as money. My thesis is that th is  s i t u a t i o n  
i t s e l f  constitutes the social fact -  the fact that the re- 
ferred objects are m oney  If we want a further explana- 
tion, il m ust be a historical one. How did the mem bers 
of the Society originally form their beliefs? The expla- 
nation is likely to be complex: there are the practical 
constraints (only some kinds of objects can iunction as 
m oney); there  are psychological factors, inc lu d in g  
memories of the past, and conscious selection, vvhich 
make some conventions more likely to arise than o th ­
ers. These factors may be partially explained by a gen ­
eral theory of hu m an  perception. But conventions are 
partially arbitrary: pure chance may play an im portant 
role in their formation.
This theory  is, indeed, circular. The mutual belief 
about the existence of a social fact is a k ind  of self-ful- 
filling prophecy vvhich necessarily makes itself true. The 
only alternative seems to be that social facts exist inde- 
pendently  and before the beliefs. That is implied by 
Rubens account. He does not, hovvever, teli us h o w  they 
exist.
Com pare again the status of social facts vvith the sta­
tus of such facts as as being a vveapon. Il I take a stick 
vvith the in tention of using it as a vveapon, the stick is a 
vveapon. It is possible for me to form such an intention 
only because 1 have learned the concept of vveapon, or 
at least 1 have some kind of co rresponding  idea in my 
niind. Somehovv, the idea or concept exists. But I d o n ’t 
think that this implies any of the follovving positions: 
(a) that the concept exists in d ep enden tly  of hum an  
m inds and activities, or (b) that even if it exists, that
8Q
E e r ik  L a g e r s p e t z
particular object was a w eapon before 1 formed that 
intention, or (c) that my in tention-iorm ation should  be 
explained by some kind of causal efiect the concept 
had on my mind. We cannot explain why a stick is a 
weapon by referring either to its physical properties or 
to ihe general concept. It is necessary to refer to my 
propositional attitudes: 1 neecl a w eapon and l believe 
that this particular stick is a suitable object to be used 
as a weapon. Thus, my propositional attitudes are used 
to explain an external laet and not the o ther way round 
There seems to be nothing odd in this.
Conventional facts and properties are different mainly 
because they require mutual a ttitudes in order to be 
realized. I can make som ething a w eapon, b u t  only wc 
can make som ething money, lf there is no collective 
conseiousness or World Spirit operating  beh ind  our 
backs, the laet that som ething becomes money has, ul- 
timately, to be explained in terms of our  individual ac- 
tions and beliets. But, w hen  constructing  such an ex- 
planation, we are not trying to reduce the notion of 
money to som eth ing  else. We are simply pointing out 
that money can exist only in this peculiar way. The ques- 
tion w hether this type oi analysis deserves the name 
'invidualist’ or not, is of secondary importance.
V. Conventional facts and legal institutions
W hat k inds oi facts are conventional in my sense? The 
paradigmatic cases 1 have in my m ind are (1) cases in 
which a is a rule or norm  or practice in S and  (2) cases 
in which a is F because there is a rule, norm  or practice 
in S that a should be counted  as F -  the case analysed 
by Searle. Both rules and instances or applicaiions ot 
rules can be treated as conventional facts. But two things 
should be noticed. Firstly, this is not in tended to be a 
linguistic analysis covering ali the possible meanings oi
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ihe words Tule’ or ‘n o rm ’. For example, technical rules 
are not conventional: vve have a reason to tollow them 
even if they are not generally recognized or followed, if 
they are useful for our  purposes.
The norm s of personal or critical morality are not 
conventional either. If I believe that eating meat is wrong, 
I have a reason to follow the rule never to eat meat even 
if 1 am the only person having that conviction. The con- 
trast with the rules of grammar, etiquette or (some parts 
oO law is obvious. (Theorists having a conventionalist 
view of morality may disagree here.) Similarily, a rule 
which is maintained by coercion only does not fit into 
the definition. A second im portan t point is that the 
notion oi conventional fact is not inherently  tied to the 
existence oi rules. It is possible that some a is F simply 
because the relevant m utual belief is there: this cuts oli 
the regress appearing in Searles account. We can some- 
times create new conventional (or, as Searle calls them, 
social) facts w ithout a reference to a pre-existing prac- 
lice. I can sometimes com m unicate  m eanings without 
relying on rules vvhich would give my expressions or 
actions that meaning; l can give authoritative com m ands 
vvithout a rule authorizing me (as in W eber’s case oi 
charismatic authority) an d  so on. Some convention-cre- 
ating acts can have their in tended  effects simply be­
cause they are believed to have these effects. Ultimately, 
every chain  ot rules has to originate from convention- 
creating acts.
Institutions are systems of existing, interlocked rules. 
By giving a conventionalist analysis for rules, it is pos­
sible to build up a theory oi such basic institutions as 
law, m oney or language which satisfies our  pre-theo- 
retical intuitions m entioned before. Notice that the term 
‘insti tu tion’ is used in a wide sense. Usually, we do not 
call language an institution. Here, this use is adopted 
in order to indicate the com m on nature of rule-governed 
practices -  1 follow the example of de Saussure w ho in
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his C o u r s  de  l in g u i s t iq u e  g e n e r a l  considered language 
(la n g u e ) as in s t i tu t ion  sociale. A more restricted use of 
the term presupposes that ‘social institutions’ are only 
those practices which are related to a u t h o n t y  a n d p o w e r .  
In the modern society, law is the most prominent among 
those institutions.
There are several classifications of rules in the litera- 
ture. SearleS (Kantian) distinction between regu la t ive  
and co n s i tu t ive  rules is important because lt reminds us 
oi the laet that rules do not only regulate actions by 
prescribing and prohibiting: they also make it possible 
for us to do new things, by defining something as sorne- 
thing. However, these classes are not mutually exclu- 
sive.
It seems that every rule called “regulative" by Searle 
has a constitutive aspect (but not vice versal). A rule 
which forbids stealing creates new types of actions: steal- 
ing and refraining from stealing. Any regulative rule 
makes il possible to re-describe actions as instances oi 
following or breaking that rule. On the other hand, not 
ali constitutive rules have a regulative elfect. But many 
do. A constitutive rule of football says that players have 
to kick the ball, not to throw it with hands. If this rule 
is not generally observed in a game, the game in ques- 
tion is not lootball but a dilferent game. Nevertheless, 
an individual player can break the rule and suffer a 
penalty. We could either say that the general observ- 
ance oi regulative rules constitutes the practice, or that 
the constitutive rules of the practice have a regulative 
elfect in individual cases. These descriptions are equiva- 
lent.
My first analysis oi rules is the following:
(R) R is a regulative rule in S if
(1) the members of S generally comply 
with R;
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(2) there is a m utual belief in S that R is 
a regulative rule in S,and
(3) (2) is at least partly a reason for (1).
(DR) R is a definition rule in S if
(1) the m em bers  of S generally count
as as F s;
(2) lt is a mutual belief in S that there is 
a definition rule R in S w hich  de 
tines as as Fs, and
(3) (2) is at least partly a reason for (1).
These analyses cannot be the whole Story. Sometimes it 
is possible to say that there are rules, for example, legal 
rules, which are not generally followed by the m em ­
bers of a particular Society. Therelore (R) and  (DR) give 
only sulficient conditions  for the existence oi rules. 
Another sufficient condition  for the existence oi rules 
is the following:
(RR) R is a rule in S if there is a definition rule
R’ which defines R as a rule in S.
(R), (DR) and (RR) are special eases oi my description 
ot conventional facts. (RR), hovvever, shows how the 
existence of a rule is not necessarily a conventional laet. 
A rule can exist because it is defined as a rule by an ­
o ther  rule. But because the chain  p ro d u ced  by the 
reapplications oi (RR) cannot go on indefinitely, the 
ultimate rules which define o ther  rules must exist con- 
ventionally. The conjunction of (R), (DR) and (RR) gives 
the necessary and sullicient conditions for som ethings 
being a conventionally existing rule in S.
The point of the recursive clause (RR) is this. Social 
rules may form system s. An individual m em ber rule oi a 
rule-system need not exist by the virtue oi mutual belief 
concerning its existence -  consider some more esoteric
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parts of law which are not known by a small circle of 
legal specialists. It is enough if a rule belongs to a chain 
or net of rules which ultimately can be tracecl back to 
mies which exist in the relevant community as conven- 
tional facts. To put it in more familiar terms, the rules 
exist it they are recognized by a “rule (or rules) of recog- 
nition” which is itself efficacious. The similarity between 
this view and that oi H.T.A. Hart in his classic The Con- 
cept o f Law  is obvious. My view, however, provides an 
answer to the charge of circularity made against Harts 
view of law. In Harts view, the rule of recognition exists 
as a social practice among the officials. Against this, N. 
E. Simmonds has claimed thai the questions about the 
validity ot the ultimate norm s of a system cannot be 
merely about the beliefs and actions of oflicials, for
if the question about the nature of a practice were a a 
question about what official thought then the content 
oi their thought could nol be a thought about the 
nature of the practice. (Simmonds 1984, 104)
This is another instance of the circularity charge dis- 
cussect above. 11 my vievv is correct, the circle is not a 
vicious one; the content of the ultimate rules can be 
analysed partly in terms of olficials’ (and of other citi- 
zens’) thoughts about these rules.
This account oi rules leaves many questions unan- 
swered. For example, the question oi how the belief ”R 
is a rule for the com m unity S” can work as a reason for 
the members oi that com m unity to comply with the 
rule? The fact that R is recognized as a rule is a neces- 
sary condition for conscious (and not merely epiphe- 
nomenal) compliance, but it is not a sulficient condi­
tion for that. There is no simple answer to the question, 
for rules allect on individuals’ practical reasoning in 
different ways. But one essential role of rules in human 
lite is to help individual to coordinate their actions. In
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interaction situations, the consequences ot actions taken 
by me (including their symbolic consequences) are of- 
ten dependent on the actions taken by you, and vice 
versa. Indeed, according to Jurgen Habermas, every so­
cial interaction that comes without the exercise of mani- 
fest violence can be understood as a solmion to the prob- 
lem of coordinating the action plans of several actors 
(Haberm as 1996, 17). In many cases, especially in face- 
to-face situations, we can solve the problem  vvithout 
any institutionalized rules, by relying on our shared 
beliefs. To use David H um e’s favorite example, “two men 
puli the oars of a boat by com m on  convention for com ­
m on interest, vvithout any promise or contrac t”. Each 
m an prefers to row, if and  only if the o ther rovvs; the 
problem  is to lind a com m on rhy thm  of rovving, and 
that can be solved vvithout any explicite rule, or even 
vvithout discussion.
Com pare  this vvith ano ther  time-vvorn example: the 
traffic rules. Here vve have institutionalized rules. Even 
here, the main interest of every one is to follovv a pat- 
tern follovved by others; the exact content of the rules 
is less im portan t than the existence of a general pat- 
tern. But several factors affect here: (i) the large num ber  
of actors, (ii) the difficulty to com m unicate  and, (iii) 
the risks involved in the case the coordination fails. 
YVhat is needed is a system of rules vvhich are knovvn 
by ali, and knovvn to be knovvn by ali. Therefore, there 
should be a single authoritative source for the rules, so 
that in order  to learn the conten t of the rules, vve have 
to consult the lavv-book and not, say, the local custom.
Traffic rules are a particularly good example of the 
coordinative functions of lavv. Hovvever, large fragments 
of lavv are not directly related to coordination. Rather, 
their function is to prolect interests or values, or to regu- 
late conflicts ot interests or values. But even those parts 
of lavv are indirectly related to coordination. Hume ex- 
plains the existence of property  rights in the same vvay:
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1 observe that it will be in my interest to leave an- 
other in the possession oi his goods, provided that 
he will act in the same m an n e r  vvith regard to me. He 
is sensible of a like interest in the regulation oi his 
conduct. W hen  this co m m o n  sense is mutually ex- 
pressed and is know n to bo th , it produces a suitable 
resolution and  behaviour. A nd this may properly  
enough  be called a convention or agreement betwixt 
us, though without an in terposition  of a promise; 
since the actions of each of us have a reference to 
those oi the other, and are perform ed upon  the sup- 
position that som ething is to be performed on the 
other part. (...) In like m anner  are languages gradu- 
ally established by h u m a n  conventions, w ithout any 
promise. In like m anner  do gold and silver become 
the com m on measures of exchange, and are esteemed 
sufficient paym ent for what is of a hundered  times 
their value. (Hum e 1739/1948, 60-1)
YVhat is most important, the conventional existence of 
the rules of recognition which define the sources oi other 
legal rules makes posstble for courts  and  olficials to 
coordinate their decisions concerning the application 
and enforcement of rules. Here, the “relevant popula- 
t ion” is the sub-com m unity  oi officials -  i.e. of those 
w ho are recognized as olficials by the entire com m u- 
nity. This not exclude the possibility that there are sev- 
eral, partly com peting rules oi recognition. For exam- 
ple, national legislation and the regulations created by 
international organizations (eg. by the EU) may be partly 
incompatible, and there may be no super- rule deter- 
mining their mutual relations. The systemic nature of 
rules is always a m atter oi degree. But, contrary  to what 
Hobbes said, the existence of several, partly com peting 
authorities need not make our lile “nasty, brutish, and 
short”. For, as Leibniz rem arked to Hobbes, people may 
well live un d e r  a divided power, if they “hold some
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niidelle road, so as not to commit everything to hazard 
by their obstinacy” (Leibniz 1677/1981, 119). The plu- 
rality oi rules may make coordination more difficult, 
but not impossible.
The idea oi convention may help us to develop a 
more detailed theory oi the nature of soc ia l p o w e r  and 
a u th o r i ty . The notion of convention used here differs 
trom the notion developed by David Lewis in his clas- 
sical work C o n v en tio n  (1969). There, one of the main 
properties of conventions is that for every conventional 
solmion to a coordination problem there exists a possi- 
ble alternative or alternatives which would solve the 
problem equally well, and the agents involved tn the 
problem are virtually indifferent between the alterna­
tive Solutions. They go along with the existing conven­
tions just because they happen to be there. This irn- 
plies that their interests are basically identical. And then, 
of course, there is no power dimension in their interac- 
tions. But consider such practices as using dollar as the 
international currency, or using English as the lin g u a  
fr a n c a  in lndia or Africa. These practices solve real co­
ordination problems: there is an obvious need in both 
cases to find a shared practice, and the existence oi some 
shared practice is, for indvidual agents, more impor- 
tant than the particular nature of the chosen practice. 
But certainly these practices are not neutral. They are 
products oi pre-existing povver-relations, and they tend 
to reproduce the very sarne relations
VI. Conclusion: institutions and freedom
As Berger and Luckmann remark, the ‘objective’ nature 
oi institutions is a potential source of alienation. Insti­
tutions, although built on human conventions, tend to 
appear us as natural lacts which are outside any human 
control -  a phenomenon already noticed by Marx and
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Durkheim . This follows from ihe fact thai institutions 
are produced , not by your or by me, bu t by us. They 
can be changed only by collective action. W h e n  collec- 
tive action is impossibie, institutions may look as im- 
penetrable and immovable as physical laws or entities. 
This gives rise to the phenom enon  called as ”ideology” 
by Marx. People tend to see the institutional reality as a 
part of the eternal order of things. VVhen such a belief 
becomes mutually shared, it inakes institutional changes 
more dillicult, a lthough it does not, oi course, make 
them  as parts of the eternal order. Ideological belief s 
are no t selt-grounding; they are collective tllusions, Itke 
the belief in the existence of the Emperohs new cloths.
Nevertheless, institutions are also potential sources 
of h u m a n  freedom, in three dilferent ways. The s tan d ­
ard liberal argument, also present tn H um e s account, is 
that institutions extend our freedom by protecting us 
against the intrusions oi others. But there are two other, 
less obvious connections between institutions and h u ­
m an freedom. First, by facilitating coordination, insti­
tu tions make us possible to act in concert. Second, in ­
stitutional rules create normative powers: by virtue oi 
institutional rules, we may promise and make contracts, 
vote and  marry, accept com m itm ents  and step into in ­
stitutional roles. Because of institutions, we are able to 
do things w hich cannot be done outside institutional 
contexts.
The im portance of the last point becomes more vis- 
ible w hen we consider the “negative” conception oi po- 
litical freedom, in tro d u ced  by Jerem y Bentham and  
William Paley and  made popular by sir Isatah Berlin in 
his famous inaugural lecture T h e  Two Concepts oi Lib­
erty’. According to this conception, politically relevant 
liberty is simply the absence of sanction-backed regu- 
lative rules. (Hence, Robinson Crusoe on his isle pos- 
sesses the largest possible am ount oi this lorm oi free-
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dotn.) Bentham, Paley, and Berlin made the explicit 
contrasi betvveen this negative “liberal” conception and 
the more classical “republican” conception that defined 
politically relevant liberty as possession of certain pow- 
ers (e.g. voting rights).
Elsewhere (Lagerspetz 1998), 1 have tried to argue 
that the standard negative view is too limited even for 
political liberals. For it neglects the positive contribu- 
tion of constitutive institutional rules. To make the 
matter more clear, consider a person who is put under 
a guardianship. He m unable to make valid contracts, 
to make a will, to vote, or marry. This is not so because 
he is under some specific reg u la tiv e  rules. He may well 
draft and sign texts entitled as “My Last Will and Testa- 
ment” or “A Contract of Sales” without being subjected 
to a punishment. fle may rise his hand vvhen votes are 
counted, or say “1 do” at the presence of a person dressed 
as a priest. He may be Iree to perform the samc sets of 
physical movements as his fellow citizens. The differ- 
ence is that these movements do not constitute any new 
institutional facts. They are not counted. It seems plau- 
sible to say that the ward is less tree than his fellow 
citizens -  less free in an ordinary and politically rel­
evant sense. He is less (ree because he does not possess 
certain powers which can be conferred to him only by 
constitutive (or definition-) rules.
Certainly, the freedom to make contracts is the most 
liberal theme one can imagine. It it cannot be defined 
in terms ot “negative" liberty, there seems to be no foun- 
dation in the claim that the Benthamite negative con­
ception ot liberty is the  liberal conception. This exam- 
ple shows that the kind oi metaphysics ot institutions 1 
am defending may also have some relevance in the nor- 
mative political theory.
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Raimo Tuomela
COLLECTIVE ACCEPTANCE 
AND SOCIAL REALITY
I. The Collective Acceptance account of 
collective sociality
~any social and collective properties and  notions
are m an-m ade in a collective sense. There are two 
im portant features of the collective creation oi some 
central aspects oi the social World that have previously 
been em phasized in the literature -  by such authors as 
Barnes (1983), B loor(1996), Kusch (1997), and  Searle 
(1995). The first feature is that of the performative char- 
acter oi many social notions. The second is the reflexive 
nature of many social concepts. My account adds to 
this list a third feature, the collective availability or “for- 
groupness” of collective social items.
1 will argue in this paper that sociality is in m any 
cases created through collective acceptance. 1 have else- 
where created  a “Collective A cceptance” account oi 
sociality and social institutions (see Tuomela and Balzer, 
1999). The first section of the present paper will present 
this account. The second and  third section introduce 
some new features to the account. The fourth  section 
discusses social institutions. Section V makes some gen­
eral philosophical com m ents  on the scope of the ac­
count. The sixth section applies the account to the prob-
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lem of the ontology of the social vvorltl. On a general 
level, the basic problem to be discussecl in this paper is 
what collective acceptance can achieve concerning onto- 
logical matters. 1 w ill try to show that it can serve to 
make relevant parts of the social World ohjeetive and 
ontologically real in a sense not relving merely on 
“epistemic objectivity” (in Searle’s, 1995 sense).
According to the Collective Acceptance account oi 
(collective) sociallty -  developed in Tuomela and Balzer 
(1999) -  certain entities get their social status by being 
collectively created. For example, many kincls ot physi- 
cal entities -  for instance, squirrel fur in the case of 
medieval F inns-can “ in principle” become money. This 
occurs through the members of the collective in ques- 
tion accepting it as money. As soon as they cease to 
collectively accept it as money and to mutually believe 
that it is money, squirrel fur loses its status and func- 
tion as money
We must distinguish between a) collectively creating 
an idea, b) collectively holding and maintaining it, and 
finally c) collectively realizing it or carrying it out. Col­
lective acceptance relates to a) and b) in the first place.
1 argue that those collective social reasons, viz. reasons 
for which collective social actions in general are per- 
formed, are Special kinds oi “we-attitudes” (cl. below 
and Tuomela, 1995, Chapter 1, Tuomela and Bonnevier- 
Tuomela, 1997).1 Collective acceptance basically is C o r n ­
ing to hold and holding a relevant we-attitude. The we- 
attitudes (social reasons) that are needed for collective 
acceptance basically belongeither to the intention-lam- 
ily or to the belief-family of attitudes. My account con- 
centrates on intentional achievement actions, but il must 
be remembered that neither coming to hold a we-atti- 
tude nor holding a we-attitude need be intentional ac­
tions. Thus, in principle, an agent can acquire a belief 
that, for instance, there is a tree in front of him, w ith- 
out h is reflection and intentional action. Thus, an agent
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can accept something as correct w ithout having inten- 
tionally arrived at this kind of acceptance State. 1 w ill 
belovv concentrate on acceptance beliefs, which are 
states of acceptance oi a content (sentence, proposi­
tion) as correct (or true), while mere believing is a State 
in which the agent experiences something as true or 
real (ci. Cohen, 1992, Tuomela, 1999). Typically such 
a state oi acceptance is produced by the mental action 
of acceptance and is, furthermore, based on the agents 
reflection of what is being accepted and oiten also on 
relevant evidential considerations -  e.g. other group 
members’ acceptances. Analogously it can be claimed 
that individual acceptance typically -  although not al- 
ways -  is intentiona!. However, collective acceptance 
need not be collectively intentional in the strong sense 
of being based on a jo int intention to accept -  the par- 
ticipants may tnstead be connected in terms of their 
mutual beliefs (recall the cases oi collective acceptance 
w ithout even an individual intention present).
Acceptances as states (viz., as states normally result- 
ing from acceptance action) are basically dispositions 
to act in accordance w ith the contents of those states, 
these contents serving as reasons for those actions. 
Whatever else those reasons may include, intentions 
and beliefs of a relevant k ind must always be involved 
(this is a generally accepted iact about reasons of ac­
tion). Thus the account oi acceptance in the sense of 
holding a we-attitude oi a relevant k ind can concen­
trate on intentions and beliefs: intentions and beliels 
must accompany wants, wishes, fears, and whatever can 
motivate action, simply because the concept oi action 
is based on the idea of doing something at w ill under 
the guidance oi beliefs. In general, 1 argue that the ques- 
tion of how much intentionality and oi vvhich kind (cf. 
I-mode versus we-mode intentionality, correctness ver- 
sus falsity of relevant beliefs) there must be in each par- 
ticular case is to be decided on the hasis of the collec-
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tive outcome -  what kinds of activities result from col- 
lective acceptance and the maintenance of what has thus 
been accepted. Trivially, people must be able to do with 
money what we generally do with it and the same goes 
for schools, churches, governments and so on.
Consider collective action performed with some (even 
if perhaps not full) collective intentionality, viz. collect­
ive social action performed for the same shared social 
reason. For instance, in a group there might be a (weak) 
we-goal to oppose a tax increase; viz. this is the group 
members’ goal, and they believe that the others share 
this goal and believe that this is mutually believed 
among them. Collective acceptance in this kind oi situ- 
ation can be construed as acceptance either in the sense 
oi conative commitment to a sentence or proposition s 
(intention to make s true or to uphold s, e.g. s= The tax 
increase is to be prevented) or doxastic commitment to 
s (the “acceptance” belief that s is true, e.g. s= The earth 
is liat). Collective acceptance here is a) (weak) “we-ac- 
ceptance”, viz. each person comes to accept s, believes 
that the others accept s, and also believes that there is a 
mutual belief about the participants’ acceptance of s. 
This we-acceptance can be either “private” acceptance 
(acceptance in the 1-mode, viz. the group members “pri- 
vately” accept s) or acceptance in the we-mode (viz. the 
group members together accept s and are collectively 
committed to s). In both cases acceptance involves re- 
flective avvareness not only concerning vvhat one one- 
self accepts but also vvhat the others accept. In the lat- 
ter, we-mode case also a collective commitment to s 
must be involved, and we get the minimal sense oi ac- 
cepting f o r  th e  g r o u p  (and the involved “we-mode” to- 
getherness vvhich intersubjectively involves the group). 
Furthermore, vvithout the “vve-mode” mutual belief there 
is not enough intersubjectivity and collective commit- 
ment for the application of the phrase Tor the group' 
and for saying that the participants are attempting to
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see to it collectively that the accepted content will be- 
come satisfied or -  as the case may be -  remain satis- 
fied. Acceptance “for the g ro u p ” with collective com- 
m itm ent can be viewed in this context as coextensive 
with acceptance in the w e-m ode. Thus, “We accept that 
s is correctly assertable for us in ou r  group-related ac- 
tivities” is truth-equivalent w ith  “We accept s in the we- 
m ode”. We can also say that w e-m ode acceptance con- 
sists of collective acceptance lor the group with collec­
tive com m itm ent concern ing  what has been accepted 
(see Section lii for further discussion). YVhen accept- 
ing som ething lor the group  the participants are collec­
tively com m itted  to a system oi norm s, which in gen­
eral requires that the m em bers  pertorm  cerrain actions 
(e.g. interences) and permits the performance of some 
other actions. In general there will be social s a n c l io n s -  
approval, disapproval -  to Control the group mem bers 
activities supposedly governed by their normative col­
lective com m itm ent.
Stronger forms of collective acceptance “for the group” 
that may be m entioned  here are b) norm -based , insti- 
tutional acceptance and c) plan-based or agreement- 
based collective acceptance. An example of b) is the 
collective acceptance that d ru n k  driving is w rong  and 
punishable, that anniversaries in a marriage ought to 
be celebrated, and perhaps also in some collective that 
squirrel fur counts as money. The last example is based 
on the social norm  that everyone in the collective ought 
to treat squirrel fur as money. An example of c), plan- 
based or agreement-based collective acceptance, is the 
group m em bers’ joint decision to eleet a certain person 
as their leader. In general, acceptance for a group en- 
tails m utual beliel in the acceptance, at least in “egali- 
tarian” groups and in groups in which the normative 
structure oi the group does not affect collective aecept- 
ance .2
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II. Collective constructivist sociality
The follovving general thesis of sociality in a collective 
and “constructivist” sense can now be proposed (cf. 
Tuomela and Balzer, 1999, and recall note 2):
Collec t ive  A c c e p ta n c e  T hesis  (C A T ):  A sentence s is so ­
cial in a primary constructivist sense in a group G il 
and only il the (ollowing is true tor group G: a) the 
members of group G collectively accept s, and b) they 
collectively accept s if and only if s is correctly assertable.
In the analysans a) is the assumption of the categori- 
cal collective acceptance oi s while clause b) is a partial 
characterization of the ktnd of collective acceptance that 
is needed here.
In logical terms,
( C A T * )  s is social in a primary constructivist sense in 
G if and only 
if
Forgroup(CA(G,s) &r (CA(G,s) <-> s)).
Here the ‘operator’ CA represents the collective 
acceptance of s as true or as correctly assertable by G 
for G. Forgroup(G,s) means that s is correctly assertable 
for the group, G, in question (see Tuomela and Balzer, 
1999, for discussion). (In the case oi descriptive 
sentences correct assertability can be regarded as truth 
in a correspondence sense.) Acceptance for the group 
in general, viz. in the case of intentional collective 
acceptance, entails m utual belief concern ing  the 
acceptance.
CA must be a performative achievement-expressing 
notion and ‘acceptance’ is general enough to cover both 
the creation and upholding oi s and has achievement 
conceptually built into it. In standard cases collective 
acceptance involving collective commitment to what 
has been accepted can be required. Hovvever, norm 
obeying on the hasis of private commitment seems pos- 
sible in some cases, although not perhaps in a full-blown
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sense; see the discussion in Chapter 6 of Tuomela, 1998.
Let me clarify correct assertability. First note that we 
can derive from (CAT) and soine logical assumptions 
eoncerning FG that FG(s) (see Tuomela and Balzer, 1999). 
We can interpret FG(s) as “group G takes s to be cor- 
rectly assertable in G-contexts” or “G treats s as correctly 
assertable in G-contexts”, where G-contexts are contexts 
related to the activities of the group members of G when 
they act as g r o u p  m e m b e r s  as opposed to privately. This, 
when we go to the individual or member-level, entails “s 
is collectively available or premissible in G-contexts”. 
Premissibility is the idea of taking s to be correct or to be 
assumable in the context in question. But a group mem- 
ber does not really have to believe  it is true. (Neverthe- 
less, premissibility in G can be viewed as a notion in the 
belief-family, construed in a wide sense.) To accept some- 
thing as right or correctly assertable entails that one has 
the right to use the sentence as a premiss. In some cases, 
e.g. when a “flatearther” is asked about the shape of the 
earth, the m ember ought to use a certain premiss (in the 
example, “The earth is liat”). Using it as premiss means 
accepting it as a premiss in one’s practical inference or 
using it as the hasis of one’s action. We can now ask 
whether one can accept s and not-s. The answer is that a 
rational group member cannot do it. Note, however, that 
one can to some extern rationally accept s c/ua a  m e m b e r  
of G and accept not-s as a p r iv a te  p er so n .  My present 
account does not rely on the notion of correspondence 
truth as an analytical notion. The basic notion herc is the 
normative notion of a groups treating something as cor­
rectly assertable. Hovvever, correctly assertable descr ip t ive  
sentences can be regarded as true in an objective, 
“picturing”sense (cf. Sellars, 1968, Tuomela, 1985).
Consider now briefly the notion of collective accept- 
ance as characterized by (C A T * ) :  Forgroup(CA(G,s) <- 
> s).
First consider the implication from left to right:
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Forgroup(CA(G,s) -> s) (Performativity)
This is true simply on the basis oi the notion of col- 
lective acceptance, which is an achievement notion rela- 
tive to the groups “intentional horizon.” VVhat the group 
accepts is correctly assertable or true for the group 
members.
Next consider the converse implication:
Forgroup(s -> CA(G,s)) (Reflexivity)
This gives a Central and often emphasized concep- 
tual “mark of the social”: For s to be correctly assertable 
within G it must be collectively accepted in G. The truth 
of s (or G makes reference to s itself within the sentence 
CA(G,s). This condition will be discussed in Section V 
YVe can say roughly that a sentence is collective-so- 
cial in a d erived  sense it it is not “constructively” social 
in the above primary sense but prcsupposcs for its truth 
(for the group) that there are some relevant true (for 
the group) sentences, which are collective-social in the 
primary sense. For instance, sentences using ‘power’, 
‘unemployment’, or ‘wealth’ are at least in some cases 
candidates for constructively social sentences in the 
derived sense. Latent or unilateral social influence are 
social features of the social world that would not - and 
correctly so -  be cases of even derivatively social fea­
tures in the constructivist sense (not even when many 
agents are concerned). The same holds lor “naturally” 
social emotions such as envy often is (cf. Tom envies 
John lor the latters new car). Furthermore, many shared 
we-attitudes are not socially constructed either (for in­
stance, shared lear may be a “natural” or “non-con- 
structed” social phenomenon).
There is also a kind of “shadowy side” in collective 
acceptance in our present sense. A group can collec­
tively  reject (CR) ideas. For instance, let s = Human be- 
ings are a product of natural evolution. A group might 
reject s. I submit that this entails not only that it does 
not accept s but that it accepts the negation oi s, viz. -s.
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In o ther words, I claim that collective rejection is a sub- 
species of non-acceptance by w hich  the group is able 
conceptually to construct notions. We do not, however, 
need to adopt a Special technical notion of collective 
rejection for this job, for my present thesis reduces the 
task to collective acceptance, viz. CR(G,s) entails CA(G,- 
s). It can he m entioned  here that there is also another 
way of dealing with “negative items”, a lthough these 
two ways are com plem en ta ry  and  do not com pete . 
Brielly, a group may (and here must, il rational) accept 
also that it rejects s and  accepts -s. Thus, in symbols, 
CA(G, GR(G,s)) and CA(G, CA(G,-s)) would  be true in 
this case. For instance, a group may accept e.g. that the 
though t that hu m an  beings are a product of natural 
evolution is rejectable (this is oi the k ind  CA(CR(G,s))). 
In my account collective acceptance has as one of its 
intuitive source ideas that it concerns w hat the group 
members are licensed to write dow n and use as premises. 
In my example, CR(G,s) is accordingly taken to entail 
that they may use -s as a premise, and  ought to use it 
when the genesis ot the hum an  race is the ohjeet of 
inquiry.
My som ew hat tentative thesis is that the family oi 
intention concepts (including agreements and com m it- 
ments) and acceptance beliefs (doxastic takings) are the 
basic a ttitudes needed to sustain (CAT), bu t a detailed 
defense is not possible here.
111. More on collective acceptance
1 have above required  of collective acceptance that, in 
the context of (CAT), it be for the group and  that in- 
volve collective com m itm ent concerning w hat has been 
collectively accepted. 1 will now consider collective ac­
ceptance (CA) som ewhat more generally in view of the 
“variables” forgroupness (FG) and  collective com m it-
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m ent (CoCom).
We have seen that collective acceptance is either a) a 
collective social action performed for a shared social 
reason or b) the state of having accepted som ething and 
being therefore disposed to perform relevant collective 
actions. Case a) is exempltfied by the case of the group 
m em bers  m aking  the agreement to accept a sentence s 
(e.g. s = We ahvays walk on the right han d  side of the 
road in our village). Making the agreement is a collec­
tive social action which is performed for the shared rea­
son  (purpose) of achieving consensus on some ques- 
tion (e.g. concerning traffic rules) and  specifically on 
w h e the r  to accept s or som ething else. The agreement 
(and  shared intention) to accept s results in the accept­
ance of s -  indeed there is no conceptual room here for 
agreeing to accept s and not accepting s. Acceptance of 
s thus  is the conceptually inbuilt “result event” of the 
agreem ent-m aking  in question. The participants’ con- 
tinued  acceptance of the agreement entails that they 
will have the in tention to continue to hold  onto s. The 
intentions to enter agreement making, to accept s, and 
to continue  to hold onto s need not be full blown joint 
intentions although they must be shared intentions with 
the same content.
Once a sentence, s, has been collectively accepted, 
collective acceptance (CA) in the “rather full” sense re- 
qu ired  in the present account (which need not be in a 
w e-m ode sense) can be regarded as a disposition to 
perform relevant collective social actions (viz. actions 
perform ed for the same social reason) concern ing  the 
accepted content, say s. The social reason here will be 
to collectively satisfy or uphold  (as the case may be) 
the sentence in question. The participants may be ei­
ther collectively or privately com m itted  to this kind of 
activity. They must in this context mutually  believe that 
they have collectively accepted s and  understand  what 
such  collective acceptance is (and thus that they are
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com m itted  to s). As their social reason involves not only 
the idea of satisfying or upho ld ing  s but also the idea of 
doing this in part because of the others also do it, we 
can see that collective acceptance involves reflection of 
social expectations. The participants must be aware of. 
or believe, not only that they themselves have accepted 
s but also that the others have similarly accepted s and 
in fact that the others also believe similarly of the o th ­
ers (and so on higher up  in the beliel hierarchy, at least 
in principle). The fuller cases thus m ust involve at least 
loop beliefs: each person should believe som ething not 
only about the o thers’ beliefs bu t also about their b e ­
liefs concerning his belief and perhaps more.
It can be pointed out, that for the above to be correct, 
CA must be understood as a proper collective social ac­
tion, viz. collective action performed for a shared social 
reason (in the sense exactly characterized in Tuomela and 
Bonnevier-Tuomela, 1997). In the literature on collec­
tive action -  especially in the literature dealing with the 
public goods problem -  collective action is often under­
stood only in a weak aggregate sense falling short of be- 
ing proper collective social action. In this aggregate sense 
a collective action consists of people performing the same 
type oi action, perhaps mutually believing that they are 
doing so. 11 only this much were meant by collective 
action, it would not by itsell rationally entail mutual b e ­
lief (be there mutual belief or not), forgroupness, nor 
collective commitment. It can be noted that there could 
even be aggregate collective action lor the group, viz. 
FG(CA(G,s)), w i th o u t  the ra tionally  necessary  ac- 
companiment of mutual belief. This is because CA would 
be private (individual-mode acceptance), and w hether 
or not mutual beliel actually happens to be present would 
not change the matter.
C onsider briefly collective com m itm ent in its weak- 
est, we-attitude sense. In the case of two persons, you 
and me, if we are collectively com m itted  to a proposi-
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tion s, the following must be true: I take myself to be 
committcd to s and w ill act accordingly, in part because 
1 believe that I ought to do what it takes to make or 
keep s correctly assertable for the group; and I believe 
that you are also sim ilarly committed to s and w ill act 
accordingly, in part because of your sim ilar personal 
(not necessarily social) normative thoughts; further- 
more, we botli believe that ali this is m utually believed 
by us. Here s could be “The earth is flat” , and we are 
talking about your and my commitment to maintain- 
ing its correct assertability. In present weak sense of 
collective commitment my account goes in terms of 
shared we-beliel only. Thus Communication is not re- 
quired and still less is explicit agreement making at 
stake. (Note that private mode collective acceptance 
need not involve collective commitment even in this 
weak sense.)
The present notion oi collective commitment can be 
strengthened, on the one hand, by requiring the nor­
mative aspect to rely on an intersubjective norm or 
obligation tovvards s. On the other hand, it can be 
strengthened by requiring the participants to th ink that 
the others ought to perlorm their “parts” of the collec­
tive commitment to uphold s and that they, being com­
mitted, indeed do perlorm them. This latter addition 
can be called a social commitment or a social aspect of 
the collective commitment to s. In ali, collective commit­
ment in this strongest sense involves i) action expect- 
ation (especially for the others), ii)  intersubjective 
(“objective”) normative basis lor commitment, and iii) 
social expectation (entitlement to expect that the oth­
ers w ill act appropriately).
Let me now systematically consider CA, FG, and 
CoCorn in their various combinations. We may th ink 
of a Venn diagram concerned w ith  the domain oi ali 
things that are in a groups concern, something the group 
actually or dispositionally is concerned vvith. Let us call
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this dom ain  of items (sentences) the g ro u p ’s intentiional 
horizon (IH). We can also say, equivalently, that the  el- 
ements of 1H are items that the group is concerned  with 
in its propositional attitudes, its thoughts, so to speak. 
W ithin IH we may now  consider the following con- 
tents:
(+-)CA(G,s) Gr (+-) FG(G,s) Gr (+-)Cocom(G,s).
Here the + and - signs obviously mean, respectively, 
inclusion and exclusion related to the sets in question.
Let us now consider the subclasses oi 1H in obvious 
shorthand  notation:
1. CA &  FG Gr CoCom
2. CA Sr FG Gr -CoCom
3 C.A &  -FG Gr CoCom
4. CA Gr -FG Gr -CoCom
5. -CA Gr FG &  CoCom
6. -CA Gr FG Gr -CoCom
7. -CA Gr -FG Gr CoCom
8. -CA Gr -FG Gr -CoCom
O ur discussion in Section II has shown that collective 
acceptance in the lullest sense m ust be of the k ind  1, 
viz. it must be collective acceptance tor the g roup  and  
il must involve collective com m itm en t (but recall the 
m ention  of some marginal cases with private com m it-  
ments only an d  see the discussion oi case 2 below). 
This is in laet what we mean by w e-m ode collective 
acceptance. (This is not mere stipulation, bu t accords 
with how  1 have analyzed the w e-m ode in C hap ter  2 of 
Tuomela, 1998.) However, the Collective Acceptance 
account can exceptionally tolerate also case 2 (while 
still requiring private com m itm ent;  cl. belovv).
Civen our earlier discussion, 1 propose the thesis that 
w e-m odeness (WM) is tru th-equivalent to collective ac­
ceptance with collective com m itm ent for the group, viz.
i) W M(G,s) <-> CA(G,s) Gr FG(G,s) Gr CoCom (G,s).
T h e  s e c o n d  c o n j u n c t  c o u l d  a lso  h a v e  b e e n  
CA(FG(G,s)), but in the present context the latter en -
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tails the former and conversely.
The lollowing can, furthermore, be proposed  as a 
vai id truth:
ii) CoCom(G,s) -> FG(G,s)
Clause ii) says that collective c o m m itm en t  in the 
context of collective acceptance entails collective ac- 
ceptance for the group. ii) can be argued for by saying 
that a g roup  cannot be collectively com m itted  to s un- 
less everybody som ehow  takes part in seeing to it that s 
will be or is kept correctly assertable and that, accord- 
ingly, w hen  s is satislied or maintained (as the case may 
be) it is collectively available for ali g roup  mem bers 
and FG(G, s) is true. It oi course immediately follows 
from i) and ii) that
lii) W M (G,s) <-> CA(G,s) &r CoCom(G,s) 
is true as well - and of course accords w ith  what was 
earlier said about the we~mode.
Given this, we can now  consider  m ore  generally 
which of the cases l)-8) are rationally possible? Case 1 
am oun ts  to we-m ode collective acceptance and  does 
not require further com m ents  here. Case 2 is possible. 
There can be cases of collective acceptance for the group 
involving only private com m itm ents. Suppose thus that 
it is m utually  believed -  in a private, tacit sense -  by 
the Finns that they are the toughest people in the \vorld. 
This k ind of collective acceptance based on m utual pri­
vate belief would  only entail private com m itm ents  but 
could  still be for the group and even be a reason for 
collective social action. Case 3 is not possible, as CoCom 
entails FG. Case 4 is possible: There might be collec­
tive private acceptance of statement such as that emer- 
alds are green without this being for the group  and with- 
out its being collectively com m itted . O r consider an- 
other example directly concerned with action. The group 
m em bers  might ali accept to go picking m ushroom s 
and accept it as true that everybody vvill go, w ithout 
accepting ali this for the group. There might be mutual
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kncnvledge about ihis in the group, but the group mem- 
bers w ould  conipete for the m ushroom s. This can be 
taken as collective acceptance in the I-mode without 
collective com m itm ent to the accepted activity and with- 
out (orgroupness. Case 5 I tind conceptually impossi- 
ble at least in the case of “egalitarian” groups (my sole 
concern here). There can be no collective com m itm ent 
w ithout people collectively accepting the sentence they 
are collectively com m itted  to, as com m itm ent entails 
having an intention to act appropriately; and that is what 
collective acceptance here am ounts  to. Thus collective 
com m itm ent to the proposition that the earth is flat 
entails the collective acceptance of the use tor ali group  
m embers ot the premiss “The earth  is flat” (although 
the converse is not generally true). How about case 6? 
Private acceptance by on ly a few people in the group of 
a sentence s w ould  satisly this case. Il is certainly pos- 
sible. More strongly, the group m ight collectively reject 
s, and this is also an instance oi 6. As to 7. it violates ii) 
and is impossible also for the reason that there can be 
no collective com m itm ent w ithout collective acceptance 
- recall the discussion oi case 5. Case 8 is possible. ltems 
which are the groups  concern  (although they are not 
for the group) bu t which it has not actively considered 
or has actively considered but not accepted belong here. 
E.g. the statement that titanium is a light metal might 
be given as an example.
In ali, we have found that of the com binatory  possi- 
bilities l)-8) only CA«Sr-FG«SrCocom (case 3), -CA «Sr 
FG «Sr CoCom  (case 5), and -CA «Sr -FG «Sr CoCom  (case 
7) are not “conceptual-rationally” possible, if we take 
collective acceptance (CA) to be collective social action 
or disposition to collective social action in the discussed, 
relatively precise sense oi Tuomela and  Bonnevier- 
Tuomela (1997). Although the Collective Acceptance 
account is typically concerned w ith  case 1 (and occa- 
sionally with 2), the consideration oi the o ther cases
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has both justified that laet and  has throvvn some fur- 
ther light on the notions of CA, FG, and CoCom.
IV Social institutions
Let us now  consider social institutions from the point of 
view oi the Collective Acceptance model. The phrase ‘so­
cial institution’ has been used in very many different ways, 
as also dictionaries witness. 1 submit that institutions 
presuppose some kind oi collective acceptance of a way 
oi acting in group contexts. Thus institutions fundamen- 
tally relate to practices (recurrent activity) and to social 
collectives or groups. In the present general case institu- 
tionalization then amounts to the creation, by the group 
m embers via their collective acceptance, of specilic re- 
peatable ways ot acting relative to group tasks and func- 
tions. For instance, in some tribes certain ritualized ways 
oi doing things (cf. rain dance) are institutional and cer­
tain roles (e.g. hunter) are institutional in this sense. I 
claim that in its most general and “rock bo ttom ” sense 
institutional (viz. institutionalized) acting is acting and 
functioning as a group membcr (as opposed to acting as a 
private person), viz. in a certain group position or role 
(be the positions differentiated or not). Acting as a group 
m em ber accordingly necessarily involves a group con- 
text, viz. acting in relation to some group tasks, purposes, 
or functions. In the groups view there is a right and a 
wrong way oi so acting, and thus we have at least a weak 
element oi normativity here. Assuming collective com- 
mitment to the instituted item, we can here equivalently 
speak of institutional acting in a group as acting in the 
we-mode rather than in the I-mode. (Hovvever, institu­
tional acting vvithout collective com m itm ent and thus 
acting in the I-mode also seems possible, given the exist- 
ence oi an institutional context.)
It a g roup  has structure in the sense oi division of
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labor and tasks we must be concerned with different 
kinds of group positions and roles and in this sense 
with institutions in a n a r r o w  sense. In such cases acting 
as a group m ember am ounts to acting in a certain norm- 
governed position or role. Acting as a group member 
means that one acts in a position and is in principle 
replaceable by some other individual (group member) 
oi the right kind (say teacher, priest, carpenter). In other 
words, the notion of group m em ber abstracts from spe- 
cilic individual features of persons and makes for the 
possibility of change of members without a change of 
the group into a different one.
In the full-blown “standard” case, covering e.g. the 
general institutions of money, language and law, as well 
as such specilic (viz. narrow) institutions as the school 
and the banking system, institutional acting is a social 
practice governed by a social norm accompanied by sanc- 
tions (cl. Tuomela, 1995, Chapter 10, and the references 
given there). This serves to create the collective outcome 
that the group as a whole functions “as meant”, viz. so 
that it tends to fulfil its basic tasks and functions.
In terms oi the analysis (CAT) we get the following 
account of social institutions in the “standard” sense 
(see Tuomela and Balzer, 1999, Tuomela, 1995, Chap­
ter 10, lor a longer discussion):
(51) A generic sentence s expresses a so c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n  
in a primary sense in a collective G if and only il
1) s expresses or entails a social norm  or system of 
interconnected social norms governing a social prac­
tice or a system of interconnected practices;
2) the members of G collectively accept s for G with 
collective commitment and with the understanding that 
collective acceptance for the group entails and is en- 
tailed by the correct assertability oi s. (This collective 
acceptance guarantees that the social norm expressed 
or entailed by s is in lorce.)
This account is stated in general terms, but is meant
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to capture  the view that a social institution in the s tand­
ard sense involves one or  more recurrently performed 
social practices, SP, an d  a “task-right system”, TR, in 
the sense of Tuomela, 1995, Chapters 1, 10. Thus the 
sentence s is supposed to express the couple (SR TR), 
in colloquial terms that there is a usually position-in- 
volving social practice or system of in terconnected  so­
cial practices governed by (in terconnected  and inter- 
locking) social no rm s  (ru le -no rm s or p ro p e r  social 
norm s in the sense oi Tuomela, 1995, Chapter 1). Clause 
2) entails that the social norm s in question  must be in 
force. Roughly, they are in force if obeyed to a suitable 
extent and are also suitably sanctioned (Tuomela, 1995, 
C hapter  1). Due to the assum ption  of collective accept- 
ance lor the group we get the result that a social institu­
tion is for the use o! the social g roup in question. Con- 
sider a village in which certain people help one oi the 
villagers concerning a certain  task. This is, so to speak, 
helping on an interpersonal level bu t not yet at the group 
level. But il a working-bee, viz. a meeting fo rcom bined  
w ork  an d  am u sem en t  (especially  of ne ighbors  and  
friends), is organized, the helping in question is a group- 
level affair, one that involves the villagers as a group 
(or, possibly, a certain subgroup  of that group). Collec­
tive acceptance with collective com m itm ent (and ac- 
com panying  social sanctions) is required in the kind of 
full-blown standard  case we are discussing here, but 
we may have to tolerate instilutional cases in which 
there are social norms to which the target persons are 
only privately committed, e.g. subconscious norms con­
cerning Communication and  body position in face-to- 
face interaction.
Searle (1995) emphasizes that social inslitutions are 
based on a collective ly created social status of some- 
thing. This seems to be right in the case of standard 
social institutions, although in the case oi weaker so­
cial institutions this idea may not always be involved
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(ci. below). I w ould  like to say that the k ind  of new 
understanding  and new “social m ean ing” involved in a 
social institution, as com pared with the case where the 
social institution did not exist, is due to two factors. 
First, we have a system of mteraction which need not 
have existed before; and, secondly, there is the holistic 
or group-level element involved in “forgroupness” and 
collective com m itm ent, bo th  involved in collective ac- 
ceptance. These elements did not exist before and es- 
pecially they account for the new status of the social 
interaction structure involved.
Let me still emphasize that the present account in the 
general case involves differentiated positions and roles 
and hence interlocking social norms (and, although 1 do 
not above stress it, interconnected institutions). This el- 
ement oi systemicity makes activity governed by a single 
social norm, it there such be, problematic il regarded as 
an institution. For instance, norrns concerned with dress- 
ing (e.g. lifting one’s hat) might be regarded as a case in 
point. We are hesitant in regardingcases like, for instance, 
greeting by lifting one’s hat or removing one’s hat when 
entering a building as social institutions because they do 
not relate to a system oi group-positions and to other 
activities. It seems that borderline cases like these can 
oiten be treated as minimal institutions in the sense to 
be discussed below. In any case, cases oi mere norm- 
obedience are not as such social institutions even in that 
minimal sense (as collective com m itm ent and forgroup- 
ness may be missing).3
Social institutions in a derivative sense can be char- 
acterized analogously with how derived sociality was 
based on primary sociality above. In them  the sentence 
s is social in the derivative (rather than in the primary) 
constructivist sense. A norm -based social power-rela- 
tion could be cited as an example of a social institution 
in the derived sense. (Cf. Lagerspetz, 1995, for a some- 
what similar approach, which, however, relies on m u-
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tual belief ra the r  than  collective accep tance .)
As has  becom e clear  by  now, the re  are m a n y  k in d s  of 
social inst itu tions.  T h u s  (SO only  gives a basic idea con -  
c e rn in g  no rm ative  social inst i tu t ions.  lt is th u s  no t  in- 
fo rm ative  c o n c e rn in g  su c h  specific in s t i tu t io n s  as are 
organizations (such as a bus iness  com pany, or  a church).  
O n  the  o th e r  h a n d ,  one can  -  in a c co rd an c e  w ith  the 
above  idea  oi in s t i tu t ions  as collectively ac cep ted  re- 
pea ted  ac ting  in a g ro u p  c o n te x t  -  also c o n s id e r  w ea k e r  
k in d s  ot social insti tu tions .  T hus ,  even  m ere  collective 
accep tance  w ith  collective c o m m itm e n t  to w ard s  a n o n -  
n o rm at iv e  p ropos i t ion  s a lready m akes  s inst i tu t ional  
in a uminimal” sense. S u ppose  th u s  tha t  som e peop le  
collectively accept as o n e  of the ir  fu n d am e n ta l  p rinci-  
ples tha t  the su n  is th e ir  god. S u p p o s in g  tha t  they  are 
collectively c o m m it te d  to th is  p r inc ip le  a n d  are also 
d isp o sed  to sanction  each  o th e r  in re levant ways we are 
a lready  dea ling  w ith  a k in d  oi ins t i tu t iona l  social fact. 
It seem s that we sh o u ld  still requ ire  tha t  there  be som e 
rec u rren t  activity (e.g. w o rs h ip p in g  every  m o r n in g  at 
sunr ise )  to con f irm  tha t  the  peop le  really  are co l lec­
tively c o m m it te d  to the ir  belief. Given th is  we are here  
dea ling  w ith  a m in im al k in d  of social in s t i tu t io n  even if 
there w ere  no  specific social n o rm  to engage in su c h  
practices -  over  a n d  above  the p e r s o n s ’ (possib le)  pri- 
vate n o rm at ive  th o u g h ts  th a t  they  o u g h t  to collectively 
u p h o ld  the ir  basic p r incip le .
A c o u p le  of rem arks  are due.  First, the  p resen t m o d e l  
of social inst itu tions is of cou rse  h ighly  general an d  only  
d iachron ic .  It is, hovvever, possib le  to give m ore con-  
ten t  to it and  to m ake  it d y n a m ic  (see Tuomela, 1995, 
Balzer a n d  Tuomela, 1999). The result  is a deta iled  m a-  
them atica l  m ode l that I have called a “social m il l”. It 
show s  h o w  social in s t i tu t ions  can be m a in ta in e d  a n d  
revised  via the a g e n ts ’ collective practices. VVhile the 
general idea is familiar from  prev ious  co n tex ts  (cf. e.g. 
G id d e n s s  theo ry  of s t ru c tu ra t io n ) ,  the re  is no  ac co u n t
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w orking seriously with “jo in tness” notions and  collec- 
tive acceptance as presented  above and in o ther works 
by myself and my collaborators.
My second rem ark  on social institutions concerns 
Searles (1995) theory  of the construction of social real- 
ity. His account basically shares m any features w ith  my 
above account bu t deals w ith  on ly with a strong notion 
of institution. His Central formula for collective accept­
ance in the context of social institutions is “We accept 
that S has pow er (S does A)” (Searle, 1995, p. 104, 
111). This is unders tood  to be implicitly entailed by 
my central acceptance sentence “We collectively accept 
s” (or CA(G,s)), but w hat is explicitly accepted in the 
present case is the sentence s, e.g. s = squirrel fur is 
money, and not the underly ing powers, righis and du- 
ties, concerning the possessors of squirrel lurs and  other 
mem bers  of the group.
Searles account operates in terms of constitutive mies, 
but it seems hard to fit p roper social norm s such as 
conventions into this account. Nevertheless, there can 
be institutional facts also in their case. Furtherm ore, 
there can be institutional facts in cases where no c o n ­
stitutive norm s seem available. Thus the case of the 
people collectively accepting (with collective com m it- 
ment) the view that the Sun is their god woulcl not repre- 
sent an institution in his account, for at least seemingly 
no new status lunction with deontic powers is created. 
(I discuss these points in Tuomela, 1999.)
V On the scope of the 
Collective Acceptance account
W hat is the precise class of sentences s to w hich  (CAT) 
is claimed to apply? Underlying my Collective Accept­
ance model is the general assum ption that in each c o n ­
text oi application one can distinguish between sen-
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tences whose objective correct assertability -  collect- 
ively taken -  is entirely up to the m em bers oi the group 
(or up  to their conceptual activities, especially to what 
they on metaphysical grounds can accept as true) and 
sentences whose tru th  is at least in part up  to nature, to 
the way the World is, and  thus in part dependen t on the 
causal processes occurring in the external World. The 
sentence “Squirrel fur is money” belongs to the first class 
of sentences and '‘Stars determ ine our fate” to the sec- 
ond. Thus, the first sentence will be correctly assertable 
for the group  due to collective acceptance and no exter­
nal, objective tru th  standard  applies to it. The second 
sentence can only be correctly assertable for the group 
as a k ind of stereotypical beliet. Il cannot be true in the 
standard  objective sense, as it is not up to the group 
mem bers  to determine w hether  stars indeed determine 
our fate. The present point gives an argum ent for the 
em ploym ent of the “forgroupness” concept. Note that 
in principle any sentence can be collectively accepted 
as correctly assertable for the group, but a central as- 
sum ption  here is that far from ali sentences thus ac­
cepted coun t as objectively true -  to the extent one can 
even speak of objective correspondence tru th  here. In 
o ther worcls, both  class one and class two sentences 
can be collectively accepted as correctly assertable for a 
group, bu t only in the case of the latter k inds of sen­
tences can the question  of objective correspondence 
tru th  meaningfully be raised. Also note that while o b ­
jectively false sentences collectively accepted for the 
group can be called “groupjective” (to coin a neologism) 
they need not subjective in the standard  sense, for their 
tru th  or correct assertability typically does not strictly 
depend on a single subjects (group m em bers)  accept­
ance.
Generally speaking, social concepts and  sentences 
are reflexive in the following sense. A collective-social 
sentence u s inga  putatively social predicate (e.g. ‘money,’
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‘leader,’ or ‘marriage’) does not apply to real things (such 
as certain pieces of paper or squirrel furs in the case of 
‘m oney’) unless collectively accepted and, so to speak, 
validated for that task. Let us consider m oney (“liat 
m oney”, in the econom ists  sense) as an example. The 
predicate ‘m oney’ does not refer to itselt b u t  to coins, 
dollar notes, squirrel furs, and so on. Reference here 
means that ‘m oney’ correctly applies to those things. 
The loose taik about reflexivity in this context there- 
fore should be understood  as being about presupposi-  
tion-stating sentences such as “Money is not m oney 
unless collectively accepted to be m o n e y ” This is not a 
matter oi what phrase to use bu t w hat the concept of 
m oney is. This concept is expressed by what the user of 
the predicate ‘m oney’ m English is entitled to say and, 
especially, extralinguistically do (and what he may be 
obhgated to do). The concept of money thus connects 
vvith some deontic povvers and  obligations collectively 
bestowed upon  those w ho use the predicate ‘m oney’ 
and who belong to the collective in question. The dis- 
cussed presupposition  (viz. that money is not money 
unless collectively accepted to be money) is central pre- 
cisely because of the follovving assum ed fact: It is u p  to 
the mem bers of the collective -  and nobody else -- to 
bestovv those extralinguistic deontic  powers upon its 
members. This contrasts with sentences involving only 
physical predicates like ‘tree’ or ‘m ass.’ In their case it is 
not up to the m em bers of the collective to do more 
than stipulate how  to use certain linguistic phrases and, 
e.g. what word to use for trees.
It can thus be said that the alleged reflexivity of col­
lective and social concepts strictly speaking is not di- 
rectly concerned  with the entities that the concepts  
(predicates) apply to. Rather, we may say that a collec- 
tive-social concept is conceptually reflexive or “self-con- 
ceptual” in the sense that it presupposes itself; and this 
can be explicated in terms of correct assertability for
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the group as follows. W hen for a social preclicate ‘q ’ 
and  a singular term  ‘a’ the sentence ‘q (a )’ is correctly 
assertable (for the group) this p resupposes the collec- 
tive acceptance of the sentence lq (a)’ and thns of a as q 
in the group. Thus, il ‘q(xV expresses tha t ‘x 1 denotes 
an item  of m oney and if ‘a ’ denotes a piece of squirrel 
fur, then  the sentence lq (a)’ can be correctly assertable 
(for the group) only if - speaking in the m aterial rnode 
-  squirrel furs are, in fact, collectively accepted as m oney 
or “m ade” m oney in the group. A sim ilar point can be 
m ade about m eanings of w ords, leaders, m arriages, 
property  rights, and  so on.
It is not easy to say precisely to w hich kinds of things 
the Collective Acceptance account appi ies. The earlier 
discussion in this paper has show n some central areas 
that certainly fall w ithin the scope of “w hat is up to us to 
determ ine as true or correctly assertable”. Thus social 
institutions in formal, informal, and belief-based senses 
qualify. Here e.g. various kinds of social positions and 
roles are included and so are social rules and norm s. 
Accordingly, law is included here, and a case can be made 
for morality to be included as well (cf. Scanlon, 1998).3 
M athem atics is another area to w hich the Collective Ac­
ceptance account seems basically applicable. I cannot here 
try to argue for these kinds of broad claims, bu t rather 
present them  as conjectures. 1 wish to em phasize that 
the Collective Acceptance account in no way entails that 
the propositions or sentences to w hich it applies are ar- 
bitrarily made correctly assertable by the w him s of the 
m em bers of a collective. Thus, for instance, in the case 
of law and morality surely some objective standards not 
depending on collective acceptance can com e to play a 
role. The final say in these m atters, however, is argued to 
be what the collective, perhaps given a num ber of highly 
restrictive (objective and other) constraints, accepts as 
correctly assertable.
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VI. On the ontology of the social world
The Collective Accepiance account basically says that 
the parts of the social World it applies to are collectively 
c o n s t ru c te d  a n d  m a n -m a d e .  H ow ever,  th is  n e e d s  
qualifications. Some remarks on the matter will be made 
below (in part drawing from Tuomela and Balzer, 1997).
One can argue that reality is criterially connected  to 
causality in the sense that an entity cannot be real un- 
less capable of occurring in singular causal inquirer- 
independen t contexts (viz. in claims oi the form C (f,f) ,  
C s tanding for causation and f, f’ being lacts related to 
the entity in question). Here inquirer- independence is 
independencc of an inquirebs m ind or, p u t  somev/hat 
differently, the “ideally rational” Scientific co m m u n ity s  
“m in d ” (attitudes, views). Roughly speaking, the in ­
quirer-independence of causation here can be under- 
stood in the sense of causation in a World similar to 
ours but in which there are no (mind-possessing) in- 
quirers. (Cf. Tuomela, 1985, Chapters 4-7, for a dis- 
cussion of this and  the appearance -  reality d istinction 
from the point of view of Scientific realism.) Note that 
our present criterion for a m ind-independent w orld  “out 
there” of course allows that there are creatures possess- 
ing m inds (e.g. intentions and beliefs) “out the re” and  
thus m ind -dependen t things in that sense. lt also al- 
lows tha t  the th ings  ou t  there  be desc r ib ab le  an d  
conceptualizable in various different ways. In addition  
to the two “levels” of a) inquirer- independent reality 
out there and b) the (ideal) Scientific co m m u n ity s  view 
or, put differently, the standpoin t of the ideal best-ex- 
p laining theory, we must also deal with c) a g ro u p s  (any 
groups, large or small) point of view. From a g roups  
point of view the social institutions and o the r  collec­
tively constructed and upheld  things in that g roup  are 
collectively m ind -dependen t in the sense of being  de-
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pendent on the group’s acceptance and thus its attitudes. 
Such g roup-dependen t things can nevertheless be said 
to be “socially real" in the group (viz. intersubjectively 
real and  belong to the groups posited “public space”), 
and they are also real in the sense oi being independent 
of an external inquirers or best-explaining theory’s point 
of view.
Criterion a) of independence  may be argued to be 
coextensive with b), b u t  one may still w ant to keep 
these criteria conceptually distinct. It can be noted that 
although group-dependen t items can be regarded as as 
“groupjective”, viz. as “generically” m in d -d ep en d en t  
(viz. dependen t on the “g roup’s m ind”, as it were, and 
hence group members' minds) an item can still be group- 
dependen t w ithout in fact being dependen t on any par- 
ticular m em bers  m ind, because collective acceptance 
is compatible with such “exceptions”. Thus ontological 
groupjectivity is distinct from ontological subjectivity. 
Let me emphasize that g roup-dependen t things are still 
objectively investigatable in the sense that they are in- 
qu irer-independent (see below). This is the case even il 
we, as a thought experiment, let the group  grow and 
become the class oi actual and  possible hum an  beings. 
The inqu ire rs  reflective stance towards an external, in- 
qu irer-independent world, which now includes also the 
class ot ali hum an beings, is still at least conceptually 
and metaphysically possible -  at least if we are allowed 
to assume (Scientific) realism. One underlying reason 
for this is that the m ethod  of investigation used, viz. 
the Scientific m ethod, is idealized and normative and 
thus transcends the limitations of hum an  beings.
One can, nevertheless, refuse to be a realist and ar- 
gue that there are things in the World, which are in- 
quirer-dependent. Consider, for instance, “qualia” such 
as the perceived sound  of the English h o rn  or an ache 
in one’s tooth. They are subjective and m ind-depend-  
ent in the sense of being dependen t on the listenebs
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m ind, bu t yet they are extensionally descnbable  or re- 
cordable (even if not perhaps phenom enally  experienc- 
ible by an external inquirer by sentences such as “S is 
experiencing the sound  of an English h o rn ”. A realists 
stance accordingly seems possible here.
Let us concentrate on social matters and  reconsider 
the claim that squirrel fur is money in a certain social 
group. W hat this am ounts  to is that the group accepts 
that squirrel fur is m oney  In o ther words, ‘m oney’ can 
be laken to reier to som ething real (viz. squirrel furs 
with a certain social use in exchange, etc.) il it satisfies 
the acceptance criterion. Ultimately I would  like to cash 
out ali this in terms of the partipants’ activities and  thus 
move to a kind of social practice ontology. In any case, 
if the acceptance criterion is satislied we are dealing 
with a real social laet. (If squirrel fur is not accepted as 
m oney in the group, this is also a social fact oi course, 
but it does not make money real.)
Ali this leaves us with such questions as w hether  
groups and their activities are real or only fictional. Pro- 
vided that one is p repared to use the predicates ‘social 
g roup’ and  ‘collective acceptance’ and, more generally, 
‘group action’ at ali, it does not matter so m u ch  for our 
present purposes w hat specific ontic content one gives 
them. Thus, for instance, a tough individualist may treat 
groups just  as certain individuals “acting groupishly” 
or a som ewhat holistically disposed theoretician may 
treat them as entities supervenient on certain ind iv idu­
als. In ali such cases groups and g roup  actions may be 
regarded real (in the specified sense). W hat is at stake 
here is the (or an) ontological individualism-holism is- 
sue, which, hovvever, I will not discuss in detail here.
From a g roups  point of view there can in accordance 
with ou r  discussion then be things which depend  for 
their existence (creation, re-creation, and m aintenance) 
on intentional group activities, depend ing  thus on the 
underlying intentions and beliels of the group  m em -
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bers (cf. the “duality models” of Giddens, 1984, Bhaskar, 
1989, Balzer and Tuomela, 1999). Note that the group 
members generally need to have correct beliefs about 
e.g. money and school, etc., when they act, but they 
need not think that by so acting they contribute to the 
maintenance and renewal of the institutions involved. 
Oi course, there are also things, which are independent 
of collective acceptance.
Recall from Section V that the present collective ac­
ceptance model presupposes the dichotomy between 
sentences whose correct assertability is entirely up to 
“us” (viz. up to the group members or indeed any hu- 
man beings or beings capable oi operating as the CA- 
account requires) collectively considered for, rather, up 
to our conceptual activities) and sentences whose truth 
is at least in part up to the vvay the inquirer-independ- 
ent world causally is. This assumption presupposes that 
sense can be made of the causal processes occurring in 
the world out there. (A realist is in general disposed to 
accept this.) Thus, according to this view, group m em ­
bers can collectively accept (for the group) the truth of 
some sentences, e.g. “Stars cause our fate to be what it 
is,” without making it the case that those sentences are 
true in the standard sense. The truth of sentences like 
“An Euro coin is money” on the other hand is com- 
pletely dependent on relevant collective acceptance.
1 wish to emphasize that the Central thesis (CAT) has 
ontic import tn the sense oi connecting with the mind- 
independent causal order. This is because tl serves to 
give the participating group members rights and duties 
in a sense having naturalistic content, their having rights 
and duties entailing their being (conditionally) disposed 
to act in certain specific ways. This is an entailment oi 
ontic content within the realm of lacts, which are up to 
us to create. To be more specific, according to the Col­
lective Acceptance account social institutions (in the 
full-blown sense), qua some kind of collections of posi-
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tion-involving normative structures, can he causally 
effective ultimately only via ihe group members’ minds 
and actions. This is because we need not assume that 
they ontically include other, more “holistic” elements, 
allhough the social institution concepts seem to be ir- 
reducible primitives. Thus, social institutions have 
causal impact via the participants’ (in collective accept- 
ance) thoughts and thus subjectively (in the group 
members’ beliefs) qua social institutions, or at least their 
Central nervous systems (in non-intentional cases). The 
“internalized" rights and duties related to e.g. institu- 
tional entities like money or institutional positions (e.g. 
teacher) can, accordingly, in this embedding involve 
causal connections independent also of the group mem­
bers’ minds.
In “non-normative” cases (cf. leader, esteem, status) 
based on collective acceptance in the sense of mutual 
acceptance belief (viz. the acceptance of something as 
true for the group) the analogous observation holds, 
for collective acceptance always is group-relative, viz. 
it relates the constructed and recreated things to the 
group (thus to the mental lile of the group members; 
cf. Tom is our leader only in so far as he is accepted by 
us as our leader).
Considering the group-dependent pan oi the social 
World, we can make the conceptual-epistemic point that 
in order to be intelligible (in the sense of being cor- 
rectly explainable) at least this part of the social World 
must be conceptualized largely as its inhabitants con- 
ceptualize it (squirrel fur may have been money lor 
medieval Finns but not for others). This is because vvith- 
out this the contents ot the created social lacts here do 
not depend on the group-members’ thoughts and can- 
not be made sense of as facts with social meaning. (This 
does not exclude the possibility that people have lalse 
beliefs about their physical and social environment, as 
long as the errors are not grave enough to result in cha-
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otic activities.)
Clearly, for every intentionally  described singular 
social fact there is an equally true non-in tentional de- 
scription in a specified vocabulary of this fact (a suit- 
able definite description wi 11 do the trick). Thus corre- 
spond ing  to the singular fact (a token event) that Matti 
today used squirrel fur, as money at the local market 
there is a complex description of this fact in physical 
and  biological terms. This does not, hovvever, suffice 
tor the reduction of the corresponding  type of event 
(viz. the event type of using squirrel fur as money), and 
it seemst that no corresponding  non-intentional type 
reduction is in the olfing.
Next, physical social artifacts such as church  build- 
ings, cars, chairs, books, and generally m u ch  of at least 
a city-dweller’s environm ent and “public social space” 
and  “social geography” should  be mentioned. Ali these 
exist as causally effective entities. They can enter causal 
connections not only qua having suitable physical fea- 
tures bu t also, and  in the present context in an impor- 
tant sense, qua being artifacts expressing normative or 
non-norm ative collective practices (see Tuomela, 1998, 
for qua-causation).
Various un in tended  and unanticipated consequences 
(cl. the states of high inflation and unem ploym ent,  pol- 
lution of the environment) also belong to social arti­
facts broadly understood. h  seems that they generally 
fall outside the scope of primary social things. Never- 
theless, they are often if not in general are collective - 
social in the derived sense, being based on things so­
cial in the primary sense.
Finally, there are social properties and relations which 
can be regarded as real in a tuore naturalistic sense and 
which correctly fall outside the scope of the CA-model. 
For instance, as seen in Section 11, TonTs en v y in g jo h n  
for the latter’s new car can be offered as an example of 
such a non-constructed  social fact, one, which correctly
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falls outside the scope of (CAT).  A nother example is 
provided by some shared collective a ttitudes (or we- 
attitudes) in the “I-m ode” (but not those in the “we- 
m o d e ”) in the sense oi Tuomela (1995). O u r  shared 
we-lear that a lion will attack us can at least in some 
cases be a relevant example of a non-construc ted  social 
fact.*
* I vvish to th an k  Kaarlo Miller, Pekka M äkelä , Maj Tuom ela, 
an d  Petri Y likoski for d iscu ssio n s an d  c o m m e n ts  re la ted  to 
th is  paper.
Notes
1 A w e -a ttitu d e  in its corc sense is d e fin ed  as follovvs relative to
an  a ttitu d e  ATT' A p e rso n  has the w e -a ttitu d e  relative to ATT 
an d  a co n te n t s if and  only il the p e rso n  a) has ATT (s) an d  b) 
believes th at also the  o th e rs  in the  g ro u p  have ATT (s) and  
also c) believes (o r at least is d isp o sed  to believe) th at it is 
m u tu a lly  believed (o r in a w eaker case p la in ly  believed) that 
the  m em b ers  have ATT (s).
2 In th is  p ap er 1 co n ce n tra te  on su ch  ega lita rian  g ro u p s  an d  the
n o t io n  o f c o lle c tiv e  a c c e p ta n c e . G ro u p s  are  h e re  to  be 
u n d e rs to o d  m erely  as co llections o f p eo p le , o f w hich  n o th in g  
m ore  need  to be an teced en tly  a ssu m ed . th e  cen tra l no tio n  
of a c c e p ta n c e  is th a t  o f  a n u m b e r  o f p e r s o n s  -  th o se  
c o n s titu tin g  the  g ro u p  in q u estio n  -  collectively  accep tin g  a 
p ro p o sitio n . C ollective m an y -p e rso n  accep tance  in th is sense 
o b v io u s ly  s u p e rv e n e s  o n  th e  p a r t i c ip a n ts ’ a c c e p ta n c e s , 
becau se  it is c o n s titu te d  by them . 1 will acco rd ing ly  assum e 
in  th is  p ap er that in the  case o f co llective  accep tance  o f a 
p ro p o sitio n  ali the p a rtic ip a n ts  vvill accep t it. N o te , hovvever, 
th at his a ssu m p tio n  can  be re laxed  even  in the  cases of the 
p re sen t k ind  of loose co llections o f  p eop le . T he in d iv id u a ls  
n iigh t share  a w e-belief and  be co llectively  co m m itted  to  the 
be lieved  p ro p o sitio n . A ssum e, h ow ever, that the  sh a rin g  is 
no t lull sh a rin g  b u t th a t still a lm ost ali sh a re  the w e -a ttitu d e  
(w h ile  the o th e rs  fail to  have the  belief o r  even d isagree w ith
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it). T hen  it siili is true  th a t th is  co llectio n  o f in d iv id u a ls  (say 
the  F inns, ihe L ondoners) can  be tak en  to  collectively  accep t 
the p ro position . A no th er p o ssib ility  for h av in g  d isag reem en t 
is thai there  is the k ind  of sp o n ta n eo u s  p o w er s tru c tu re  in 
the collective that one in d iv id u a l o r  a c lique  o f in d iv id u a ls  is 
able to d e te rm in e  the co llective’ view.
T here  are o ther, im p o rta n t cases o f collective accep tance 
in w hich  p ro p e r social g ro u p s are invo lved . In such  cases we 
speak  of a social g ro u p s  accep tance  o f a p ro p o sitio n . In such  
a case the m en ibers accep tan ces m u st a lso be involved , b u t 
in m any  cases only the so -called  “o p e ra tiv e ” m en ibers will 
jo in tly  accept the p ro p o sitio n  in q u e stio n , w hile  the o th ers  
in  som e w eak  sense m ust tac itly  accep t it o r  go a long  w ith  
the  op era tiv e  m em b e rs ’ co llective  a ccep tan ce  of the  p ro ­
position . N ot on ly  the n o n -o p e ra tiv e  by a lso  the operative  
m em bers m ay in  p rincip le  privately  accep t the negation  of 
the  p ro p o sitio n  accep ted  by the g ro u p . (See the  trea tm en t in 
T uom ela, 1995, C h ap te rs 5 - 7.)
3 The Collective A cceptance m o d el resem bles S can lo n ’s (19 9 8 ) 
co n trac tu a lism  to som e ex ten t. As su ch  a lm ost any m oral 
p rin c tp les  and  ideas can be collectively accep ted . A cceptance 
in th is sense is form al. To co n n ec t CA m o d el to  m o rality  we 
n eed  o th er form al p rincip les , at least universalizability . There 
sh o u ld  be also som e kind of idea of m ax im iz in g o r o p tim izing  
m oral good o r m oral righ tness. T hat w o u ld  also be a form al 
d e c is io n  p r in c ip le .  But a lso  s u h s ta n t iv e  a s s u m p t io n s  
co n ce rn in g  \vhat is right and  w ro n g  o r good  an d  bad (or what 
we owe to each o th er) in the m oral sense are n eeded . Perhaps 
S can lo n s co o p era tio n  p rin c ip les , viz. the Rescue p rincip le  
an d  R easonable H elpfu lness, can  find a place here  as form al 
p rincip les . S can lo n s Rescue P rincip le  says this: If you  are 
p resen ted  w ith  a s ituation  in  w h ich  you can  preven t som e- 
th in g  very bad from  h ap p en in g , o r alleviate so m eo n e ’s d irect 
p ligh t, by m ak in g  only a slight (o r even  m o d era te )  sacrifice, 
th en  it w o u ld  be w ro n g  n o t to  d o  so. T h e  p r in c ip le  oi 
Reasonable H elpfulness States the  following: Take in to  account 
o th e rs  in te res ts w hen  th at can  very easily  be d o ne . I co u ld  
add  o th er sim ilar principles, e.g. Helpfulness: Be helpful, w hen 
it is relattvely easily to be so, and  C ooperativ ity : C o operate , 
w h en  it is relatively  easy to  d o  so. O th e r m oral ideas that are 
c o n c e rn e d  w ith  w h a tev e r o u r  fellow  m e m b e rs  reg ard  as 
m orally  im p o rtan t can easily be found , e.g. Scanlon m en tio n s 
the  im p o rtan ce  oi hurnan  life, the m in im iza tio n  oi suffering
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is im p o rtan t, and the p reserva tion  of d iversity  as such  
acceptable m oral ideas. These substan tive princip les are 
group-relative and basically to be found out by m eans of 
em pirical research.
As a sum m ary we have som ething like the follovving. 
Speaking in tentative term s, the CA m odel of morality w ould 
accordingly seem to require the following kinds of principles 
(m ost of which are considered in Scanlon, 1998):
I Form al principles (absolute, not group-relative) 
a) Universalizability
h) O ptim ization of moral rightness
c) Individual complaint principle (individuals’ complaints 
m ust count, consensus principle)
d) C ooperation principles (such as Rescue Principle of 
Reasonable H elpfulness) and other morally relevant 
principles oi action
II Substantive principles (group-relative)
i) a priori ideas of what is morally right (e.g. hum an lile, 
m cluding of course one’s own life, is to be preserved) 
iil empirically investigatable ideas about what a group 
finds as morally im portan t in a substantive sense (sub­
stantive moral “bottom  Iines”).
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Michael Q uanle
ON THE LIMITS OF 
CONSTRUCTION AND 
INDIVIDUALISTI IN SOCIAL 
ONTOLOGY
O u lI ines  o f s o c i a l  ontology beyond Sc i e n t i f i c  
n a  t i u  eilis m
Die V ereinigung als solche ist selbsl der w ahrhafte  lnhalt 
u n d  Zweck, u n d  die B estim m ung der Ind iv iduen  ist, ein 
allgem eines Leben zu fuhren.
(G.W.F Hegel)
In this article 1 will try to make visible the lirnils oi consti uction and  individualism in social ontology. My 
main thesis is that the ideologies of Scientific natural- 
ism and methodological individualism have a deep -  
and distorting -  inlluence on the current approaches in 
social ontology. This can be seen even in the excellent 
theories oi John  Searle and Margaret Gilbert w ho  try to 
Iree themselves from these background  ideologies. My 
interest in this article is primarily on ontological and 
methodological questions. But since the relation be- 
tvveen etlucal and ontological questions is im portant 
for my topic, 1 w an t to separate ontological and ethical 
questions clearly from each other. Sometimes in the lit- 
erature on our topic these questions and the ansvvers to
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them are confusedly run together or are not distin- 
guished at ali. To be sure, distinguishing between these 
two kinds of questions does not amount to the claim 
that they are completely Independent from one another. 
Nevertheless 1 want to emphasize that these questions 
must be clearly distinguished if we want to clarify how 
they might be related.
Onto log ica l questions, to give some examples, include 
the (ollowing: Are there irreducible social facts? Can 
groups be reduced to their members? Is social reality 
constructed? What is the relation between nature and 
social reality? What is the function of social entities such 
as groups or States? What is the nature oi social enti­
ties? Are social facts evaluative or normative?
With respect to the last question one clarification may 
be in order. To ask whether social lacts are evaluative or 
normative is not to ask an ethical question. lf we give a 
positive answer to this question, evaluative or norma­
tive terms are mentioned, not used. We should always 
have in mind that to point out the evaluative or norma­
tive nature of social reality is not the same thing as to 
make an evaluative or normative claim.
E th ica l questions include the follovving: How should 
the freedom of autonomous persons be related to po- 
litical or social obligations? Should social entities have 
irreducible rights? Should social entities have aims 
vvhich cannot be reduced to the interests of individu- 
als? Should autonomous individuals acknowledge ob­
ligations vvhich are in conflict vvith personal autonomy? 
Should members of social entities regard these social 
entities in a purely instrumentalistic way?
The rough notion of ethics vvhich is operative in this 
article includes questions about the good lile and nor­
mative aspects of morality or political obligations. Since 
1 am here primarily interested in the ontological level 
and in hovv the ontological and the ethical levels are 
related, this somevvhat loose sense of the ethical vvill
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suffice for my purposes in the following.
Having distinguished between ontological and ethical 
problems of social reality one may ask how these two 
domains are related. Do answers to the ontological ques- 
tions have ethical implications? Do ethical considerations 
guide our thinking about ontological questions? If so, 
what are we to make of this? Is the evaluative (or norma- 
tive) nature of social reality at least partly shaped by ethi­
cal considerations? Are we allowed to have a normative 
ontology here in the sense that ethical considerations may 
at least he included in the ontology of the social? Is it a 
mistake to analyse social ontology on the basis oi some 
ethical premises such as assumptions about the right re- 
lation betvveen -  say -  political obligations and personal 
autonomy? Is there an ontology of the social which is 
fundamental in the sense oi being completely independ- 
ent of our ethical thinking?
In order to understand these questions about the re- 
lation betvveen the ontological and the ethical level it is 
necessary, first to clarify the ontological issues. As the 
title oi my article suggests, 1 shall concentrate on the 
notions of construction and individualism -  understood 
as ontological categories.1 Furtherm ore it suggests that 
although there is some truth in construction-talk and 
individualism there is also something vvrong with it. In 
the following 1 will try to show where their limits are.
I. Individualism  and constructivism
I n d i v i d u a l i s m  is, as we shall see, a version of social 
constructivism. “The doctrine oi methodological indivi- 
dualism ” is, as Steven Lukes has put it, the thesis “that 
facts about Society and social phenom ena are to be 
explained solely in terms of facts about individuals” 
(Lukes 1992, p. 121).2 Il we take “psychological” to
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mean “psychological features of individuals”, the Central 
question here is:
(Q -l) Are social phenom ena reducible to psycho­
logical phenomena?
A second question which lurks behind the picture of 
the construction of social reality can be stated as follovvs:
(Q-2) Are social phenomena reducible to brute facts?5
Whereas the lirst question concerns the relation betvveen 
two levels vvithin the mental -  the psychological and the 
social -  the second question cleals, roughly speaking, with 
the relation between the mental and the physical (or bio- 
logical). The anscvers to these questions are logically in- 
dependent (cl. Mandelbaum 1992, p. 110 fn. 3). One 
may be a reductionist m the sense of adopting methodo- 
logical individualism vvithout being a reductionist con- 
cerning the mental and the physical (or the biological). 
Or one might hold that both the social and the psycho­
logical can be reduced to the physical (or the biological) 
without holding that the social can be reduced to the 
psychological. Or one might think that neither reduc- 
tion is possible. Finally -  as many philosophers do -  one 
may believe that the social can be reduced to the psy­
chological in a lirst step, and the psychological to the 
physical (or biological) in a second step.4
Individualism is, as I claimed above, a version oi so­
cial c o n s t r u c t i v i sm . So we need to distinguish between 
t\vo kinds ol construction: the construction of social 
reality on the hasis of individual psychology and the 
construction oi social reality on the bedrock oi the physi­
cal (or biological). In order to keep these two lorms of 
constructivism distinct I shall use “constructivism ” to 
refer to the latter sort and “individualism ” to refer to 
the former.
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Constructivism and individualism as such do not 
entail reductionism. Therefore, we can speak of non- 
reductive constructivism and of non-reductive individu­
alism. As I read them, John Searle defends a version of 
non-reductive constructivism, while Margaret Gilbert 
defends a version of non-reductive individualism. Un- 
derly ingjohn Searle’s non-reductive constructivism is 
a concept of nature which belongs to Scientific natural- 
ism (of which he accepts certain elements and criti- 
cizes others). In the background of Margaret Gilbert’s 
non-reductive individualism is a reductive version of 
individualism, i.e. methodological individualism. In 
what follovvs I will try to show that Scientific natural- 
ism and methodological individualism are a source of 
certain misleading tendencies in social philosophy -  
tendencies which make it difficult to see and under- 
stand the limits of individualism and construction.
II. Searle s theory
In T h e  C o n s t ru c t io n  o j  Soc ia l  R e a l i ty  Searle approaches 
social philosophy primarily from the ontological poit 
of view.5 Ethical considerations are not explicitly at 
issue. This feature of his approach and his commitment 
to naturalismi make his arguments a good starting point. 
According to Searle, the starting point for social philo­
sophy must be a proper understanding oi the mind- 
body relation:
“The mind is just a set oi higher-level features of the 
brain, a set of features that are at once ‘mental’ and ‘physi- 
cal'. VVe will use the ‘mental1, so construed, to show 
how ‘culture’ is constructed out of ‘nature1.’1 (CSR 9)
Searle wants to abandon the traditional dualistic con- 
ception of the m ind-body relation, and 1 am quite
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sym pathe tic  wiih this wish. A second  crucial c o m p o n e n t  
of his  ap p ro a ch  is w h a t  he calls “ex te rn a l  rea l ism ” -  the 
th e s is ,  a s c r ib e d  to c o m m o n  sense  a n d  a c c e p te d  by  
Searle, tha t  there is a m in d - in d e p e n d e n t  reality.'1 Finally, 
Searle in tro d u c es  a “d is t inc t ion  b e tw e en  those  features 
of the  w o i id  tha t  exist in d e p e n d e n t ly  of us and  those 
th a t  are d e p e n d e n t  on  us for the ir  ex is te n ce” (CSR 9). 
A l th o u g h  I agree tha t  there is som e sense  in w h ic h  this 
c la im  is co r rec t ,  m u c h  d e p e n d s  on  h o w  it is to be 
u n d e r s to o d .
Searle d is t ingu ishes  first b e tw e en  an  ontological an d  
an  epistemological sense of the sub jec t ive-ob jec tive -d is-  
t inc tion .  The m in d - in d e p e n d e n t  par t  oi reality is ob- 
jective in the ontological sense a n d  the  m en ta l  b u i ld s  
the  onto log ica lly  subjective part.  Ali m in d - d e p e n d e n t  
pa r ts  of  reality are ontologically  sub jective .  O n  Searles 
f o rm u la t io n  the  sub jec t ive  a n d  the  ob jec tive  in th is  
on to log ica l  sense are m o d e s  of existence.
In the epistemological sense, acco rd ing  to Searle, facts 
are objective il they  can  be justilied. A n d  it is possible 
th a t  the re  m ig h t  be ep is tem ically  ob jective  facts a b o u t  
on to log ica lly  subjective par ts  ot reality. M oreover  there  
are sub jective  facts k now ab le  on ly  from  the first-per- 
son-s ingu la r-pe rspec tive .
A se co n d  im p o r ta n t  d is t inc t ion  w h ich  Searle m akes  
is b e tw e e n  objects a n d  aspects o r features  of objects . M ind 
itsell is a feature of reality -  a h igher-level feature of the 
bra in .  This  seem s puzz l ing  to me b ecause  the  m ind  it- 
self is -  trom the f irs t-pe rson -pe rspec t ive  -  clearly ac- 
tivity, no t a feature of som e th ing .  This  p ro b le m  is a con-  
se q u e n c e  of the f act that the “h igher- leve l- fea tu re -read-  
in g ” is m a d e  from  the th ird -p e rso n -p e rsp ec t iv e  while  -  
seen  from the f i rs t-pe rson-perspec t ive  -  the  m en ta l  is 
p a r t  of o u r  be ing  in the World, part of o u r  Lebcnsform.
Given the d is t inc t ion  b e tw e en  ob jec ts  a n d  the ir  fea­
tu res  o r  aspec ts  it follows, thirdly, tha t  the re  can  be dif- 
feren t k in d s  of features b e lo n g in g  to the  sam e objects.
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Hence the ontological distinction betvveen subjective 
and objective parts of reality may be understood as a 
distinction between features of substances, not between 
substances or domains of objects. Consequently, Searle 
distinguishes between su b je c t i v e  and ob jec t iv e  f ea tu re s  
ot the world.
It seems unproblematic to me that there may be 
epistemically objective facts about subjective features 
without this requiring that there be ‘subjective’ objects 
in the world. We may therefore draw an epistemic dis­
tinction between su b je c t ive  and ob jec t iv e  Jac ts .
Searle further distinguishes between two kinds of 
features: in t r in s ic  and o b s e r v e r - r e la t i v e  ones. Intrinsic 
features are mind-independent. whereas observer-rela- 
tive features are relative to observers and users. These 
features are m ind-dependent,  and so, according to 
Searle, ontologically subjective.
This distinction is crucial, since according to Searle 
observer-relative features are ontologically constitutive 
oi social reality or at least of social mstitutions. Since 
these features are created or constructed by intention- 
ality and are mind-dependent, the notion of construc- 
tion comes into play here (CSR 190).
Problems relevant to our topic lurk here because, as 
Searle himself notes, there is a tension between intrin­
sic and observer-relative features on the one hand and 
subjective and objective features on the other hand (CSR 
11). Mental features are intrinsic and not mind-inde­
pendent, that is, they are intrinsic subjective features. 
Searle’s distinction between consciousness and inten- 
tionality as kinds ot ontologically subjective features of 
reality and his restriction oi observer-relativity to in- 
tentionality does not resolve this tension, because in- 
tentionality itself is an intrinsic feature of the world.
Furthermore Searle invokes a distinction between 
brute and non-brute facts. Here Searle’s taik ot non- 
brute lacts rellects a problem that l have encountered
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in reading him. He seems generally to oppose brute 
lacts to institutional facts (cf. CSR 2, 27, 34f. or 1901.), 
except for one time (CSR 15) vvhere bru te  facts are con- 
trasted with facts including function ascription gener­
ally. Since Searle distinguishes between the class ot so­
cial lacts and the class of institul ional facts as a subclass 
oi social lacts (CSR 26), it seems to tollow that ali non- 
institutional lacts are brute facts. Hence there could be 
brute  social facts. Now I th ink  that this reading is not 
intended, for brute lacts seem to be intrinsic facts of 
nature, which are not Observer-relative. Brute facts are 
com pletely  rep resen ta t ion -independen t.  Hence they 
might be altogether independen t of intentionality. In- 
deed, Searles em ploym ent of the term “brute physical 
facts” (CSR 121) suggests this interpretation.
Another passage in Searles book  suggests an alterna- 
tive conception of brute facts, however. Social facts can 
be created only by agents w ho have the capacity to as- 
sign functions (CSR 19). In my m ind  this is not help- 
ful, hovvever, since Searle does not strictly adhere to 
the distinction between social and institutional facts. 
Sometimes he uses the notion of social facts to pick out 
the special features oi this subclass oi institutional facts, 
sometimes he uses institutional facts -  as pars pro toto 
-  to reveal something about social facts generally.7 Since 
1 was not successful in overcoming my uncertainty ac- 
cording to the criteria for social facts and the relation 
between social and  institutional lacts generally, 1 wi 11 
op p o se  b ru te  a n d  n o n -b ru te  facts leav ing  it op en  
w hether some social lacts are brute ones or not.
Betore I can try to show where these difficulties in 
Searles theory might come from, 1 want to make briefly 
one more point concerning brute  facts that is of some 
im portance for my arguments. Although Searle claims 
that his notion of brute fact is derived trom Elisabeth 
Anscombe, 1 do not th ink that he actually uses this 
notion in A nscom be’s sense.8 According to Anscombe
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(1958), the bruteness of a laet is a relational feature. A 
fact B may be brute  relative to some descriptions oi 
events or some set oi facts, bu t tt may be that the very 
same fact B is non-bru te  relative to some other descrip- 
tion oi events or some other set of facts. Now  Searle 
does employ som eth ing  akin to A nscom bes concep- 
tion of brute facts, for he maintains that brute lacts are 
intelligibility-conditions for other facts. To be sure brute 
lacts and the related set ot non-bru te  lacts are hierar- 
chically related. But on Searles account the distinction 
between brute and  non-brute  reflects an ontological dis­
tinction, and so tt is not a relational b u t  an absolute 
distinction. Moreover, he relates bruteness to robust- 
ness and fundam ental reality. Hence on Searles picture 
we seem to have different ontological levels -  a kind of 
“layer-ontology” (cf. Kim 1993, p. 337). Even though 
this is not incompatible with A nscom bes m odel, it does 
not follow from it.
It seems to me that Searle’s reading of the difference 
between brute and non-brute  tacts is motivated by Sci­
entific naturalism. O n this picture, what is real is the 
world described by natural science. Everything else 
depends  on it and  ali o ther features are observer-rela- 
tive and constructed  or created.
III. The fundamental problem  of 
Searles theory
Intentionality is an in tnnsic  (even il higher) feature of 
the brain, a biological phenom enon . It adds no non- 
physical objects to reality. W e-intentions which even 
hyenas might have (according to Searle), are natural in 
this sense. Thus intentionality and, l might add, the 
social world as a whole is realised in physical reality. In 
his insistence on the biological or even physical basis 
of intentionality Searle opposes the natural to the super-
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natural. But in ihe next step he further identifies what 
is natural with objects and features described by natural 
science. AU other features, even biological functions, 
are constructed by intentionality. By consequence of this 
the natural is opposed to the m ind-dependent, and there 
is a strict opposition now between nature  and cu ltu re .9
Searles chiel example oi a m ind-dependen t feature 
is being money. Since there is no physical hasis for why 
a piece of paper is a ten-dollar-bill, being a ten-dollar- 
bill is a feature constructed  by complex relations of in­
tentionality and representation. There is consequently  
a part of social reality in which features of objects are 
observer-relative. This m uch  is true in constructiv ism .10
But som eth ing  has also gone w ro n g  here. First of ali, 
we need an  a rgum ent which  leads from the naturalness of 
the m ental (as o p posed  to the superna tu ra l)  to the idea 
that natu re  is com pletely described by natural Sciences.
H in t in g a t  ex terna l  realism is of no  h e lp  here. Even if 
c o m m o n  sense accep ts  the  thesis  tha t the re  is a m in d -  
in d e p e n d e n t  reality, it is no t c o m m it te d  to the  idea that 
there  are n o  m in d - d e p e n d e n t  par ts  of reality, a forteriori 
no t  il it is accep ted  tha t  the  m e n ta l  is a pa r t  of reality 
itself. F u r th e rm o re ,  c o m m o n  sense is no t  c o m m it te d  to 
the idea tha t  na tu re  is res tr ic ted  in the  sense in w h ich  
Scientific na tu ra l ism  takes it to he. My c la im  is tha t  ph i-  
lo so p h e rs  sh o u ld  no t h o ld  to Scientific na tu ra l ism  here 
either. True, the m en ta l  is par t  of n a tu re ,  bu t we do  
have the no t io n  of “second  n a tu re ” vvhich inc ludes  those 
aspec ts  th a t  be lo n g  to the  w ay  m e m b e r s  of a species 
live the ir  lives. O u r  c u l tu re  is n a tu ra l  for us, m aybe not 
in the sense  of be ing  m in d - in d e p e n d e n t ,  b u t  in so far 
as it is a realisation of o u r  na tu ra l  a n d  in tr insic  capaci-  
ties a n d  features. These features are n o t  obse rver-re la ­
tive in th e  sense s ta ted above.
Searle himself tells us that in doing social philoso- 
phy we m ust adopt the herm eneutic  stance and -  ac- 
c o r d in g ly - th e  first-person-perspective, including both
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[he firsl-person singular and  p lu ra l .11 However, il is 
not true that ali features of second nature are observer- 
relative. Only some -  such as being money -  are. Searle 
unplausibly extends the features oi the money-exam- 
ple to cover ali social phenom ena . Moreover, his dis- 
tinction between brute  and  non-bru ie  facts is draw n 
from a purely explanatory  th ird-person-perspective ,  
which is not suitable for social phenomena. Indeed, even 
the thesis that the mental is a natural biological phe- 
n om enon  does not imply that this phen o m en o n  may 
he properly explained from the third-person-perspec­
tive. With respect to social philosophy m ind  should  
not be taken as a feature oi the brain but as an activity, 
or as a Lebensform -  and this may be done only from 
the first-person-perspective. Even ihough Searle devotes 
considerable a ttention to intentional activity, his con- 
ception of construction  is quite clearly motivated and 
determ ined  by an underly ing com m itm ent to scientiiic 
naturalism.
In other words, Searles argum ents are infected with 
the idea that nature is completely and exclusively de- 
scribed by natural Sciences. Although he himself sorne- 
times makes clear that there are some tensions in his 
account that derive trom this, he nevertheless conflales 
social reality as it is seem from the first-person-perspec- 
tive with his ontological criteria com ing from the third- 
person-perspective.
This is especially apparent in his notion oi the back- 
ground abilities which -  1 th ink  -  is one oi the most 
fascinating and successful parts of his theory. Even tn 
his discussion oi the background  abilities Searle oscil- 
lates betvveen the lirst-person- and the third-person- 
perspective. Although the rejection of Cartesian dual- 
ism implies that ali our abilities supervene on our  b io­
logical capacities, il is incorrect to reduce these back ­
ground abilities to d ispositions or som eth ing  else as 
described by natural science. Background abilities are
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o ur  first nature as it is shaped by our  second nature, or 
o u r  biological aspect seen from the perspective of sec­
ond  nature. It is no surprise that education, habitus or 
Bildung  are the Central categories of this part oi reality. I 
th ink  that we need an ontology that allows us to under- 
stand the difference betvveen background phenom ena  
and intentional phenom ena vvithout reducing the back­
ground phenom ena either to our biological nature as it 
is described by natural science or to mere social con- 
structions.
Although there are features of reality and even of in- 
tentionality itsell which are constructed  or created by 
intentionality, not every feature that is not a part of Sci­
entific naturalismi is observer-relative, created or pro- 
jected onto  reality. We shoulcl not identify com m on  
sense realism with Scientific realism and we should  not 
identify nature with the worldview of Scientific natu- 
ralism. In adopting this strategy one does not fall back 
into Cartesianism. Moreover, we should  not concen- 
trate only on those features of reality which are observer- 
relative in the way a piece of paper that functions as 
m oney is. The bedrock of social reality are the struc- 
tures oi intentionality: recognition (A n e rk e n n u n g ), val- 
ues, intentions and the vvill. The mental taken as activ- 
ity is the basic structure of social reality. With this in 
mind 1 w ould  like to suggest an alternative way of dis- 
tinguishing the mental and the physical.
IV An alternative way of draw ing the Iines
I suggest that we have to distinguish between four kinds 
of features realised in na tu ra l  physical objects and  
events: m ind-independen t,  m ind-involving, m ind-de- 
penden t  and m ind-constructed  features.
Mind-independen t  features are features vvhich can be 
realised independently of the existence of intentional-
147
M ic h a e l  Q u a n t e
ity.12 They are those features vvhich have existed or would 
exist in a World devoid of mental features. M ind-invo lv-  
ing features are constituted1 'b y  intentionality but are ei- 
ther not realized as effects of intentional actions at ali or 
are causally independent of any actual intentional action 
which takes place at the moment ot the realisation of the 
token ot the mind-involving feature in question. Many 
learned and trained movements ot the body for example 
in sports or driving a car are of this kind. As results of 
former intentional efforts they become -  as we say in 
German -  “in Fleisch und  B lut ubergcgangcn”. The realisa­
tion oi m in d -d ep en d en t features is alvvays the effect of an 
intentional action x of S without S having intended14 to 
realise them by his doing x. A famous example of these 
features is given in the analysis of alienated labour in the 
social philosophy of Karl Marx. Finally m ind-constructed  
features are those features whose realisation is the effect 
of an intentional action x oi S and vvhich are intended by 
S to be realised by his doing x.
The lirst and the fourth group of leatures need not 
be discussed here, although 1 am not convinced that 
Searle is right in excluding ali functions trom the mind- 
independent leatures. lf tvvo persons agree in using a 
piece oi w ood as a knight in their chess game, they 
obviously intend to give this piece of wood features 
vvhich are m ind-constructed. Here we have a clear case 
oi social construction, even il the money-example Searle 
uses so olten may not be such a clear example of this. 
Furtherm ore, m ind-dependent features are not in need 
of a lengthy discussion since they have been studied at 
length in the philosophical analysis oi social phenom - 
ena. Many elfects ot intentional actions are not intended 
by agents and yet are of great im portance because they 
constitute social reality and deliver conditions in vvhich 
individual agents have to realise their goals (e.g. the 
market-system). Obviously to analyse m ind-dependent 
or m ind-constructed leatures is no problem tor a social
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constructivist theory such as Searles. Things are differ- 
ent w hen  it comes to those features I liave nam ed “mind- 
involving”. This group of features includes some of the 
background abilities such as those abilities, disposition, 
or patterns of individuals which exist independen tly  of 
actual intentional actions but which cannot be identi- 
fied without knowing that there is intentionality  and 
vvithout knowing what it is to be an intentional agent. 
Moreover this group includes those aspects of in ten­
tionality which are realised in the way h um ans  live their 
lives. Here we see that there are facts abou t h u m an  be- 
ings which constitute the way h u m an  intentionality is 
shaped, structured or organised, and w hich  neverthe- 
less cannot be taken to belong to nature  as it is de- 
scribed by Scientific naturalism. They are facts about 
the second nature of hum an  beings that canno t be re- 
duced to the class of m ind-dependen t or even mind- 
constructed features. Many social p h enom ena  like love 
or trust are neither reducible to biological phenom ena  
nor are they mere causal ‘side-effects’ or in tendend  re- 
sults of hum an constructions. To put it this way: Mind- 
involving features are those features which ou r  social 
nature consists of and vvhich are realised w hen  our so­
cial nature manifests itself in the social reality we live 
in. Sinee these mind-involving features can help us to 
explain other social facts, they can be taken as brute  
facts. And since they are not result of intentional action 
they can be regarded as intrinsic facts. These facts can 
be discovered by observers but they are not created 
thereby.
This account impi ies that constructivism makes two 
mistakes. First, it dravvs an absolute ontological dis- 
tinction between m ind-independen t,  intrinsic, or brute 
features and those features that are regarded as observer- 
relative. Second, it conceives ali features w hich  are not 
m in d - in d ep en d en t  as m in d -cons truc ted .  T hus  c o n ­
structivism dravvs one rough d istinction vvhere we need
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several f ine-g ra ined  ones. Like J o h n  Searle, 1 th in k  that 
“the re  oug h t  lo he a m o re  o r  less c o n t in o u s  Story tha t  
goes f rom  an on to lo g y  of b io logy to an on to logy  tha t  
in c lu d e s  cu l tu ra l  a n d  in s t i tu t ional  forms; there sh o u ld  
no t be an y  radical b r e a k ” (CSR 227).  Therefo re  I th in k  
we sh o u ld  replace social c o n s tru c t iv ism  w ith  a m ore  
f ine -g ra ined  theory.
V The limits of individualism
1 w an t  to tu r n  n o w  to the  limits of in d iv id u a l ism  a n d  to 
the  q u e s t io n  of  h o w  the  on to log ica l  a n d  the  e th ica l  
d i m e n s i o n  oi soc ia l  p h i l o s o p h y  m ig h t  be  re la te d .  
A l th o u g h  e th ica l c o n s id e ra t io n s  are n o t  the  top ic  oi 
Searles  The Construction of Social Reality we ca n  read  
the  fo llow ing  evaluative s ta te m en t  there:
“O ne  oi the m ost  fascinating -  a n d  te r r i fy in g - fe a tu re s  
of the  erä in w h ic h  1 w rite  th is  is the  s teady  ero s ion  
of  accep tance  of large in s t i tu t ional  s t ru c tu re s  a r o u n d  
the  World. The  b re a k d o w n  of nat ional  lden ti l ica tion  
in favor of e thn ic  tr iba lism  o ccu rs  in places as various 
as B osn ia ,  C a n a d a ,  th e  f o r m e r  C z e c h o s lo v a k ia ,  
Turkey, an d  m a n y  A m erican  un ivers i t ie s .” (CSR 1 17)
1 lully  agree w ith  this desc r ip tion .  F u r th e rm o re ,  1 t h in k  
tha t  social p h i lo so p h y  has tw o m ain  tasks: first un d e r -  
s ta n d in g  the reasons  for th is  e ros ion  ot the  social W orld 
an d  seco n d ly  d e v e lo p in g  theo ries  w h ic h  he lp  to restore 
the  accep tance  oi ins t i tu tions  an d  to deve lop  reasonable  
ways oi Iden ti fica t ion  w ith  the  social w orld .
1 t h in k  tha t  c o m m o n  u n d e r s ta n d in g  oi the  n a tu re  oi 
o u r  social reality has a t r e m e n d o u s  im p a c t  on  h o w  peo-  
ple live in the ir  social w orld .  F u r th e rm o re  1 believe tha t  
ph i lo so p h ica l  theories  a b o u t  the social are an  im p o r ­
ta in  factor in th is  c o m m o n  u n d e r s ta n d in g :  they  are ar-
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ticulations of this com m on unders tand ing  on the one 
hand  and they give rise to new versions of the com m on 
understanding  on the other h a n d .1'’
My intuition is that the ‘trickling d o w n ’ of unlimited 
constructivism and individualismi with respect of so­
cial ontology into this com m on understand ing  is one 
oi the reasons why identilication with existing and al- 
legedly “created” institutions vanishes and  an onenta-  
tion allegedly objective “b ru te” ethnic facts comes to 
the surface. This may be understood  as a result oi a loss 
of belief in the robustness of social reality, and as a re- 
sponse to the idea that social institutions are created 
only to serve the interests and  purposes oi individuals. 
In times ofcrisis a more lundamental basis is dem anded  
than anything that could be derived from institutions 
w hen  they are understood as mere conventions, crea- 
tions or as simply dependent on hum an  agreement. And 
often biological or ethnic features are proposed as the 
basis for a new biological or at least natural social or- 
der.
Searle’s version oi social constructivism may not be 
guilty of this on the surface level, because h is theory 
suggests explicitly that the created or constructed  so­
cial world is not merely a tool for specific purposes or 
for the fulfilment oi individual, group  or class interests. 
Yet the background ideologies oi scientilic naturalism 
and  oi methodological individualismi may nevertheless 
be d iscerned in non-reductive constructivism and in­
dividualismi. And to my m ind  these background ide­
ologies have consequences not only lor social philoso- 
phy, but also lor social reality since they have the ten- 
dency of leading com m on unders tand ing  of the nature 
of social reality and social institutions into the direc- 
tion of varieties oi unlimited constructivism and  indi­
vidualismi. The apparent erosion of the acceptance Searle 
diagnoses might very well be partly a consequence oi 
this changed com m on u nders tand ing .16
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In order to m ake my intuition plausible and to make 
some oi these relations apparent, 1 shall consider the 
relation betvveen the ontological and the ethical in the 
course of my discussion of non-reductive individual- 
ism. Yet, 1 do not m ean to claim that there need be 
strong logical connections between ontological and e th i­
cal theses. These relations seem to me to be more ideo- 
logical than logical. One might even say thai philoso- 
phers doing social philosophy are sometimes led astray 
because they believe that certain ontological claims will 
necessarily result in certain -  unacceptable -  ethical 
conclusions.17
To bring these possible relations between these two 
dim ensions of social philosophy into view 1 want to 
consider (1) the relation betvveen Scientific naturalism 
and methodological individualism, and  (2) the rela­
tion betvveen methodological individualism  and e th i­
cal individualism. Furtherm ore I will ask (3) what is 
the signilicance of ontological holism for ethical ind i­
vidualism and (4) vvhether we may build  ethical con- 
siderations into our social ontology.
Belore I give a short sketch oi my ansvvers to these 
four problems in the concluding  section of this article, 
1 will clarify what these questions mean. 1 vvill argue for 
my claim that even non-reductive individualism has its 
limits. In the following, only the relation between the 
psychological and  the social, and not the relation be- 
tween the mental and  the physical, is at issue. Also it is 
im portant to notice that we are speaking of h u m a n  be- 
ings not simply as biological organisms but as part of 
the social World, as having personality and individual- 
ity -  as beings that may be acknow ledged as more or 
less au tonom ous m em bers in various social contexts. 
Therelore we are dealing with au tonom ous persons who 
have a right to personal au tonom y which has to be re- 
alised in social and  political institutions and has to be 
respected by the State.
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For the purpose of this article it will be helpful to 
distinguish three ontological and  four ethical options 
which  seem to be in the background of m uch discus- 
sion in the ph ilosophy of social reality.18
On the ontological side we firstly have o n to lo g ica l  k o ­
l is tu .  According to this position personal autonomy of a 
hum an  individual presupposes the existence of a suit- 
able structure oi the sutrounding  social world and is con- 
stituted by social facts. The credo of m e t h o d o lo g ic a l  i n d i ­
v idua l i s t i t  is that ali facts about social phenom ena can be 
reduced to facts about psychological States of individual 
persons. According to this second option reality is con- 
stituted by individual psychological facts. A third way is 
suggested by n o n - r e d u c t i v e  i n d i v i d u a l i s o i ,  vvhich claims 
both that there are irreducible social facts and that there 
are irreducible individual psychological facts.
C onsidering the  theory of John  Searle, one might ask 
vvhether he is a methodological or a non-reductive in- 
dividualist (since he accepts irreducible first-person- 
singular intentional States he is an individualist in any 
case). On the one hand  he claims that collective inten- 
tionality or We-intentions are not reducible to 1-inten- 
tions. This seems to make him a non-reductive indi­
vidualist. On the o ther hand  he says (CSR 26) that hav- 
ing a we-intention is a psychological state realised in 
an individual agent. In this sense he m ight be a m e th ­
odological individualist because he refuses to postulate 
some social super-m ind vvhich is the ovvner of an we- 
in tention (CSR 25). Margaret Gilberts approach  (LT 
211) is similar in this respect.
Nevertheless, I think that they are both non-reductive 
individualists. There are tvvo ways of understanding  this 
idea. Now we must bear in mind that -  according to 
my thesis -  social philosophy has to be com m itted  to 
the first-person-perspective and the hermeneutic stance. 
Therefore the laet that a we-in tention is instantiated in 
the brain of an individual organism is irrelevant here.
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Relevant are the contents and the commitments which 
are instantiated thereby. Moreover the instantiation oi 
we-intentionality in more than one organism does not 
constitute social reality19 What is decisive is the Spe­
cial structure of we-intentions forming a joint-commit- 
ment, as Gilbert has shown. There is hence more to 
social reality than the simple co-instantiation oi we- 
intentions. Decisive lor the ontology oi social reality is 
the structure of collective intentionality which cannot 
he reduced to interrelations between individual inten­
tionality As Gilbert shows, no summative account can 
grasp tully the content oi collective intentionality (LT 
197 ff) and as Searle argues tn a similar vvay, “no set of 
‘1 Consciousness’, even supplemented with beliefs, adds 
up to a lWe Consciousness’” (CSR 24).
But why call these accounts individualism? Let me say 
first, that 1 believe that Searle would defend non-reductive 
individualism and not ontological holism, although in 
T h e  C o n s tru c tio n  o f  Socia l R ea lity  there are no arguments 
for this claim. My reason for believing this is his com­
mitments in the philosophy oi mind, especially his claim 
that any form of externalism is incorrect (cf. Searle 1983, 
Chapter 8). So 1 take hiin to hold the thesis that indi­
vidual intentionality can exist independently (in the con- 
stitutive, not in a genetic sense) oi any form oi social 
reality As 1 read hiin, human beings simply have indi­
vidual and collective intentionality.
My reason for counting Gilberts theory as a form of 
individualism is that -  as far as 1 can see -  she takes 
autonomous individuals as the starting point and ar­
gues forcefully then that a non-reducible social reality 
emerges Irom their interactions. This is evident for ex- 
ample in the discussion ot love in her earlier work (cf. 
Gilbert 1989. pp. 223f f.) and her recent papers (e.g. LT 
Chapter 8): Love is discussed primarily under the as- 
pect of how autonomous individuals “merge” in love 
relationships. The other direction, that is, how human
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beings develop a sense of being au tonom ous  persons 
in love-relations, is not discussecl.20 O ther themes domi- 
nant in her various papers are “agreem ent” (cl. LT 293) 
w hich  seems to presuppose au tonom ous persons, and 
‘Identification” (LT 377).21 Moreover she seems to ac- 
cept the “'individualistic’ na tu re” of focus in her ap- 
proach claiming however that she is “sensitive to the 
‘holistic’ nature of what is achieved by agreem ents” (LT 
307 fn. 23). As she States in this note, an ontologically 
individualistic approach need not take jo in t commit- 
m ents  as “‘asociaL or atomistically’” (ibid.) -  in an ethi- 
cal sense, as I vvould Itke to add.
But maybe this formulation does not capture Gilberts 
position, lndeed at one point she explicitly says that she 
does not want to decide “vvhether plural subject con- 
cepts are in some way parasitic upon or secondary to our 
conceptions of the psychological attributes of individual 
hum an  beings” (LT 349). Furthermore, there clearly is a 
development (rom “On Social Facts” to the papers in- 
c luded in “Living Together”. In the later works she writes, 
that in “On Social Facts” she spoke of the suin of wills 
and the pool oi wills without implying “the wills in ques- 
tion som ehow merged together to become indistinguish- 
able, as drops of water might merge in a pool of water” 
(LT 20 fn. 10). And, as 1 read her papers, the theory of 
joint commitments includes non-reductive individual- 
ism more clearly ihan the former book but it is not com- 
mitted to ontological holism either.
My point is that we shou ld  not only focus on the 
way au tonom ous persons let social reality emerge but 
also on the way social reality constitutes au tonom ous 
persons. If we remember that becom ingan  au tonom ous 
person is possible only as a m em ber of social reality wc 
should  ask vvhether we ought to regard the develop­
ment of au tonom ous individuals as the first and funda- 
mental step vvithin social reality and the emergence of 
social g roups out of au tonom ous individuals as the sec-
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ondancl -  ontologically -  d ependen t step. This, 1 th ink , 
is ihe tru th  in ontological holism  and  il is a lim itation  
oi social ph ilosophy if it canno t accom odale ihe first 
claim. A iten tion  has to be paid to the “social passions” 
-  to use Josiah  Royce’s phrase (1908 , p. 41) -  like loy- 
alty, or to the phenom enon  of basic trust in social insti- 
tu lions w ithou t w hich these institu tions sim ply  cannot 
w ork. There are social em otions, feelings and passions 
w hich  are constitu tive for our social World and  also tor 
personal au tonom y -  w hich thus cannot be red u ced  to 
form s of m utual in tentionality  (Lagerspetz) or collec- 
tive acceptance (Tuom ela).22 To my m ind the concen- 
tration  on the second step prim arily is a reflection on 
and reaction to the doctrine ot m ethodological indi- 
vidualism , w hich lorces us to take au tonom ous persons 
as the basic units. Since this m ay -  at least partly  -  be 
ethically m otivated  we have to consider the eth ical as- 
pects now.
O n the ethical side four positions have to be distin- 
guished. S t r o n g  e t h i c a l  h o l i s m  claims that the interests23 
of social entities are the only ethically respeclable values. 
The interests oi the individuals are respectable only as 
means for realising the social functions and aims. S t r o n g  
e t h i c a l  i n c l i v i d u a l i s m  holds the opposite thesis that only 
individual interests are w orthy oi ethical consideraiion. 
Interests of social entities are respectable only as means 
for realising individual interests. Besides these two ex- 
treme positions there are two m ediate options. Accord- 
ing to w c a k  e t h i c a l  h o l i s m  both the interests of social en ti­
ties and the interests oi individuals are ethically respect­
able. In cases of conllict social interests should  receive 
prim ary consideration. X V e a k  e t h i c a l  i n c l i v i d u a l i s m  agrees 
w ith the first pari of weak ethical holism but holds that 
in case of conllict the individual interests should  dom i- 
nate the interests ot social entities.
C ertainly o ther positions may be held. Yet 1 th ink  
my clistinctions suflices to include the m ost historically
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influental positions and systematic options. Strict lib- 
ertarians like John  Stuart Mill, for exam ple, w o u ld  
clearly defend strong ethical individualism. Many con- 
tem porary  com m unitarians, on the o ther hand, hold 
versions oi weak ethical holism. And maybe most so- 
phisticated liberals would  w ant to defend versions of 
weak ethical individualism.
VI. Conclusions
Having outlined these different positions, I w ould  like 
to propose some short ansvvers to the four problems 
and questions formulated above.
(1) Scientific naturalism  and  methodological indi­
vidualism seem to be close relatives: There is a histori- 
cal p recedent for this idea in the w ork  of Hobbes, who 
sought to do social philosophy analogously to physics. 
Moreover, methodological individualism  follows the 
natural Sciences in recognizing only causal explanations. 
Furtherm ore , the Scientific concept oi a completely dis- 
enchanted nature makes it necessary to ignore the evalu- 
ative aspects of the mental. C onsequently  the most re- 
spectable philosophy oi m ind  vvas to construct hum an  
beings as individuals driven by psychic forces which 
could  be unders tood  in a naturalistic way. Of course, 
m uch  curren t philosophy of m ind  remains in thrall to 
the influence of this scientilic naturalism. An yet, there 
is no logical connection here. As the system-theory oi 
Luhm ann or Foucaults structuralism  and some tenden- 
cies in the philosophy of Marx suggest, ontological h o ­
lism is also compatible with Scientific naturalism. But 
Scientific naturalism and m ethodological individualism 
are certainly ‘natural allies’.
(2) The relation between methodological indiv idu­
alism and  ethical individualism is not so straightfor- 
ward. We can understand  w hy there is an affinity be-
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tween Scientific naturalism and methodological indi­
vidualisoi ra ther than one belvveen Scientific na tu ra l­
ism and ontological holism better il we add to ou r  pic- 
ture the laet that most philosophers w ho  o n e n te d  their 
philosophy according to the model of natural Sciences 
did so vvithin the tradition of Enlightm ent and political 
liberalism. D isenchanting  na tu re  u n d e rm in e d  philo- 
sophical doctrines which  tried to justify social an d  po­
litical order by recourse on some evaluative o rder  of 
nature. As is clear, e.g., in the w ork  oi Jo h n  Stuart Mill, 
the additional ethical idea of personal au tonom y un- 
derlies methodological individualismi as well. Il it could 
be established that everything in the social w orld  could 
be reduced to individual psychological facts, it would 
be far more dilficult to restrict individual autonomy. 
This might be done only in a contractarian, liberal, fash- 
ion.
(3) To understand the relation between ontological ho­
lism and ethical individualism we have to understand 
the direction and nature of their dependency precisely. If 
we could establish independently from ethical consid- 
erations that there are no irreducible social lacts, it would 
follovv that some ways oi justilying social or political 
obligations which are not reducible to individual inter- 
ests will no longer be plausible. Obviously strong ethical 
holism woulcl no longer be an option in such a case.
Hovvever, since we have reasons in d ep en d en t  of ethi­
cal considerations to believe that ontological holism or 
at least non-reductive individualism is true, it is impor- 
tant to recognize that ontological holism is not com- 
mitted to any spectal ethical position, but is even com- 
patible with strong ethical individualism. Hence one 
might argue e.g. that only those social interests that 
support individual au tonom y are w orthy  oi ethical con- 
sideration.24 The reason why ontological holism is not 
com m itted  to any Special ethical position, and  a forti- 
ori not to strong ethical holism, lies in two features oi
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ihe natu re  of social realily that we m ust consider in 
order to answ er my fourth  and linal question .
(4) Are vve allowed to build ethical considerations into 
our social ontology? It should  be noted that the nature of 
social reality is evaluative or normative tn several respects, 
although 1 agree with Gilbert that we should  not regard 
these as moral in the narrow  sense. Since ethical think- 
ing itself is part of our social reality, the way different 
values, norm s or obligations are ranked and related is 
itself a constitutive feature oi social reality. A lthough I 
have argued tor the thesis that m uch of this evaluative 
social reality is not constructed by intentionality, social 
reality  is open  to reco n stru c tio n  and  im provem en t 
th ro u g h  th o u g h t and ac tion . T his m u ch  is true  in 
constructivism . Yet, there are limits to construction  and 
hence also limits for constructivism . These limits may be 
discovered only w hen we try to create social realities that 
enable us to lead good lives. The nature of social reality 
is “second nature” which is the elomain of freedom .25 
This is the tru th  oi constructivism  and  creating societies 
w hich m ake personal autonom y possible is, as far as 1 
can see, the best way to m ake our World a place in w hich 
a good life may be lead. This is the tru th  in ethical ind i­
vidualism i. But, as 1 have tr ied  to show , u n lim ite d  
constructivism  and individualismi bu ttressed  by the ide- 
ology of Scientific naturalism  not only give an unsatisfy- 
ing account of social ontology they may even threaten 
our goal of m aking a good lile possible.
Notes
1 I d e a l  w i th  th e  d i f fe re n ce  b e tw e e n  ih e  so c ia l  a n d  th e  
in s t i tu t iona l  only  indirectly and  wi 11 c o n cen tra te  p r im ari ly  
on  the  qu es t io n  of realism. So I shall h en ce fo r th  speak  of 
social reality \vithout  lu r the r  qualif ications m o s t  o f  the  time. 
A l though  ne ithe r  “reality” n o r  “n a tu r e ” are part o f  the  title of 
th is article the no t ion  of “n a tu re ” shall p rove  crucial to my
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argum ents, since it m arks the limits of construction in social 
ontology. It is im portan t to nottce that “n a tu re ” may be 
understood in two different senses: in a norm ative or at least 
evaluative sense which conccrns the essence (and perhaps 
telos) of social and institutional reality; and in a descriptive 
sense which concerns the ‘naturalness’ of social reality
2 Since the lahel “m ethodological individualism ” is used in a 
variety of ways (cf. Ruben 1985), som e clarificattons are in 
order. First of ali. 1 take it in the classical sense that it is a 
metaphysical thests about w hat social phenom ena really are, 
nam ely that they are ju s t, or are vvholly con stitu ted  by, 
individual persons (with beliefs, desires, and o ther m ental 
States) in various relattons w ith one another. This States the 
metaphysical thesis both in term s ot identity and constilution 
and takes individuals to be “natural persons”. Secondly, 1 
presuppose a kind of ‘explanatory realism1 in the follovving. 
This means roughly that an explanation of a kind x can be a 
genuine one only if there are some entities of the kind x w hich 
cannot be reduced. This principle of explanatory realism is 
incompatible with w hat many social theonsts hold who accept 
m e th o d o lo g ic a l in d iv id u a l is m  in th e  o n to lo g ic a l or 
m etaphysical sense on the one hand , and believe in the 
explanatory autonotny of social explanations on the other 
hand (cf. Coleman 1990, C hapter 1). For sure, the doctrine 
of methodological individualism  presupposes that we have 
criteria to determ ine w hether a fact is a social one or not, but 
I shall not press this question here.
3 By “brute facts”, 1 m ean those included in the explanation of
phenom ena given by a natural S c ie n tific  a c c o u n t  o f  the World. 
I shall say a bit more about the very idea o f  “brute facts” later 
( 1 . 1 ).
4 P resu p p o sin g  the on to lo g ica l th es is  of m e th o d o lo g ica l 
in d iv idua lism , or the p rinc ip le  of ex p lana to ry  realism , 
reduction can be understood along the Iines of Kemeny &  
O ppenheim  (1956) as “explanatory replacem ent” (w ithout 
these presuppositions a stronger notion  of reduction which 
includes ontological claims would be needed -  cf. Nagel 1961, 
C hapter 11).
5 1 reter to Searles T h e  C o n s tr u c t io n  o f  S o c ia l R e a lity  as CSR and
to G ilberts L iv in g  T o g e th e r  as LT.
6 A lthough I agree w ith Searle that we should overcom e the
traditional dualistic conception of the m ind-body relation, I 
do not agree w ith his thesis that the abandonm ent of such a
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dualistic conception is necessary for giving a correct answer 
to the questions concerningsocial phenom ena. And although 
1 agree with Searle in ascribing the external-realism -thesis to 
com m on sense and although I agree that there are m ind- 
independent aspects of reality, I do not th ink that these thcses 
are crucial for ansvvering any philosophtcal questions which 
are Special for social ontology. To put it this way: 1 think that 
there are no reasons in Berkeleyan m etaphysics which make 
the development of an adequate analysis of social phenom ena 
impossible.
7 O ne further difficulty is the following: Searle m aintains that
he takes ‘“social fact' to refer to any fact involving collective 
intentionality” (CSR 26) taking w e-in tentions as a sufficient 
condition for social facts. Thus he counts even the hyenas 
h u n tin g a  lion as a social fact (cf. CSR 38 or 121). Now I do 
not know  Searles view about the cognitive abilities of hyenas, 
but given that for som ething to count as a social fact it must 
be ascribed a function (CSR 19) and m ust be recognized as a 
social fact (CSR 34), it seems problem atic to consider hyenas 
h u n tin g  a social fact. S om eth ing  can be, to use Searles 
example, a war only il it is thought and accepted to be a war. 
But perhaps hyenas have the needed abilities so that hunting 
the lion really is a social laet.
8 “The notion of ‘brute fact1 in this s e n s e  is due to G.E.M. 
A nscom be” (CSR 229 In. 1 -  my em phasis).
9 My line of argum ent in this section is deeply indebted to 
McDovvell (1 9 9 4 - c f .  also Q uante 1998a and 1998b).
10 Yet the money-example, especially il vve th ink  of the m odern 
forms of electronic money, shows that the general thesis that 
the m ental is a higher leature of the physical does no work in 
explaining the Special features of money. A nother example 
along the same Iines are persons playing chess ‘blindly1. E\’en 
if we presuppose thai ali their moves and com m unicative acts 
somehovv are realized in the physical, this thesis does no work 
in explaining their playing chess vvithout using figures and a 
chessboard. We can understand  what is going on here only 
from within the practice of playing chess. M oreover Searles 
general theses about the m ind-body relationship simply are 
not relevant here.
1 1 According to Searle the assignm ent of function, collective 
intentionality, and constitutive rules are necessary for an 
analysis of social reality. “In explaining these no tions”, Searle
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says, “1 am  p erfo rce  in  a k in d  of h e rm en eu tic  c irc le” (CSR 
13). The in ev itab ility  o f th is  h e rm e n eu tic  circle is ev idence 
for m y c la im  th at d o in g  social p h ilo so p h y  is b o u n d  to the 
h e rm en eu tic  stance. U nfo rtu n ate ly  Searle in lects th is analysis 
w ith  th e s e s  a n d  p re s u p p o s i t io n s  w h ic h  are  d u e  to  th e  
e x p lan a to ry  stan ce  of n a tu ra l science.
12 “In d e p e n d e n t” m eans “logically and  causally in d ep e n d en t”. 
f his im plies a co m m itm en t to a realistic co ncep tion  of features.
13 “C o n s titu tio n ” m eans th at the  realisa tion  of the  (eature is 
logically o r causally  d e p e n d e n t on  in ten tionality .
14 1 use “b e in g  in te n d e d  as m c lu d in g  “h av in g  lo reseen ” in th is 
con tex t.
15 A lthough  Searle d oes n o t State th is  w ith  respec t to  social 
p h ilo so p h y  especially, he  agrees w ith  th is c la im  in general: “I 
actually  th in k  th at p h ilo so p h ica l theo ries m ake a trem en d o u s  
d ifference to  every  aspect o f o u r  lives. In  m y o b se rv a tio n , the 
re jection  of realism , the d en ia l o f o n to log ical objectivity, is 
an essenttal c o m p o n e n t of the attacks o n  ep istem ic objectivity, 
rationality, tru th , and in telligence in co n tem p o ra ry  intellectual 
life.” (CSR 197)
16 For su re , tln s  is not the only  cause  for th is  e rosion . E conom ic 
prob lem s, the pressure on  trad itiona l form s of life arising  from  
g lo b alisa tio n  an d  the e ro sio n  of the b io log ical fram ew o rk  
aris ing  fro m  b io -tech n o lo g ies are fu rth e r im p o rta n t lactors. 
They ali c o n tr ib u te  n o t on ly  to  the  im p ress io n  th a t o u r  social 
w orld  is fragtle bu t to the idea that it is o p en  to  free and  
u n lim ite d  c o n s tru c tio n .
17 In the co n feren ce  w here  th is  p ap er vvas p re sen ted  O ta  W ein- 
berger reac ted  to M argaret G ilbert s su g gestion  that there  are 
good o n to log ical reasons for p o stu la tin g  n o n -red u c ib le  social 
en titie s by m ak in g  just th is m ove. He replied  that such  an 
on to log ical cla im  w o u ld  resu lt in bad e th ica l co n seq u en ces .
18 For su re , a lte rn a tiv e  w ays of s tru c tu r in g  the field are possib le  
an d  m ay  he m ore  a d eq u a te  for d ifferen t p u rp o ses.
19 M aybe Searle s in te rn a lis tn  is an obstacle  for fo rm u la tin g  a 
re la tiona l a cco u n t of the d e ep e r s tru c tu re  w h ich  is necessary  
for tlus co n s titu tio n . In the co n feren ce  Searle e x p la in ed  th at 
the su c c ess -co n d itio n s  o f a w e -in te n tio n  c an n o t be analysed  
in a pu re ly  in te m a l vvay in one respect: the  success o f th e  
reference of “w e” is d e p e n d e n t on  ex te rn a l factors. Dut as far 
as I can see he gives us no  fu rth e r analysis of the  d e ep e r 
s tru c tu re  in  w h ich  th is  “w e ” is c o n s titu ted  b ey o n d  the  idea o f 
co -in s tan tia tto n .
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20 In ihis Gilbert follows the main trend in the recent literature 
on love. Delaney (1996, p. 340) takes it to be a “pretty generally 
accepted” idea that love is a form oi fusion (cf. Friedman 1998). 
Even Frankfurt (1999) who explicitly does not concentrate on 
the special form of ‘romantic love’ overlooks the laet that in 
love we have an intersubjective basis for personal autonom y 
(cf. Quante (a.) for a detailed discussion oi this).
21 As her discussion makes clear she is not interested in how 
personal autonom y is constitu ted  in acts of identification (cf. 
Q uante (a.) for this line of thought) but in the ethical question 
w hether an identification ot an autonom ous person e.g. with 
her country is “legitim ate” (LT 377).
22 I don t want to clatm that these concepts are irrelevant for 
social philosophy. Quite the opposite. But l th ink  that they 
take for granted a basic level of our social nature which is 
important for social philosophy on the one hand and irreducible 
to individualism on the other hand (cf. also Siep 1992).
23 I use the no tion  of in terest as a neu tral te rm  covering  
everything which might be ethically relevant in the following.
24 By referring to phenom ena 1 ike loyalty, trust or love I do not 
intencl to make the norm ative claim that these autonom y- 
constitu ting  relations should be taken as the sole norm ative 
principles for a legitimation of social or political institutions. 
But I \vant to hold that some problem s of legitim ation cannot 
be ansvvered w ithout taking these pre-au tonom ous aspects 
into account.
25 1 discuss the notion oi second nature, as it is usecl in  the 
w ork  of Jo h n  McDovvell, as an a lte rn a tiv e  to S c i e n t i f i c  
naturalism  in Q uante (b.).
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ON NORMATIVITY IN 
LEGAL CONTEXTS
I. Introduction
W ith the following remarks, l basically wish to suggest two things.
First of ali, I propose to apply Jo h n  Searles episte- 
mological and ontological thesis regarding institutional 
reality to a Central discussion in ju r isp rudence .1 1 vvill 
try to show that these theses are a necessary foundation 
il we vvant to explain the specific practical character oi 
law. 11 1 am right, the epistemic and the ontological the ­
sis of Searles theory -  which 1 vvill call the “social-real- 
ity th e o ry ” -  support  a certa in  positivistic analysis 
against two classical reductionist approaches used in 
jurisprudence.
Secondly, 1 w ould  like to raise some doub ts  and  pose 
some questions about the content and the g rounds oi 
these ontological and epistemological theses as such. 
Regarding this point, I wi 11 suggest that the approach 
needs to be developed further. In some cases, what is 
needed is only greater precision; but in others, the aim 
m ust be to show, against possible objections, that the 
proposal is possible.
There is an ongoing debate in legal theory about the 
interpretation of some typical normative properties as-
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cribed to legal dispositions.2 1 am talking about proper- 
ties such as “obligatoriness”, “genuine normativity”, 
“binding lorce”, “practical character”, etc. These prop- 
erties are predicated in order to express a kind of evalu- 
ation, which is sometimes covered by the notion of “va- 
lidity”.3 Sometimes, “validity” is understood in the sense 
oi “binding force”, and it is thought to exist only when 
certain mora! requisites are satisfied, where this refers 
to a critical or ideal, rather than to a positive morality. 
The ep is tem o lo g ica l status ot statements ascribing such 
properties, and the on to lo g ica l status of the moral prop- 
erties they refer to depend on what metaethical theory 
one adopts.
OI course, not ali legal theories admit “validity” or 
“binding lorce” as referring to a normative property. But 
what matters is to underline that vvhenever this n o rm a ­
tiv e  meaning is at issue, whether it is admitted or re- 
jected, it is generally regarded as a m ora l property.4
From a classical point of view, there are two alterna- 
tive positions which are usually considered to be ex- 
haustive. In one case, normativity, as binding lorce, is 
to be demystified or, at least, left aside -  I vvill call this 
the “skepiical position”. In the other, it is a strictly moral 
predicate, and to determine its specific meaning requires 
an ethical discussion -  this I vvill call the “moral posi­
tion”. Although they start from different premises and 
vvith different commitments, both positions agree on 
the same kind oi reduction since both reject the idea 
that legal d ispositions may have a specific so c ia l  
normativity vvhich is not necessary related to a moral 
property but can also not be reduced merely to indi- 
vidual agents’ beliefs. The dilference is that sk e p tic a l  
a p p ro a ch e s  -  generally represented by so-called “legal 
realism” -  hold that there is nothing that can be identi- 
fied as “genuine” validity or normativity, neither m the 
social nor in the moral sense. Consequently, those who 
believe in such a thing are assumed to be vvrong; and
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theo r ies  thai a d m it  it are reg a rd e d  as n o th in g  b u t  justi- 
f ica tory  ideologies. In tu rn ,  m oral approaches -  classi- 
cally re p re se n te d  by n a tu ra l- law  theory, b u t  also by a 
larger class of critics of posit iv ism  -  c la im  tha t  it is pos- 
sible to identify  “g e n u in e ” valid  n o rm s ,  th a t  is, n o rm s  
w h ic h  have “b in d in g  force”: they  are prec ise ly  w h a t  is 
ca lled  “m ora l  n o r m s ”. In  this  view, a legal sys tem  is 
au then t ica l ly  b in d in g  o r  no rm ative  if, a n d  on ly  if, its 
c o n te n ts  c o r re sp o n d  w ith  morality. In o th e r  w ords ,  the 
basic  difference be tw een  the tw o  perspec t ives  lies in 
the laet tha t  skep tic ism  rejects ali k in d s  of  n o n - re d u c -  
ible normativity , w hereas  post-pos it iv is t ic  app ro a ch es  
do  a d m it  one single k ind ,  n am ely  m o ra l  normativity.
In m y  view, these posit ions are n o t  exhaustive .  O ne  
can  c o u n te r  the  two reduc t ion is t  a p p ro a c h e s  by seri- 
ous ly  ta k in g  in to  ac coun t  a d im e n s io n  of ins t i tu tional  
n o rm a t iv e  facts and  by exp la in ing , on  th is  basis, the 
specific way h o w  law can  be sa id to be norm at ive  or 
b in d in g .  T hat is to say, we can exp la in  g en u in e  legal 
n o rm a t iv i ty  as an  irreducib le  social p h e n o m e n o n  w h ic h  
does  n o t  necessarily d e p e n d  o n  critical morality. In sum - 
mary, 1 th in k  that,  in exp la in ing  the  prac tica l cha rac te r  
oi in s t i tu t io n s  in general, social-reality  th e o ry  also pro- 
v ides a n  exp lana tion  of the  practical ch a ra c te r  o f  law  in 
a posit iv istic  way. This e x p lan a t io n  does  n o t  resort to 
a n  i d e a l  m o r a l i t y  (vvh ich  vvould  c o n t r a d i c t  th e  
posit iv is tic  thesis of the s e p a ra t io n  b e tw e e n  law and  
m orality ) ,  n o r  does it im ply  a m e taphys ica l  co m m it-  
m e n t  w ith  a s trange k ind  of en tities  (w h ich  vvould c o n ­
trad ic t  its em pirica l  ph i losoph ica l  b a c k g ro u n d ) .
In th is  con tex t ,  1 th in k  it is im p o r ta n t  to recall the 
d is t in c t io n  betvveen tvvo dil leren t k in d s  of d iscourse ,  
vvhich are som etim es  expressed  in the  sam e te rm s. For 
in s tance ,  even w h e n  it is fo rm u la te d  in descr ip tive  lan- 
guage ,  the  ethical d iscuss ion  a b o u t  the  c o n d i t io n s  tha t  
m u s t  be satisfied lor an au th o r i ty  to be legitim ate , or  a 
law to be just, is e i ther  a cr it ica l (eva luative)  o r  a m eta-
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physical discussion. Its purpose is neither to identify 
nor to explain real normative institutions. Rather, it tries 
to establish what would be good ju s tific a to ry  reasons 
for creating, maintaining or rejecting such institutions. 
Social-reality theory does not compete with these ap- 
proaches, because its purpose is a totally different one. 
It does not intend to offer good justificatory reasons in 
support oi the existence of institutions in general or 
specific institutional facts in particular. Instead, it com- 
petes with other e x p la n a to iy  attempts, and specifically 
with ali dualistic or reductionist theories regarding the 
deontic element involved in institutional reality.
With respect to this, it is generally accepted that law 
as a social reality is an agent-relative “reality”. But pre- 
cisely because of this, the normativity of law -  if it is 
not to be of a moral kind -  is thought to be reducible to 
agents’ beliels. If we look at social reality, it is said, we 
cannot find genuine normative facts. We can find and 
explain only w ha t is considered to be a normative laet. 
Here, I think, we can see clearly where the difference of 
the approach oi social-reality theory lies. Social-reality 
theory can attempt to explain social normativity; but a 
reductionist approach, il it is coherent, cannot -  sim- 
ply because it denies the existence of such a thing.
II. Some necessary prernises
In order to carry out my purpose 1 will mention some 
prernises of social-reality theory that must be taken for 
granted. (Although 1 will later point out some problems 
concerning these prernises.)
a. Social-reality theory is based on a m onistic  ph ilo - 
sophical thcsis: We live in one single world. And that 
World is, we hope, more or less as the empirical Sci­
ences describes it.
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b. Social-reality theory is a non-reductionist theory 
about social institutional reality. It offers us a structure 
or a pattern of interpretation according to which under 
certain conditions we can assert the existence of a Spe­
cial kind of facts, namely institu tiona l facts. This kind of 
reality includes human rights.5 And if  that is so, then 
we can certainly say that it also includes legal rights, 
duties and povvers.
c. Institutional reality is ontologically subjective. That 
is to say, its mode of existence depends on agents’ atti- 
tudes and background capacities. But this does not mean 
that such attitudes are the truth-condition of a state- 
ment about institutional facts. The truth-condition of a 
statement about an institutional fact is precisely the in ­
stitutional fact referred to by the statement. Subjective 
ontology means only that this laet would not exist il 
the appropriate attitudes did not obtain.
d. Institutional reality is epistemically objective. The 
existence of institutional facts can he objectively known. 
That is to say, we can determine the truth-value of state- 
ments about them.
I would like to make a Comment on this first group 
oi ideas. In order to interpret them correctly 1 th ink it 
would be uselul to keep in mind a distinction between 
the theoretical proposal, on the one hand, and the philo- 
sophical metaphysical thesis underlying it, on the other. 
In o ther w ords, we must not conluse the non- 
reductionist thesis of social-reality theory w ith  its 
monistic philosophical assumption. Reductionism and 
non-reductionism are theoretical theses regarding spe- 
cilic properties or lacts. There are different kinds of re- 
ductions that a theory rnay propose or reluse, regard­
ing specific objects or properties. To sustain non- 
reductionism about some kind of facts or properties 
means to distinguish the existence of tvvo kinds ot things 
or realities: those which are considered to be irreduc- 
ible, and those to which they are said to be irreducible.
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In contrast, to sustain a reductionist thesis means to 
de ny this distinction and to defend the thesis that the 
first kind of entity or reality is actually nothing other 
than the second. In that case, there are then nol two 
types oi ontologies, but only one. In other words, if a 
theory offers a non-reductionist thesis regarding cer- 
tain tacts, that means that it offers a language and es- 
tablishes the conditions under which the facts in ques- 
tion can be said to exist. An existenttal statement in this 
sense is internal to a theory it must be understood in 
the sense proposed by the theory
The metaphysical assumptions of the theory regard­
ing the external World are something completely differ­
ent A theory may say that, at the end of the day, there 
is nothing out there; or, on the contrary, that ali the 
theoretical distinctions correspond to independent ex­
ternal realities. But the arguments lor or against a 
reductionist or a non-reductionist stand regarding a 
specific property analysed by a theory are not arguments 
for or against metaphysical presupposilions, such as 
idealism, monism or pluralism. I am not trying to say 
that there cannot be any logical relations between theo­
retical and metaphysical theses in general. For instance, 
if one assumes certain metaphysical theses, some theo­
retical reconstructions must be rejected as logically in- 
compatible. But in this particular case I am saying that 
the theoretical recognition of two different ontologies 
does not imply two different external worlds. The th eo ­
retical Identification oi multiple kinds of entities is logi­
cally compatib le  with the p h i l o s o p h i c a l  idealistic, 
monistic or dualistic background. It this were not ad- 
mitted, then social-reality theory would be ab  initio con- 
tradictory; since it is trying to sustain that we can dis- 
tinguish two kinds oi entities in a unique metaphysical 
World.6
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III. Legal normativity as 
institutional existence of rights and duties
As we know, the same set of words may he uttered with 
a m ind -  (or word)-to-world direction of (it or with a 
w o r ld - to - m in d  (or -w ord )  one. By e x a m in in g  the 
d irec tion  of fit of the respective speech-acts  we can 
determ ine w hether they constitute a directive or a de- 
scriptive use of language. To be sure, directive discourse 
is not always legal. In this respect, let us suppose that 
legal theory provides us with a sulficiently clear criterion 
to recognize vvhich discourse should  be considered a 
legal one.
According to social-reality theory, just as we have 
words for describing success or failure in achieving fit 
for statements, we also have words for describing suc­
cess or failure in achieving fit for directive discourse. 
The term s for statements are “tru e” and “talse”, and the 
terms for directive discourse are “obeyed” and “diso- 
beyed”.7
Taking these ideas into account, it shou ld  be noted, 
however, that obedience may not be the principal aim 
of a directive discourse. It may have further purposes 
and  may therefore be evaluated in additional ways. In 
legal theory, it has been underlined that obedience is 
neither tfie only nor the principal purpose or aspira- 
tion of authorities; the main goal is rather to constitute 
justificatory reasons for actions. This aim is generally 
considered as the trait that distinguishes legal au thori­
ties from a gangster. Leaving aside the discussion re- 
garding the k ind  of reasons iegal discourse intends to 
p ro d u c e ,8 we can say that since Herbert Hart’s proposal, 
existing law, -  law, that is, whose rule of recognition is 
accepted -  is better understood as a set of justificatory 
reasons for action than as a set of orders backed by 
threats. In this line of thought sophisticated contribu-
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tions d istinguishing between mere obedience and ac- 
ceptance have been developed in legal philosophy.
Obedience, according to Herbert Hart, is a relation- 
ship between a lawgiver and the addressee(s) of the law. 
li this were the only way to evaluate legal discourse we 
could not unders tand  the law as a con tinuous phenom - 
enon  that persists even w hen  authorit ies change. h  
would  then have to be unders tood  as a set of orders 
related to each other by their origin in one single law- 
giver. But if, for whatever reason, the lawgiver disap- 
peared, the legal system w ould  collapse and  it would 
not be possible to say thai a new lawgiver has the right 
to com m and. For that to be true, the new lawgiver would 
first have to gain new obedience from the addressee is l .
1 m ention  these Hartian ideas at this point only to em- 
phasise that, in his view, the principal aim of law is not 
obedience but acceptance; only when  some basic con- 
stitutive rules are accepted, we can see legal disposi- 
tions as speciiic institutional factsd
In addition to this, we can say that, to a greal extent, 
one of the Central aims of legal clispositions is to give 
rise to new  rights, duties and  powers. To be sure, not 
ali legal dispositions succeed in this a ttem pt, and not 
ali dispositions that do succeed are legal ones. None- 
theless, it is generally acknowledged that a legal d ispo­
sition reaches its goal in establishing a new duty or right 
when it has b inding  lorce. To predicate the normativity 
or b inding lorce of a legal disposition means to assert 
the existence oi the correspond ing  duties, rights, or 
powers.
On the hasis of these ideas, a parallel can be drawn. 
Like “t ru th ” and “obedience”, “normativity” is another 
word of evaluation .10 Just as statements can be judged  
to be true or talse, and  c om m ands to be obeyed or diso- 
beyed, directive discourse in tending to create rights and 
duties can be evaluated as valid or invalid (binding or 
non-binding). In doing so, we produce statements -
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v a lid ity  s ta te m e n ts  or sta te m e n ts  o f  b in d in g  fo rce . Such 
statements can, in turn, be judged as true or false. That 
is to say, legal dispositions are valid or invalid, and va­
lidity statements are true or false. Now, il what 1 said 
before is correct, a non-reductionist account of the ex- 
istence of rights and duties as institutional facts per- 
mits a non-reductionist account of this property -  va­
lidity, understood as normativity or binding force -  with 
which we evaluate legal dispositions about rights and 
duties. Therefore, the truth of a statement predicating 
the validity or binding force of some ought-statement 
must be assessed on the basis of whether or not it cor- 
responds with the existence of the duty in question.11
According to social-reality theory, the notion of truth 
must be understood in terms of “disquotation” and “cor- 
respondence”. The disquotation and the correspond- 
ence theory are both tautologically true. Once a mis- 
leading interpretation of the notions of “facts” and “cor- 
respondence” is avoided, we can accept both views as 
completely compatible. The (brute or institutional) facts 
referred to by statements are not at ali metaphysically 
strange objects. In this view, truth and facts are neces- 
sarily related because a laet is what makes a statement 
true. According to social-reality theory, ‘the whole point 
of having a notion oi “fact” is to have a notion for that 
vvhich stands outside the statement, which makes it true, 
or in virtue oi vvhich it is true, il it is true. On this 
account, every statement determines its own truth-con- 
ditions’,12 and iacts are the c o n d itio n s  in the World that 
salisfy the truth-conditions expressed by statements.13
For instance, take the follovving prescription P:
P: ‘Ali citizens aged 18 and older are allowed to vote 
in presidential elections.’
Now we can ask whether this prescription P belongs 
to, or exists within, a given legal system. |This question 
corresponds to a sense of “validity” that could also be 
analysed in terms of institutional facts, but 1 will not
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discuss it here. Cf. footnote 3] Additionally, we can ask 
w hether  this prescription is “valid” in a different sense, 
that is, w helher it has “b ind ing  force”. In the approach 
I am presenting now, normativity or validity in this sense 
m eans that the corresponding  right does in fact exist. 
The tru th  oi the validity sta tem ent ‘Prescription P is 
valid’ should he analysed in terms of disquotation. That 
is to say:
‘Prescription P is valid’ is true if, and only if, Pre­
scription P i s  valid.
In virtue oi the correspondence theory oi truth, the 
“fact” that makes the statement true is the validity of 
Prescription P, that is, the institutional existence of the 
right to vote .14
It could be said that one ot the principal goals of 
directive language in legal contexts, as far as it claims 
to have binding force and normativity, is the social ex­
istence oi institutional powers, rights and  duties. Note, 
however, that neither such language by itself, nor the 
procedures in the context oi which it has been uttered, 
nor the intentions of the utterers can guarantee that the 
alleged rights and duties come to exist. In the approach 
oi social-reality theory, duties and rights can be said to 
exist w hen  a constitutive rule is accepted and some sta­
tus functions are thus assigned to certain persons or 
things. On that account, it may well be that a right or 
duty is only formally established by legal dispositions, 
vvithout constituting, or corresponding  to, a right or a 
duty  as an institutional fact. In this case such rights or 
duties are the content of legal dispositions which have 
been formally promulgated, but still do not exist. To 
the extent that the existence of these rights and duties 
is the tru th-condition  of statements of validity, or b in d ­
ing force, such statements are false, that is to say, the 
co rresponding  legal dispositions lack b inding  force. By 
m aking  this distinction we make explicit the difference 
betvveen the institutional existence of law or legal dis-
1 7 4
O N  NORMATIVITY IN LEGAL C O N TEX TS
positions and the institutional existence of the rights 
and duties that they intend to, but do not always suc- 
cessfully, create.
IV Some general remarks on reductionism
As l have already said, frotn the predominant perspec- 
tive, there is only one sense -  if at ali -  in which a legal 
disposition may he authentically normative or binding, 
and that is a moral one.
It must be stressed that if, in the last resort, morality 
is to be understood as an institutional social phenom- 
enon, then the confrontation betvveen a moral and a 
social approach to normativity is merely a verbal dis- 
pute. Likewise, we would have only an apparent disa- 
greement it m oral approaches did not intend to analyse 
normativity or normative institutions, but to propose -  
with a world-to-word direction oi fit -  the conditions 
people shou ld  consider belore accepting, or refusing to 
accept, certain norms. On this interpretation, the moral 
approach would be a proposal from which we can criti- 
cise real or potential institutions. In this case, it would 
then be necessary to recognise that there are two genu- 
ine senses oi normativity, namely social institutional 
normativity, and rational or moral normativity that is a 
regulating idealV However, most legal theorists reject 
this last proposal and consider that there is only one 
sense of genuine or non-reducible normativity, and that 
ascribing normative or practical force to social institu­
tions independently  of critical moral requirements 
amounts to a fallacy committed by ideological positiv­
ismi. In virtue of what has been called the principle of 
the unity of practical reason, for something to be a genu­
ine duty, it must be in last resort a duty in a moral sense.10 
From this point of view, social authorities attempting 
to establish duties, rights and powers, even it they are
175
M a r i a  C h r i s t i n a  R e d o n d o
accepted, do not succeed in their a ttem pt w hen  they 
do not conform to moral requirements. Ali this amounts 
to a real disagreement betvveen the moral approach and 
the social-theory approach; because from the former 
point of view, in order to unders tand  and identify au- 
thentically normative facts or b ind ing  norm s we must 
rely on metaethics and a critical morality. From the per- 
spective oi social-reality theory we only need a phi- 
losophy of society and a theory ot institutional social 
lacts. Here, an interesting point must be underlined. 
Moral approaches do not deny that socially accepted 
norms exist. W hat they say instead is that if the content 
of such accepted norm s does not conform  to moral 
standards, their practical character, or b inding force, 
can be reduced to pure coercion or false beliefs. But, on 
this hypothesis, such social rules cannot be genuine 
reasons for action. Sum m ing up, the alternative is the 
following, normativity is to be understood  as a moral 
property or as sheer coercion plus beliefs. Against this 
alternative, we need an argument for uphold ing  the rec- 
ognition oi a genuine -  non-reducible -  social n o rm ­
ativity.
On the one hand, according to social-reality theory, 
the continuous acceptance of the m em bers  ot a group 
is strictly necessary m order for institutional normative 
reality to exist. This is not a claim about the m eaning 
with which people use normative language from an in- 
ternal point oi view. Nor is il a claim about participants’ 
beliefs. The participants may not be aware ot it, or ihey 
might thm k  that the accepted rules have binding  force 
independently  of the attitudes oi h u m an  beings.17 So­
cial-reality theory is an external18explanation com pat- 
ible with the fact that, from an internoi point oi view, 
participants attach different k inds of m eaning  to state- 
ments about powers, duties, prohibitions and rights.ig
In order to explain the practical character of authori-  
tative language regarding duties and rights as the insti-
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tu t io n a l  exis tence of the r ights  a n d  d u l ie s  th a t  they  pro- 
pose ,  this  ap p ro a c h  d o e s n ’t requ ire  d ia t  p a r t ic ip a n ts  
believe in the arb it ra r iness  of these  r igh ts  a n d  du tie s  
(as w o u ld  be requ ired  by a strict con v e n t io n a l is t  recon-  
s t ruc t ion) .  In laet, it ne i th e r  requ ires  th a t  par t ic ipan ts  
believe tha t  they are c o n s t i tu t in g  rights as inst itu tional 
facts n o r  tha t  they  believe in the ex is tence of these facts 
as m e taphys ica l  entities. Ali it r equ ires  is that par t ic i ­
p an ts  assign these s ta tu s - func t ions ,  for w h a te v e r  rea- 
sons  they m ay have. Only  after cer ta in  in s t i tu tional  facts 
com e to exist, the beliefs referring  to th e m  can  be evalu- 
a ted  as objectively true  o r  false.
In the exam ple , participants m u s t  accep t that ‘x (be- 
ing a Citizen aged 18 or o lder) c o u n ts  as y (having the 
right to vote) in context C ’, a n d  it is irrelevant vvhether 
they  th ink  that it cou ld  have been  othervvise, or that it 
o u g h t  to be tha t way, for necessary m oral  reasons. The 
im p o r ta n t  point hete  is that social-reality theo ry  can ex- 
p la in  the existence of these rights, even il they are con- 
s idered  a m atte r  of conviction or  a rb it ra ry  c o n v e n tio n .20 
The inst itutional theory  m atches  well in b o th  cases.21
O n the o th e r  h an d ,  ac co rd in g  to social-reality  theory, 
we live in one single World -  at m o s t .22 We m u s t  ab a n -  
d o n  the idea that there is a nrental World bes ides  o u r  
physical  one. In the same vein, we m u s t  a b a n d o n  the 
idea that there is a realm oi ough t {‘ein Reich des Sollens’) 
a longside  the physical one. In o th e r  w o rd s ,  we sh o u ld  
ren o u n c e  the classical is /ought d is t inc t ion  as m e tap h y s i ­
cal. N evertheless ,  this last thesis  does  no t  im ply  tha t  
we c a n n o t ,  from  a theoretical po in t  of view, d is t ingu ish  
diflerent k inds oi entities that we can c la im  to exist w h e n  
the  co n d i t io n s  stated in the respective th e o ry  o b ta in .23 
W e th u s  d o  not need  to reduce  o u r  m e n ta l  o r  in s t i tu ­
tiona l no rm at ive  reality in o rd e r  to be co h e re n t  w ith  
the  rejection  oi m etaphysica l dua l ism . M ental an d  n o r ­
mative reality can exist ac co rd in g  to a theory, w i th o u t  
m e taphys ica l  consequences .
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To consider different kinds of reductions in Searles 
approach, we should move on to the arguments pre- 
sented in his T h e  R ed is c o v e ry  o f  the  M i n ä .24 In this work, 
we can find a reflection about why we are able to re- 
duce phenomena as heat, sound, color, solidity, etc. to 
their physical foundations, while we are unable to do 
the same regarding mental entities. Concerning the 
question ‘Why do we regard heat as reducible and päin 
as irreducible? The ans\ver is’ -  Searle says -  ‘that what 
interests us about heat is not the subjective appearance 
but the underlying physical causes.’25 Extendmg this 
argument to normative reality, we can say that our in- 
terest in some contexts is directed towards its ob jec t ive  
appearance rather than its underlying su b je c t ive  hasis. 
Regarding consciousness, Searle observes:
Part oi the point ot the reduction in the case of heat 
was to distinguish between the subjective appearance 
on the one hand and the underlying physical reality 
on the other. lndeed, h is a general feature for such 
reductions that the phenomenon is dehned in terms 
of the ‘reality’ and not in terms of the ‘appearance’. 
But we can’t make that sort oi appearance-reality 
distinction for consciousness because consciousness 
consists in the appearances  themselves. W h e r e  
a p p e a r a n c e  is concern ed  \ve c a n n o t  m a k e  the a p p e a r a n c e -  
rea l i ty  d is t inc t ion  bec a u se  the  a p p e a r a n c e  is the reality.20
li we keep this idea in mind, we can realise that the 
same may be said about normative phenomena ot rights 
and duties. We cannot make the appearance-reality 
distinction for normative lacts, such as the existence oi 
rights or duties, because they consist in the appearances 
themselves.
Following the parallelism we should say that, oi course, 
the reduction is possible. ‘Surely when you get down to 
brass tacks, there are no real facts’.27This is so because
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this non-reductionism does not reflect any metaphysi- 
cally necessary feature, bu t a trait of our definitional prac- 
tices.28 The interesting point to remark is that if the par- 
allei to the non-reducibility of mental entities can be 
drawn, we can say something more about the recogni- 
tion of a specific institutional normative reality. We cou ld  
try to reduce and redefine institutional normative prop- 
erties like binding force in terms oi what is believed or 
considered to be binding, just as we redefine “red”, in a 
reductionist way, as the reflection of light of a speciiic 
kind. But this would not mean that we eliminate the ap- 
pearance of normativity (as we also d o n t  really eliminate 
the subjectivity oi red), it would simply mean that we 
stop calling them by their old names.2g
V Some epistemological and 
ontological remarks
1. In s t i tu t io n a l  reality  is e p is te m o lo g ic a l ly  o b jec t ive .  It is, 
we could say, a cognitivist thesis about institutional re­
ality. That som ething can be objectively know n entails 
that statements about it are true or false, or that ques- 
tions about it have a correct anscver. Objective knowl- 
eclge supposes that ‘disagreement does not underm ine 
the thesis that there is a fact oi the matter awaiting dis- 
covery. Rather, such disagreement suggests a fault oi at 
least one of the interlocutors’.30
In social-reality theory, the contrast between epistemic 
objectivity and  epistemic subjectivity is a matter of de- 
gree.31 Hence, institutional reality can be objectively 
know n on ly if collective acceptance and the practice 
support ing  it are also clearly established.
Even il this is apparently  simple and  sound , 1 think 
that some difficulties arise w hen  we distinguish betvveen 
a c t - c a te g o r ie s  and a c t - i n d i v i d u a ls , }2 or between institu- 
tions -  and the general rights and cluties related to them
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-  on the one hand, and individual instantiations of such 
institutions, on the other. The problems we may en- 
counter  here are oi different kinds. We may be uncer- 
tain about the truth-value of a “pure s ta tem ent” regard- 
ing the very existence of an insti tu tion .33 This may be 
the case, for instance, w hen acceptance is not yet, or no 
longer, clearly established. Uncertainty, however, does 
n o t  m ean  in d e te rm in a t io n .  We can  still m a in ta in  
bivalence regarding this k ind  oi statements. That is to 
say, we can stipulate that statements about the exist­
ence of an institution -  for instance, Commercial trans- 
action or donation -  are objectively true il the insti tu­
tion has reached a certain level x  of acceptance, and 
that they are talse in ali o ther cases. O ur ignorance about 
this iact, that is about the level of acceptance, does not 
u nderm ine  the truth-value of propositions about the 
existence oi the institution. There may, however, arise 
a d d i t io n a l  p ro b lem s  re la ted  to the t ru th -v a lu e  of 
“applicative statements” referring to individual instances 
oi some clearly existent institution -  for instance, con- 
cerning w hether  some agent A on a particular occasion 
has perform ed a Commercial transaction or a donation, 
and w hat the corresponding rights and duties are. This 
is so, first of ali, because the concepts referring to insti­
tutions and the rights or duties related to them  may be 
vague; and secondly, because there may be unresolved 
conflicts betvveen equally valued rights and duties, or 
betvveen incom m ensurable  ones .34
Here social-reality theory leaves room for discussion. 
For example, regarding the problem of vagueness, there 
are two classical approaches. From one point oi view, 
indeterminacy is an epistemical problem. Perhaps it is 
not ahvays possible to know  the truth-value of some 
propositions, but this does not mean that they do not 
have any. Indeterminacy, in this view, is a lack of knowl- 
edge, and that presupposes that there is som ething to 
be know n. O n the second approach, the indeterminacy
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of a proposition is a semantic problem. For instance, 
imagine a transaction X where, taking into account ali 
the relevant characteristics of X, we cannot determine 
vvhether it is a sale or a clonation. The problem is that 
the m eaning of “sale” and  “dona tion” is partially inde- 
te rm in a te .  There  will a lways he b o rd e r l in e  cases. 
Propositions about borderline cases are semantically 
indeterminate; that is to say, they are neither true nor 
false.35
For social-reality  theory, it is an op en  q u es t io n  
vvhether or not epistemological objectivism regarding 
insti tu tional facts implies that any single -  pure or 
applicative -  proposition about social reality has a truth- 
value. On the one hand, objectivism suggests bivalence, 
and that implies that the ansv/er to the question is, Yes, 
they do. O n the o ther hand, the gradual nature of the 
objective-subjective distinction, the general problem  oi 
vagueness, Irom which our statements cannot escape, 
as well as the possibility of genuine conflicts suggest 
that the ansvver in these cases should  be No, institu­
tional statements referring to such cases lack truth-value.
Sum m ing up, as lar as the explicit thesis of social- 
reality theory goes, it seems compatible with bo th  clas- 
sical opposite ansvvers regarding borderline cases and 
unresolved conflicts. In principle, we can say that this 
does not represent any problem to the theory. The only 
purpose of this remark is to underline that these doubts 
reflect others about the special ontological status of this 
kind of reality. Usually, epistemic objectivism regard­
ing normative facts which are non-reducible to empiri- 
cal reality has been associated with a problematic on- 
tology, namely an ideal reality that can be kno w n  ob- 
jectively because it is ontologically objective, that is to 
say, it exists independently  oi hum an  beings. To con- 
serve an objective epistemological thesis regarding a 
gradually m an-m ade reality may have paradoxical con- 
sequences for applicative statements if semantic and
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valora tive  d isa g re em en ts  a b o u t  ih e m  are, as seem s to 
be the  case, unavo idab ie .
2. N o w  1 w an t  to m ove o n  to a n o th e r  po in t  c o n c e rn in g  
the onto log ica l a n d  ep is tem olog ica l  thesis  of social-re- 
ality theory. ln s t i tu t io n a l  reality exists because  of the 
a c cep tance  a n d  prac tice  of agents .  It is an  agent-re la -  
tive reality a n d ,  in th is  sense,  it is on to log ica lly  sub jec-  
tive. O n ly  il the  (sub jec tive )  c o n d i t io n s  of  ex is tence 
o b ta in ,  ob jec tive  t r u th - ju d g e m e n ts  are possib le .  For 
ex a m p le ,  w h e n  can we tru ly  say tha t  A is an  au tho r i ty  
or B is a d u ty  w i th in  a g iven g roup?  The an s w e r  is: 
W h e n  it is an in s t i tu tiona l  fact th a t  A is an  au th o r i ty  or 
that 6 is a d u ty  vvithin th a t  g roup .  At th is  po in t ,  w ha t  
m a tte rs  is not the issue oi d e te m i in in g  w h o  or  h o w  m any  
agen ts  sh o u ld  sus ta in  an  ins t i tu t ion  in o rd e r  to m ake  
su c h  s ta te m en ts  objectively  true .  The in te res t ing  po in t  
here  is tha t  we are a l low ed  to State tha t  it is objectively 
true  tha t  A is an  authority , o r  that B is a d u ty  for the 
m e m b e r s  oi the  g ro u p  as a w ho le ,  even  if no t ali the 
m e m b e r s  of  the  g roup  do  accep t the respective in s t i tu ­
tion.
This  a sy m m e try  em erges  because  social en tit ies  are 
n o t  str ic tly  sub jective  m en ta l  ones. A feeling of pä in  
exis ts  il one  agen t leels päin .  The ex is tence oi this feel­
ing  is relative on ly  to tha t  agent,  a l th o u g h  it can  be 
objectively recognized or  knovvn by others .  ln st itu tional 
facts, in  con tras t ,  do  no t exist relative to each  agent;  at 
least that is clearly  sugges ted  by the fact tha t w e char- 
ac terise  th e m  as “soc ia l” lacts. H ence,  un less  w e are 
vvilling to a d m it  tha t  social en t it ies  exist m ere ly  in rela- 
t ion  to  each  single ac ce p ta n t  (in w h ich  case we sh o u ld  
s to p  charac te r is ing  th e m  as part ot a soc ia l  reality), we 
are iacing  a p ro b le m  ot asym m etry .
Lets su p p o se  tha t  1 reject the  ins t i tu t ion  of authority. 
Il th e  sen tence  ‘A is an  au th o r i ty  in g roup  G’ is objec-  
tively true ,  th e n  ‘A is an  a u th o r i ty  lor  m e ’ is also objec-
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tively true, provided I am a m em ber of group G. This 
m ean  diat according to this theory, that authority, with 
ali its practical consequences, exists in relation to me 
even if 1 do not accept it. At this point it is easy to slide 
into a futile discussion abont the “real” existence of an 
au thority  if we do not rem em ber the different direc- 
tions oi fit with which the same words can be used. 
W hen  we affirm that according to the premises of so- 
cial-reality theory, A is an authority also for me or rela- 
tive to me, even il 1 do not accept the institution of 
authority, this does not mean that the theory assesses 
this fact as a morally good thing. Nor does it mean that 
l shou ld  accept the authority simply because it is an 
institutional normative fact according to the theory. The 
theory olfers a language in which we can identify and 
explain that k ind of reality. Its purpose is not to explain 
what 1 think, or should think, as a m em ber  oi the rel- 
evant group. It offers a reconstruction  accord ing  to 
which we can state that, in the example, A is an au thor­
ity that will have practical consequences even for those 
that reject it.
In this context, it is perhaps useful to introduce a 
distinction which was originally drawn with a different 
pu rpose .30 The existence of som ething may be subjec- 
tive in two different senses. It is possible to distinguish 
betvveen existence r e l a t i v e  to  someone and existence in  
vi i  l u t : o i  someone. In the first sense, that something exists 
subjectively means that it exists only tor, or in relation 
to, a person or g roup of persons. To say that something 
is relative to some group does not teli us anything about 
why it exists or what the necessary conditions lor that 
existence are. In particular, it does not teli us vvhether 
it exists because it is accepted. This first k ind oi “sub- 
jectivity” implies a threshold beyond which  the onto- 
logical claim vanishes. From this point oi view, a men- 
tal entity is relative to one person while institutional 
facts are always relative to a group. This means that
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such facts exist only within groups and do not exist 
outside of them.
The second sense of “subjectivity” stresses the fact 
that agents’ attitudes eonstitute a necessary condition 
for the existence of an institutional fact. To say that an 
ohjeet is subjective in that sense is to say that it would 
not exist if the person or group oi persons in question 
did not have the right attitudes. From this point of view, 
institutional reality exists in virtue of the acceptance of 
certain individuals and not in virtue oi the acceptance 
of the whole group .>7 Social-reality theory asserts that 
institutional entities are subjective in both senses, but 
it does not say that the members oi the group must be 
aware oi that. Hence, the fact that narticipants b e l i e v e  
that their institutions exist in a non-relative way, inde- 
pendently oi any agent’s attitudes, does not refute the 
explanation. An ohjeet can be subjective in both of the 
senses mentioned even when that subjectivity is de- 
nied by the agents in relation to whom that object ex­
ists and on whose attitudes it depends.
Summing up, institutional reality is subjective be- 
cause it exists r e la t i v e  to a social group. In this sense, it 
is relative to a l i  agents belonging to the group. But it is 
also subjective because it exists in v i r t u e  o f  certain agents, 
namely those who give their acceptance. This may seem 
a purely 1 inguistic movement, but 1 think it might be 
relevant to stress the difference. A may well be an au- 
thority in r e la t io n  to  myseli and relative to my actions, 
vvithout being at the same titne an authority in v i r t u e  of  
my actions and myself.38
3. Finally 1 \vish to say a lew words about the transcen- 
dental argument for external realism on which social- 
reality theory is founded. This argument does not refer 
to institutional reality. It only shows that institutional 
facts -  which depend on our representations -  presup- 
pose a different kind of reality independent of any rep-
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resen ta t ion .  It is w orth  n o t in g  th a t , first of ali, ihe p lau -  
sibility  ot the  a rg u m e n t  for ex te rna l  realism  d o es  no t  
ex c lu d e  the p lausib il i ty  of a n o th e r  a rg u m e n t  for ex te r ­
nal moi ai realism, w h ic h  does  no t  reject the  first, h u t  
r a th e r  c o m p le te s  it w ith  the recogn it ion  of a n  ob jective  
no rm a t iv e  reality In fact, m e taphys ica l  realism a b o u t  
g e n u in e  no rm ative  p roper t ie s  (w h ich  are usua lly  co n -  
ce p tua l ly  assimilated to m o ra l  ones)  rejects  n e i th e r  e x ­
te rna l  physical realism n o r  a c o r re sp o n d e n c e  th e o ry  of 
t ru th .  Secondly, the a rg u m e n t  for ex terna l  realism is 
even  m ore  com patib le  w ith  a sub ject ive  r e d u c t io n is t  
v iew  of inst i tu t ional  no rm ative  reality -  namely, the  one  
\vh ich  I h ad  called the “skeptical a p p r o a c h ”.
This is no t  a lault of the  a rg u m e n t  for ex terna l  reality 
as it is p rese n ted  in social-reality th e o ry  because  it d oes  
n o t  in te n d  to be an a rg u m e n t  for m o n is m  -  th a t  is to 
say, for the existence of on ly  one  ex terna l  reality  -  or  
n o n - re d u c t io n ism  co n c e rn in g  ins t i tu t ional  reality -  tha t  
is to  say, for the recognition  of  ins t i tu t ional  n o rm a t iv e  
facts vvhich can be d is t in g u ish e d  i rom  the sub jec t ive  
a t t i tu d e s  on  vvhich they d e p e n d .  In o th e r  vvords, th is  
a rg u m e n t  is no t  a s u p p o r t  for the  tw o Central theses  
here d iscussed ; because it is no t d irec tly  re levant in the 
d iscuss ion  a b o u t  the on tological sub jective  thesis  a n d  
the  ep is te m o lo g ic a l  ob jec tive  thes is  r e g a rd in g  in s t i ­
tu tional  reality  It says n o th in g  a b o u t  re d u c t io n ism  a n d  
n o n - re d u c t io n ism  oi a specific inst i tu t ional  ontology. 
Likevvise, it says n o th in g  to those  vvho ho ld  tha t  a long-  
side the ex terna l  physical World the re  is ano ther ,  n o r ­
mative w orld  in d e p e n d e n t  oi the first.
In a w o rk  dev o ted  to ins t i tu t ional  n o rm at iv e  facts, 
instead  of th is  clear a rg u m e n t  for the ex is tence of an  
o b je c t iv e  i n d e p e n d e n t  rea l i ty  it w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  
des iderab le  to find an  a rg u m e n t  for th is  special sub jec-  
tive-objective in s t i tu t ional  reality. I am  no t a sk in g  for 
a n o th e r  t ran sc e n d e n ta l  a r g u m e n t  a b o u t  in s t i tu t io n a l  
reality. It cou ld  be su s ta ined  tha t  a th e o ry  w h ic h  ex-
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plains the structure and  the conditions of existence of 
such  entities -  just like o ther  theories abou t entities 
li ke electrons, numbers, mathematical relationships, and 
so on -  does not need to produce a transcendental ar- 
gum ent for the acknow ledgm ent of these entities. A 
theo rys  success or failure depends  on its capacity to 
account for the problems it intends to explain and  to 
iormulate useful hypotheses about them. In o ther words, 
there is no need for a philosophical argum ent for every 
theoretical distinction. l-fowever, as a theory abou t so­
cial reality the theory un d e r  scrutiny com petes  wtth 
various o ther theories, w hich  are philosophically com- 
patible with it, that is, theories which accept m onism , 
external realism and the correspondence theory of truth, 
bu t w hich  explain the structure and the emergence of 
institutional normativity in o ther ways.
C oncern ing  this point, I would  like to go back to 
som eth ing  f have said earlier. In practical philosophy, 
there are two classical approaches to the ontology of 
norm s, which may be extended to the ontology of rights 
a n d  du ties .  I have called th em  the m o ra l  a n d  the 
skeptical approaches. As 1 already said, they are usually 
considered to be not only mutually  exclusive, b u t  also 
exhaustive. In o ther vvords, it is assum ed that there is 
no logical space for a third approach. On this view, we 
can be either realists (empiricists) or idealists regarding 
norm s, rights or d u t i e s .R e a l i s m  is necessarily con- 
nected vvith monism, but also with reductionism  about 
normative properties. O n the opposite side, the analy- 
sis  of n o r m s  as id ea l  e n t i t i e s  a m o u n t s  to  n o n -  
reductionism , bu t it is at the same time com m itted  to 
the existence of an independen t ideal world. Consider- 
ing this classical dichotomy, we must produce an argu­
m ent to show the possibility of that logical space in 
w h ich  monism  does not imply reductionism , an d  non- 
reduction ism  does not imply dualism. W ithou t such 
an argum ent, a Central critique of the social-theory ac-
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count of normative social reality says that it is logically 
impossible. If we take its non-reductionism seriously 
we must accept dualism. If we take its commitment 
with monism seriously we must be reductionist regard- 
ing ali non-physical properties.
In other words, vve must still argue for, and not only 
assert, the thesis that we live in o n l y  o n e  s in g le  World, 
because this does not lollow from the transcendental 
argument tor an external wotid. We must not overlook 
that on a ditferent account, external moral realism is 
considered to be the best explanation (or non-reduc- 
ible normative properties.40 The commitment with the 
existence ot an objective moral reality, together with 
the thesis that social institutions are normative insofar 
as they correspond -  or in some way relate -  to that 
moral reality is not a new theoretical proposal. It is a 
philosophical thesis that contradicts the assumptions 
of social-reality theory. Its implausibi 1 ity is not shown 
by merely asserting that we live in only one single vvorld 
it must be shown as the result oi an argument. There- 
fore, a general argument for non-reducibility of social 
normativity and against dualism seems to needed if we 
are to debate -  as 1 think we should -  with those who 
sustain alternative positions. This argument is a neces- 
sary hasis il we want to defend -  as 1 have intended 
here -  that an institutional approach constitutes the only 
coherent foundation oi a positivistie conception about 
legal normativity as a possible genuine property, which 
does not depend on morality.
Notes
1 I will refer especially to: Searle 1995.
2 1 wi 11 use the tern ts  “legal n o r m ” a n d  "legal d i s p o s i t io n ” 
indiscrim inately  to refer to m eaningfu l  language in te n d in g  
to prol iib i t  or to m ake  obliga tory  soine c o n d u c t ,  o r  to confer  
a p o w e r  in legal contexts.
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3 O f course, here I am not talking of validity as a systemic relation
internal to law reconstructed as a system. 1 am aware ot the 
fact that m investigations about the structure of legal systems 
“validity” is understood in this latter sense.
4 It is im portant to take note of the am biguity of the word 
“norm ativ ity”. In a very w ide sense tt refers to ali language 
w ith a w orld-to-w ord direction of lit. In a narrow er sense, it 
relers only to the practical nature or b inding force w hich 1 
intend to discuss now. In the first sense, ali legal dispositions 
explicitly  in tended  to p roh ib it, obligate or em pow er are 
norm s. In the second sense, not ali of them  are norm ative, 
because even if they intend to, not ali of them  succeed in 
constituting a right, a duty, or a power. Thus, legal dispositions 
may he assessed as having binding force or normativity. The 
ontological and epistemological status of this property is what 
1 in te n d  to  analy se . R egard ing  th is  is su e , L agerspetz  
d istinguishes betw een “rules”, “norm s”, and “obligations”. I 
will be concerned vvith the practical force w hich is a necessary 
elem ent of obligations bu t a contingent elem ent of norms. 
Cf. Lagerspetz 1995, pp. 14 f—142.
5 Cf. Searle 1995, p. 93.
6 I am su g g es tin g  th a t the irred u c ib ility  of in s titu tio n a l 
n o rm a tiv ity  is in d e p e n d e n t oi a m o n is tic  or dua lis tic  
m e ta p h y s ic a l th e s is . F or e x am p le , one  co u ld  acccp t 
m etaphysical realism regarding moral properties and still 
explain social norm ativity as an irreducible institutional fact 
Independent of moral properties.
7 Cf. Searle 1995, p. 215.
8 Central on this issue is the proposal of Joseph Raz, which has
given rise to many others contributions. See especially Raz 
1990. In resum ed terrns, we can say, following M acCornnck, 
that by taking into account the force of the rules il is possible 
to distinguish ‘rules of absolute application’, ‘rules of strict 
application’, and rules ot discretionary application’. The first 
and the second correspond to Razs and to Schauers models, 
respectively. The third one corresponds to rules of thum b. 
A ccording to M acCorm ick, we should recognise that these 
lasi ones have a specific force as tie-breakers when the balance 
of reasons does not determ ine a result. Cf. M acCormick 1998, 
pp. 316 -3 1 8 .
9 U sing the schem a provided by social-reality theory we can
in terp re t the rule ot recognition  as the constitu tive rule
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acceptance of vvhich allows us to identify the laws which 
belong to and have to be applied in a legal system.
10 For a different analysis of this property cf. Celano 1999.
1 1 Regarding ontology in the legal context, cf. also Coleman 
and Leiter 1995.
f 2 Cf. Searle 1995, p. 215.
13 Cf. Searle 1995, p. 211.
14 It might be said that there is a similarity betvveen the results 
of application oi Searles theory and Kelsens theory of law. 
But although it is true that Searles theory enables us to explain 
as institutional facts both the existence of legal norms and 
the existence of rights and duties, we should not therefore
confuse the two things. As explained above, tf a legal norm
has no binding force, it does not give rise to a right or 
obligation, even though it may exist. Kelsen’s theory, in 
contrast, has been criticized precisely for conlusing two 
different meanings of “va lid ity” , that is, lor equating the 
existence of a legal norm with the existence oi the duty to do 
what that norm says.
15 O f course, as far as metaethics engages in ontological 
reflections, there are many specific metaethical theories that 
contradict the monistic ontological thesis.
16 Cf. N ino 1991, pp. 16-24.
17 AVhere the institution demands more of its participants than 
it can extract by force, where consent is essential, a great deal 
oi pomp, ceremony, and razzmatazz is used in such a way as 
to suggest that something more is going on than simple 
acceptance of the formula XcountsasY in C.’ Cf. Searle 1995,
p. 1 18.
18 In fact this is an example of a ‘non-extreme external point of 
view' or hermeneutic point of view’. Cl. MacCormick 1981, 
p. 38. Also, MacCormick 1986, p. 104.
19 lt isimportant to admit that the agents who participate in the 
practice can use the institutional words —“authority” , “righis” , 
“money” and the like -  w ith  a meaning that does not 
correspond to the reconstruction provided by social-reality 
theory. 11 this were not the case (for instance, il ali participants 
in the practice of authority vvere to reject the idea that the 
concept oi authority implies that they are believed to be, or 
regarded as, such authorities), the theory would have to admit 
that authority is not an institutional fact. We must remember 
that for social-reality theory, for instance, part of the content
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of the claim t liat som ething is money is the claim that it is 
believed to be m oney’. If ali participants refuse the claim, 
there are only two alternatives, namely: to say that m oney is 
not, m this case, an institutional fact or, as I am suggesting, 
that the participants use the Word w ith a m eaning w hich is 
different trom  the reconstruction  proposed by the theory. 
Regarding this issue, cl. Celano 1999.
20 On this subjetc 1 am referring to the well know n discussion 
related to Ronald Dvvorkins criticism regarding convetionalist 
approaches to lavv. Cl. Dvvorkin 1986.
21 It is obviously true that m any aspects that can be analysed 
with this theory can also be analysed with a stnct convention- 
alist theory. But it is also true that social-reality theory can 
explain more than the conventionalist approach. For example, 
cases where the arbitrariness clause does not obtain, or the 
case in w hich institu tions em erge independen tly  of any 
coordination problem .
22 Cl. the quote oi Davidson in Searle 1998, p. 144.
23 Carnap 1952.
24 Searle 1992.
25 Ibid. p. 120.
26 Ibid. pp. 121-122.
27 Cf. Searle 1995, p 45.
28 l take this argum ent as a good one, even il linguistic practices 
have been considered as an insufficient basis lor preventing 
reductionism . C.1. Sabates 1999.
29 Searle 1992, p. 123.
30 Shafer-Landau 1994.
31 Cl. Searle 1995, p. 8.
32 von Wright 1963. Also, Searle 1995, p. 32.
33 1 take this category from Joseph Raz. We can say that true or 
lalse s ta te m e n ts  ab o u t in s ti tu t io n s  are e ith e r  p u re  o r 
applicative. A statem ent is pure il the existence of an institu ­
tion suffices to make it true. It is an applicative statem ent il 
there is an institution and an individual laet, vvhich together 
are suflicient to make it true, while none ot them separately 
suffices to do so. Joseph Raz talks about norm ative, rather 
than institutional statem ents. Cf. Raz 1980, pp. 49 and 218.
34 This could be presented w ith the language ot Joseph  Raz. 
Raz affirms that in virtue oi the social sources of legal rights, 
powers and duties, there are certain kinds of inescapable gaps, 
vvhich correspond to statem ents about rights, povvers and 
duties having no truth-value. They arise vvhen the language
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of rights, dutics and powers is sem antically indcterm inate or 
w hen there are unresolved conflicts. Cf. Raz 1979, pp. 5 3 -  
77.
35 von Wright 1996.
36 Cf. Sosa 1993, p. 621.
37 Institutional facts require acceptance by a sub-group or some 
relcvant individuals. Cf. Lagerspetz 1995, pp. 6 and 156.
38 Note that il Searles theory defined ‘au thority ’ (or any other 
institutional concept) as that which is subjectively considered 
to be an authority; it would have a logical problem . In the 
exam ple, provided that 1 do not considerx  to be an authority, 
‘x is an authority’ would be (alse regarding to me; but it would 
at the same time also be true, provided that it is objectively 
true that x is an authority  relative to the group and it is also 
true that 1 belong to the group.
39 Cf. von Wright 1969, pp. 89 -90 .
40 Cf. Moore 1982 and 1989; Brink 1989; H urd 1990.
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CONFRONTING TW O 
CONSTRUCTIVISTS
I. Introduction
en  1 began  to read  The Construction o f Social Re-
li ty,1 for the first t im e, I was am az ed  by the simi- 
larity be lw een  the s ta r t ing  po in t  of th is  b o o k  a n d  the 
s ta r t ing  point of H ans K elsens Päre Theory o f  Law.2 It 
seem s to me tha t  bo th  a u th o rs  are facing a lm os t  the 
sam e p ro b lem ,  bu t  from  the  very  b e g in n in g  of the ir  
b o o k s  they  solve it differently. Even th o u g h ,  probably, 
the  d ifferences betw een  the Solutions they  p ropose  are 
no t  as d e e p  as may a p p e a r  at first sight. In the follow- 
ing, I will critically co m p are  th e ir  Solutions, and  th e n  1 
vvill co n tra s t  b o th  oi th e m  w ith  Ali Rosss alternative.
Kelsen, in the  second  ed i t ion  oi Pure Theory , lacing 
the  ques tion  of ‘vvhether the sc ience of law is a n a tu ra l  
o r  a social science; vvhether law  is a na tu ra l  o r  a social 
p h e n o m e n o n ’,3 he writes: ‘[...] the c lean  de l im ita t ion  
be tw e en  na tu re  and  Society is no t easy, because  Society, 
u n d e r s to o d  as the  actual living to g e th e r  oi h u m a n s  be- 
ings, m ay  be th o u g h t  of  as pa r t  of life in general and  
h en ce  of  na tu re .  Besides, law (...) seem s at least partly  
to be roo ted  in nature  an d  to have a “n a tu r a l” existence. 
F or  if y o u  analyze any b o d y  of facts interpretecl as “le-
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gal" or som ehow  tied up  with law, such as a parliam en- 
tary decision, an administrative act, a judgm ent, a con- 
tract, or a crime, tvvo elements are distinguishahle: one, 
an act or series of acts -  a happen ing  occurring  at a 
certain time and in a certain place, perceived by our 
senses: an external manifestation of h u m an  conduct; 
two, the legal m eaning  ot this act, that is, the meaning 
conferred upon  the act by the law. For example: People 
assemble in a large room, m ake speeches, some raise 
their hands, others do not -  this is the external h a p ­
pening. Its m eaning is that a statute is being passed, 
the law is created. [...] A m an in a robe and speaking 
from a dais says some words to a man s tanding  before 
him: legally this external happen ing  means: a judicial 
decision was passed. A m erchant writes a letter of a 
certain content to another merchant, who, in tu rn  an- 
swers with  a letter; this m eans they have concluded  a 
legally b inding  contract. Somebody causes the death  ot 
som ebody else; legally, this means m urder.’4
In Kelsens theory, as in Searle’s, social lacts are, in a 
scnse, natural lacts (and then legal science could be 
reduced to natural science), but, in another sense, they 
are not reducible to natural lacts. This is so because 
every social laet -  legal f act, from Kelsens perspective, 
for, unlike Searle, he was interested in explaining legal 
phenom ena  only -  is constitu ted , not only by a mere 
natural fact (“b ru te” fact in Searles terminology), but 
by a further element too; its specilic social (or legal) 
“m eaning”. For Kelsen as well, as for Searle, it is at bot- 
tom a nortn that ascribes to a natural laet such specilic 
social (or legal) “m eaning”, diat constructs  it as a social 
(or legal) laet. Here, however, the analogies between 
the two theories fall short, and  the paths ot the tvvo 
authors diverge.
From what 1 have said so far, both Kelsen and Searle 
could in fact be considered as constructivists, and, rnore 
specifically, “social” constructivists, accordingto  the clas-
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sification oi different kinds of constructivism recently 
established by Vittorio Villa.5 Villa writes that this label 
*[---] explicitly recalls Finn Collins characterization [...] 
of the thesis according to which “social reality is some- 
how  generated by the way we th in k  or ta ik  about it, by 
our consensus  about its nature, by the way we exp la in  it 
to each other, and by the concep ts  we use to grasp it. 
Social facts are ihought to be a product of the very cogni- 
tion, the vety intellectual processes through \vhich they 
are cognised, explained and classified, in so far as this 
cognition is a shared, collective one” (F Collin, Socia l 
R ea lity . London, Routledge 1997, pp. 2-3).’
We can notice, hovvever, some differences betvveen 
Kelsen and Searle. In the next section I shall focus on 
three main differences, concern ing  the scope of their 
theories, the distinct kinds of constructivism they en- 
dorse, and the contrasting answers they present to the 
so-called question of “institutional reality”.
II. Some differences between 
Kelsen and Searle
A. T h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e i r  t h e o r i e s
The first sharp difference relers to the aims and scope 
of Kelsen and Searles theories, respectively.
As is well-known, Kelsens aim is to build  up a pu re  
theory of law. Therefore, he carries out (at least) a triple 
“purification”:
a) To begin with, Kelsen wants to puri ly legal theory 
oi any ideological elements, that is from any value judge- 
ment, or any political, religious or moral evaluation: 
‘[...] the Pure Theory has an outspoken  anti-ideological 
tendency. The Pure Theory exhibits this tendency by 
presenting positive law free from any adm ixture  with
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any “ideal” or “right” law. The Pure Theory desires to 
present the law as it is, not as it ought to be; it seeks to 
know the real and possible, not the “ideal”, the “right” 
law. In this sense, the Pure Theory is a radical realistic 
theory of law, that is, a theory of legal positivismi.’6
b) Secondly, Kelsen wants to purify the methodol- 
ogy of legal theory of any influence of dilferent Sciences. 
Kelsen aims at avoiding any methodological syncretism 
-  that is, the combined use of tools proper to different 
disciplines -  especially in the field of social Sciences, 
where only the methods of inquiry could draw a line 
between disciplines having the same object. In particu- 
lar, Kelsen wants to avoid methodological syncretism 
betv/een sociology and legal theory: the first one be- 
longs to the causal Sciences (together with natural Sci­
ences and history), while the second one belongs to 
normative Sciences (together with ethics, logic and 
grammar).7 The division between causal and norm a­
tive Sciences -  hence the dillerence between sociology 
and legal theory -  reflects, in Kelsen’s opinion, the fun- 
damental antithesis betvveen Sein and So ilen ,  is and ought.
c) Thirdly, and consequently, Kelsen also wants to 
purify the object of legal theory. Kelsen \vrites of his 
ovvn theory: ‘li characterizes itself as a “pure” theory of 
law because it aims at cognition focused on the law 
alone, and because it aims to elimmate from this cogni­
tion everything not belonging to the object oi cogni­
tion, precisely specified as the law.’8
Thus, provided that ‘[...] the law -  the sole object of 
legal cognition -  is norm’,9 Kelsen restrains the scope of 
his analysis to legal norms only: ‘The obvious statement 
that the object of the science of law is the law includes 
the less obvious statement that the object of the science 
of law is legal n o rm s ,  but human behavior only to the 
extern that it is delermined by legal norms as condition 
or consequence, in other words, to the extern that h u ­
man behavior is the content of legal norms. Interhuman
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relations are objects of the science of law as legal rela- 
tions only, that is, as relations constituted by legal norms. 
The science oi law endeavors to com prehend its object 
“legally”, namely from the viewpoint of the law. To com ­
prehend something legally means to com prehend some- 
thing as law, that is, as legal norm  or as the content oi a 
legal norm -  as determined by a legal n o rm .’10
Jo h n  Searles work, on the o ther hand, has a more 
ambitious aim and a b roader scope than Kelsens. Ile 
w a n ts to b u i ld  up  a ‘philosophy of Society [...] centering 
essentially around questions of social ontology.’11 Like 
a great fresco, Searles vvork now  includes a theory oi 
speech acts ,12 a theory of m in d 13 and a theory of social 
reality. The three theories purport,  as a whole, to pro- 
vide an answer to the puzzling existence, in our unique 
world, of phenom ena which  do not seem reducible to 
the phenom ena described by natural Sciences. Accord- 
ingly every social fact constitutes the scope oi Searles 
theory: not only legal iacts -  as in Kelserks pure theory 
-  but also those labelled, for example, as political, eco- 
nomic, and moral ones.
It seems, therefore, that the two theories differ too 
m uch to he compared. But, in my view, this is not the 
case, for at least three reasons.
First, Searle, being concerned  with ali social iacts, is 
consequently concerned with legal iacts, too. lt is true 
that we cannot compare Searle and Kelsens theories as 
such, having different aims and  scope: b u t  we can c o m ­
pare them in so far as both oifer an explanation of the 
legal dominion.
Second, the explanation of the legal dom inion is not 
a matter of secondary import in Searle’s work: not only 
because he ollen refers, as examples of social Iacts, to 
m any legal concepts and  institu tions, but also, and  
chiefly, because he maintains that his analysis ‘at bot- 
tom is about pow er’, 14 about the power relations in S o ­
ciety. And there is no doubt that law has m uch to do
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with power relations, even if, of course, it does no t ex- 
haust them.
Third, because, from the point of view of a legal phi- 
losopher, it is m teresting to test the impact of Searles 
ph ilosophy of society in the legal lield, exactly compar- 
ing it with the most im portan t legal theory  ot ou r  cen- 
tury, namely, Kelsens theory.
B. Social co n s tru c t iv ism  a n d  Scientific c o n s tru c t iv ism
Both Kelsen and Searle seem to be constructivists. But 
w hat k ind  of constructivists are they? To name bo th  of 
them  “social constructivists”, as we have done above, is 
not an answer but the beginning of an answer. This 
label, in laet, is used for keeptng them  apart: on  the 
one hand , from radical constructivists, w ho th ink  any 
k ind  oi reality, natural reality inc luded , is observer- 
d e p e n d e n t ;15 and , on the o th e r  h and ,  trom  radical 
empiricists, w ho th ink any kind of reality, social reality 
included (tl any), is observer-independent.
Constructivism has to do with ones  ontology and 
epistemology. The differences b e tw een  Searle’s and 
Kelsens constructivisms, in my view, lay more at the 
epistemological level than at the ontological one.
Etymologically, ontology is the study oi what is. But, 
since classical philosophy, “what is” means, alternatively 
or cumulatively: a) what exists, which things do exist; 
b) how il is what there is, what is the nature of things 
that do exist. Ontology Studies, using o ld-fashioned 
terminology, the existence and/or  the essence oi things, 
vvhether facts exist and/or how facts are, the “being” 
and /o r  the “is”.
Weil, I guess Kelsen and Searle -  who, in my op in ­
ion, do not explicitly distinguish the two m eanings of 
‘ontology’ -  share a similar ontology, in both meanings 
of the word.
They share, in the sense of ‘ontology’ as the study oi
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the existence of things, a realistic ontology: there is a 
world outside, and it is one World. Searle, on this subject 
matler, is more explicit than Kelsen, but also the latter, 1 
believe, could subscribe Searle s external realisrn, that is 
‘[...] the view that there is a way that things are that is 
logically independent of ali hum an  representations’.16
Both share, in the sense ot ‘ontology’ as the study ot 
the essence oi things, the idea that, am ong w hat exists, 
there are ontologically objective things and  ontologically 
subjective things. The ‘m ode of existence’1' of the lirst 
ones, their essence, is independent ot ou r representa­
tions: ontologically objective things (simpltlying: nature) 
are described by natural Sciences. The ‘m ode oi exist­
ence’ of the seconcl ones, their essence, is dependent on 
our representations: ontologically subjective things (sim- 
plifying: society) are described by social Sciences.18
I insist that both Kelsen and Searle are social con- 
structivists since they affirm that social facts are “con- 
structed” by men, and they are not completely  reduc- 
ible to natural facts.
There is not time enough now  to do it, but 1 think 
that Kelsens ontology could he translated, w ithout se- 
rious difficulties, in terms of Searles ontology. For ex- 
ample, we could affirm that, according to Kelsen, the 
law is a complex network oi brute facts to which we 
have imposed the status of “normative coercive order”,19 
that has the function oi guiding hum an behaviors.
On the o ther hand, Searle’s epistemology looks dif- 
ferent from Kelsens, still inlluenced, in the second edi­
tion oi keine R echtslchre, by neo-kantianism. Searle, 1 
think, would not accept, for example, the kelsenian use 
oi a p n o r i categories as conditions of intelligibility oi 
legal lacts qua  legal facts, as in the case of “basic n o rm ”: 
‘Insofar as only the presupposition  of the basic norm 
makes it possible to interpret the subjective m ean in g o f  
the constitution-creating act (and of the acts established 
according to the constitution) as their objective mean-
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ing, that is, as objectively valid legal norm s, the basic 
norm  as represented by the science of law may be char- 
acterized as the transcendental-logical cond ition  of this 
in terp reta tion , if it is perm issible to use by analogy a 
concept of K ants epistem ology.’20
Both Kelsen and Searle are nonreduction ists, since 
they do not believe that (the language of) natural sci­
ence suffices for a descrip tion  of the whofe reality. If 
they are dualists in epistem ology, however, their dual- 
ism is ra ther different.
Kelsen distinguishes between causal and  normative 
Sciences: on the one hand, the Sciences w hich are con- 
cerned with what is (by nature  or by convention); on 
the o ther hand, the Sciences which are concerned with 
what o u g h t  to be. O n  the one hand, the Sciences which 
use as explanatory tool the principle of causality; on 
the o ther hand, the Sciences which use the principle of 
im p u ta t io n .21 Kelsen, therefore, puts together, from an 
epistemologica! poin t of view, natural Sciences and 
empirical social Sciences. And he carefully distinguishes 
both of them  froni legal science. Kelsen, at least in his 
long neo-kantian  phase, seems to be a constructivist 
also from the epistemological point of view: 'It is [...] 
true that, according Kants epistemology, the science of 
law as cognition of the law, like any cognition, has con- 
stitutive character -  it “creates” its ohjeet insofar as it 
com prehends  the ohjeet as a meaningful whole. Just as 
the chaos of sensual perceptions becomes a cosmos, 
that is, "nature” as a unified system, through the cogni­
tion of natural science, so the multitude oi general and 
individual legal norm s, created by the legal organs, be­
comes a unitary system, a legal “o rder”, th rough the 
science of law. But this “creation” has a purely episte­
mological character. It is fundamentally  different from 
the creation of objects by hum an  labor or the creation 
of lavv by the legal authority .’22
This kelsenian constructiv ism  lives together, in his
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mature works, with descriptive attitudes, and sometimes 
il enters into a State oi tension with them. The interpre- 
taiion 1 am providing may look “strained”, but 1 would 
say that, in Kelsens epistemology, there is the idea of 
“two levels of reality”. The first level is that of legal 
materials that are not “constructed” by legal science: 
they are a product of social construction because they 
are dependent on hum an acts and are described by so­
cial Sciences. The second level is that oi legal norms 
that are “constructed” by legal science qua  its object of 
inquiry.
In conclusion, Kelsen, in addition to being a social 
constructivist, is also an epistemological constructivist,23 
and, particularly, a Scientific one: it is legal science, not 
people at large, that “constructs” legal reality, that is the 
legal order and legal norms.
Searle s dualism, on the contrary, is the dualism be- 
tween ali natural Sciences (the language of physics and 
chemistry) and the social Sciences, or, perhaps, the phi- 
losophy oi Society. In my opinion, we cannot label Searle 
as an epistemological constructivist. Unless we are using 
‘constructivist’ in a very weak sense, to which would thus 
apply to ali scientists and philosophers, because they use, 
to describe reality, a language partially “constructed” or 
reconstructed by themselves. In this weak sense, Searle 
too would be an epistemological constructivist: (or ex- 
ample, “fact”24 and “action”25 seem to me, in his work, 
theory-dependent terms, the meaning oi which is con­
structed inside the very theory he works out.
C. Facts and norms
Kelsen and Searle agree, Irom an essence-relative 
ontological point oi view, that in the World there are 
“things” different from, and not completely reducible 
to, physical entities.
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It we limit ou r  inquiry to the legal tield -  for the 
reasons m entioned above -  these “things” are for Kelsen, 
basically, meanings;26 for Searle, basically, institutional 
facts. Hence there is a family resemblance between the 
two positions.
This resemblance is concealed by the different epis- 
temological approach of the two authors  and by the 
different lexicon they use. Since it is impossible to deal 
with ontological questions without using language -  
language, in a sense, cannot be transcended -  radical 
linguistic differences usually make us to believe that 
there are radical differences in the two au tho rs’ onto- 
logies. But, as 1 said above, this is not the case. Never- 
theless, ihere are some differences left in Kelsen and 
Searles nonreductionism s. 1 shall tiy to show briefly a 
few similarities and differences in their positions on  the 
puzzling question of institutional reality.
Let us consider the passage by Kelsen 1 quoted  above: 
‘People assemble in a large room, niake speeches, some 
raise their hands, others do  not -  this is the external 
happening. Its meaning is that a statute is being passed, 
the law is created’. VVe have certain h u m a n  acts, certain 
physical entities, some “b ru te” lacts, on the one hand, 
and their objective legal m eaning (the enactm ent oi a 
statute), on the o ther hand. Those acts ot will -  in 
Kelsens words -  have the objective legal m eaning  oi 
the enactm ent ot a statute because they conlorm  with 
the content oi a valid norm. Narnely, the validity oi a 
norm  -  its ‘specific existence’ in Kelsen’s words -  at- 
tributes an objective legal meaning to the acts that con- 
form to its content, and it constructs  those acts as the 
enactm ent of a statute: ‘That an assembly of people is a 
parliament, and that the result oi their activity is a stat- 
ute (in o ther words, that these events have this ‘m ean ­
ing’), says simply that the material lacts as a w hole cor- 
respond to certain provisions of the constitution. That 
is, the content of an actual event corresponds to the
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c o n te n t  o f  a g iven n o r m . ’27 K tha t  n o r m  h a d  no t existed
-  o r  if it h a d  n o t  been  valid , w hat for Kelsen is equiva-  
len t  -  the sam e acts w o u ld  no t  have h a d  tha t  objective 
legal m ean ing : they  w o u ld  on ly  have had  a subjective 
one.  Sam e acts, two different m e a n in g s .28
Searle, faced w ith  the sam e exam ple ,  w o u ld  say that 
'X ( those  h u m a n  acts) c o u n t  as Y (en a c t in g  a s ta tu te)  in 
C ( the  con tex t  oi a p a r l iam e n ta ry  legal sy s te m )’. This is 
a cons t i tn t ive  rule tha t  im poses  the  s ta tu s  of enac t ing  a 
s ta tu te  to the acts ot th a t  g ro u p  of p e rso n s ,  w ith  the 
as soc ia ted  function ,  for exam ple ,  of g u id in g  behaviors .  
T herefo re ,  given X, in the  con tex t  C, collective in ten -  
t iona lity  -  the sha red  beliel tha t  Y is en a c t in g  a s ta tu te
-  c o n s t ru c ts  the  inst itu tional fact Y. Il collective in ten- 
t iona li ty  does  no t  ob ta in ,  th e n  X does  n o t  c o u n t  as Y. 
The sam e acts co u ld  ob ta in ,  b u t  the  in s t i tu t iona l  laet Y 
w o u ld  n o t  exist. Same acts, tw o  different facts.
U p  to n o w  1 have stressed som e sim ilarities betw een 
Kelsen a n d  Searles Solutions. N o w  1 w o u ld  focus on 
tw o  m a in  dLlferences.
a) A cc o rd in g  to Kelsen, the objective legal m e an in g  
of an  act d e p e n d s  on a (regulative)  n o rm  w h ich  has a 
dii f eren t s t ru c tu re  from the  (consti tu t ive )  rule tha t ,  ac ­
co rd in g  to Searle, im poses  s ta tus  an d  fu n c t io n  on  a fact. 
The  s t ru c tu re  oi a n o rm , ac c o rd in g  to Kelsen, is i l  X, 
th e n  Y o u g h t  to b e ’; the s t ru c tu re  of a rule, ac c o rd in g  to 
Searle, is ‘X co u n ts  as Y in C \
This  s h a rp  difference can  be w e a k e n e d  if we inter- 
pret (at least) the  kelsen iän basic n o rm ,  f ro m  a d y n am ic  
po in t  of view, as a cons ti tu t ive  rule, that cou ld  have 
rough ly  th is  fo rm ulatk in : ‘W h a t  is d e te r m in e d  by the 
su p r e m e  original p o w er  in a Society c o u n t s  as the  first 
co n s t i tu t io n  in tha t  Society’.
Two dilferences, however, w o u ld  no n e th e le ss  persist. 
First, even  if we in te rp re t  the basic n o rm  as a c o n s t i tu ­
tive ru le ,  ac co rd in g  to Kelsen the re  w o u ld  be, in a legal 
system , o n ly  one cons ti tu t ive  rule tha t  a t t r ib u te s  objec-
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live legal meaning to hu m an  acts; ali o ther norm s, that 
carry out the same function, are regulative. Whereas, 
according to Searle, ali the rules that construct institu- 
tional facts are constitutive (or they have, at least, a 
constitutive element). Second, for Kelsen the sole c o n ­
stitutive rule (the basic norm ) is a p resupposition  of 
the legal science, a transcendental-logical condition of 
intelligibility oi the whole legal order; for Searle, on the 
contrary, ali constitutive rules that contribute  to pro- 
duce institutional reality seem to be socially constructed 
and /o r  accepted.
b) The above-m entioned collective acceptance oi the 
im posed  status and lunction constitutes, I w ould  sug- 
gest, the second main difference between Kelsen and 
Searle.
According to Searle, the collective acceptance, ‘within 
systems oi constitutive rules’,2g is a necessary and sutfi- 
cient condition lor the existence of institutional lacts .30 
W hereas for Kelsen it seems to be neither a necessary 
nor  a sufficient condition.
But, in this case too, the differences are less sharp  
than they appear at a first sight.
It is true that for Kelsen the existence of every objec- 
tive legal m eaning only depends on the very existence 
oi a vai id legal norm , and, therefore, social acceptance, 
collective intentionality, social beliels, and so on, are 
totally irrelevant on this point. They can only deter- 
mine the subjective meaning oi an act, no t the legal 
objective one.
Kelsens epistemology prevents him from taking into 
systematic account the notion of “etlicacy” -  a notion 
that, lor him, properly belongs to causal Sciences and 
not to the normative ones: even if collective acceptance 
makes elfective a status and function imposition on some 
act, this acceptance is nevertheless not sullicient to as- 
cribe an objective legal meaning to that ac t .31
But it is also true that in Kelsen’s work we tind the
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idea  acco rd ing  to w h ic h  a necessary  c o n d i t io n  oi the 
ex is tence  of a legal o rd e r  in  a soc ie ty  is its overall effi- 
cacy, nam ely  the ( in s t i tu t iona l)  laet tha t  such  a legal 
o rd e r  is socially cons idered ,  as a w ho le ,  the  law  of that 
society. This is a p re-analy tical c o n d i t io n  of the exis t­
ence of  law that cons ti tu tes ,  as it is w e l l -k n o w n ,  a very 
p ro b lem atic  po in t of Rcine Rcchtslehre.
In conc lus ion ,  rough ly  speak ing ,  the  o p p o s i t io n  be- 
tw ee n  objective legal m e a n in g s  an d  in s t i tu tional  faets, 
as b u i ld in g  b locks of inst i tu t ional  reality, is less sh a rp  
th a n  it appears: on  the one  h a n d ,  Searle w o u ld  regard  
ke lsen ian  n o rm s  a n d  objective legal m e a n in g s  oi acts 
as different sorts of inst itu tional faets; on  the  o the r  hand ,  
Kelsen vvould regard at least an  im p o r ta n t  part  of Searles 
in s t i tu t iona l  faets as n o rm s  o r  objective legal m e an in g s  
of acts.
III. Some open questions
N ow  1 vvould point ou t tw o  o p en  q u e s t io n s  in Kelsen 
a n d  Searles theories. These qu es t io n s  have to do  w ith  a 
basie  ontological tene t  oi b o th  a u th o rs :  the  neecl to 
p o s tu la te  a specitic m o d e  of ex is tence of  in s t i tu t ional  
reality. A m ode ot existence tha t  vvould m ake  true  som e 
s ta te m en ts  vvhich do  no t reler to physical  entities.
Let us  start vvith Searle. In som e passages oi h is book , 
he ad m its  tha t  collective intentionality , vvhich creates 
and  m a in ta ins  inst itu tional faets, cou ld  be based 011 false 
beliefs: ‘[...| in ex trem e cases they  [the participants]  may 
accept the  im position  oi (u n c t io n  on ly  because  oi som e 
rela ted theory, vvhich m ay no t even be t rue .  They  may 
believe tha t  it is m o n e y  on ly  if it is “b a c k e d  by  g o ld ” or 
tha t  is a m arriage only  il it is sancti l ied  by  G o d  or that 
so an d  so is the k ing  only  because  he is d iv inely  au- 
th o r iz ed  [...]. As long  as peop le  c o n t in u e  to recognize 
the  X as hav ing  the Y s ta tus  function ,  the  inst i tu t ional
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fact is created and maintained. They do not in addition  
have lo recognize that they are so recognizing, and  they 
may hold ali sorts of o ther false beliefs about what they 
are doing an d  w hy they are doing it .’32
Searles strategy, in my view, consists in keeping sepa- 
rate the belief whtch creates the institutional fact from 
the lalse belief whtch functions as justification of the 
first belief. There are cases, hovvever, in which  the sec- 
ond  belief collapses on the first one. In such a situa- 
tion, I think, some difficulties arise for Searle’s theory.
Let us take the following example. Let us suppose 
that in antiquity  the application of a constitutive rule 
according to which “Blindness counts  as a divine sanc- 
t ion” had created the institutional fact nam ed  “divine 
sanction”. People collectively accept this rule, vehich 
imposes to blindness (a brute fact) the status of a d i­
vine sanction, and then the lunction of pun ish ing  blind 
persons, w ith  associated normative consequences for 
thetn, such as to be considered blamevvorthy, to be 
marginalized, and so on. The normative background 
could be, for example, that constituted by the natural 
law doctrine in the antiquity.
lf a divine sanction is an institutional laet, then it is 
true -  atemporally  or plainly true, according to von 
Wright s defin ition33 -  a statement like “the blindness 
oi O ed ipus  is a divine sanction”, which corresponds to 
that institutional laet. This statement should not to be 
conlused with other true statements, according to which, 
for example, T h e  ancient Greeks shared the beliet that 
“Blindness ot O edipus is a divine sanction”’, T h e  a n ­
cient Greeks accepted the constitutive rule “the Blind- 
ness counts  as divine sanction”’, and so on. We do  not 
need assum ing  the existence oi any institutional laet to 
affirm the t ru th  of these last statements. But the very 
point of Searle is that institutional facts make true -  in 
the sense of tru th  as correspondence -  the statements 
referring to them.
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On the other hand, in our example, the content of 
ancient Greeks’ belief, which functions as justilication 
of the belief vvhich creates the institutional laet, is just 
that “Blindness is a divine sanction”, that is to say it is 
exactly the same belief vvhich creates the institutional 
fact. In other words, the ‘related theory’ that justify the 
sta tus  and  function im position  on b lindness  is that 
“Blindness is a divine sanction”. Weil, 1 suppose that 
Searle w ould  agree, on the hasis of m o d e rn  natural Sci­
ences paradigms, that ancient Greeks’ theory is false, 
that blindness is an illness and not a divine sanction, 
nanrely that the ancient G reeks’ belief accord ing  to 
vvhich “Blindness is a divine sanction” is a false belief. 
Then, 1 guess, Searle should  conclude that a statement 
like “the blindness oi O edipus is a divine sanction” is 
false, atemporally lalse.
The amazing conclusion is that the same statement 
(“the blindness of O edipus is a divine sanction”) vvould 
be atemporally true, ascorresponding  to an institutional 
fact, and  atemporally lalse, according to the paradigms 
of natural Sciences, vvhich, for Searle, describe ‘[...] the 
most fundamental leatures’34 of our only vvorld. If this 
conclusion is sound, there is, 1 guess, a serious prob- 
lem for Searle’s theory.55
It seems to me that Kelsen (aces an analogous d i­
lemma vvhen he deals vvith the subject matter of irregu- 
lar norms. The problem is the follovving.
From a dynamic point of vievv, in Kelsens S tu fenbau  
a norm  is valid il and only il it vvas enacted  by an au- 
thorised organ, that is an organ that vvas empovvered to 
enact that norm  by a superior valid norm . The legal 
system is thus necessarily consistent, because every valid 
norm  (except the basic one) conforms to a superior one. 
Dealing with the conflict betvveen no rm s of different 
levels, for example betvveen a statute and  a judicial de- 
cision, as vvell as betvveen the constitu tion  and a stat­
ute, Kelsen vvrites: ‘A “norm  contrary to a n o rm ” | . J  is
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a sell-contradiction; a legal norm  which might be said 
to be in conflict with the norm  that determ ines its crea- 
tion could not be regarded as a valid legal norm  -  it 
would be null, which m eans it would  not be a legal 
norm  at ali.’30 Then, w hat about irregular norms? W hat 
about, for example, a statute enacted by an unauthor-  
ized organ, or \vhose m eaning-content contradicts the 
m eaning-content of a superior norm? lf and  when that 
statute is annulled  by a com peten t organ (for example 
a constitutional court), there is no problem. But it hap- 
pens sometimes that such a statute is not annulled and 
remains in iorce. According to Kelsen, in this case the 
statute which is deem ed to be against the constitution 
maintains its validity tili it is repealed.
Here again, as in Searle’s case, we meet a statement, 
for example “The statute X is valid at time t in the legal 
system S” which is atemporally lalse, because the stat­
ute conflicts w ith  the constitution, and  it is atemporally 
true, because the statute is not (yet) repealed by the 
constitutional court.
Kelsen is avvare of the existence of this problem  in­
side h is own theory, and tries to overcome it by resort- 
ing to the so called “tacit alternative clause”:37 the ques- 
tion is answered atfirming that the previous statement 
is atemporally true and not false. His solution is of course 
highly problematic, even if 1 tried, elsevvhere,38 to ar- 
gue lor the consistency of Kelsen’s idea with the whole 
structure oi pu re  theory.
Is there also any solution for the analogous problem  
that, in my opinion, affects Searles theory?
IV An alternative? Alf Rosss approach
A possible way ou t ,3g but obviously not acceptable for 
Searle, w ould  be rejecting the m ode of existence of 
institutional facts and to reduce institutional facts to
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bru te  facts. This solution, in the legal field, is presented 
by Scandinavian legal realism and by Alf Ross, who deny 
the need to postulate the existence oi institutional facts 
in order to formulate true statements referring to the 
same phenomena that, for Searle, are institutional facts.40
As it is well-known, Ross analyses legal terms such as 
ovvnership, right, territory, marriage, nationality, etc., as 
a ‘technique of presentation [...1 which is highly impor- 
tant tf we are to achieve clarity and order in a compli- 
cated series oi legal rules.’41 In my opinion, something 
like that seems maintained also by Searle, w hen  he says: 
T h e  word “money” functions as a sum m ary term or as a 
place holder for being a m edium  of exchange, a store of 
value, a payment for Services rendered, a measure of value 
of other currencies and so on.’42
But, Ross adds, these terms connect ‘a cumulative plu- 
rality oi legal consequences [...1 to a disjunctive plurality 
ot conditioning lacts.’43 And these terms are completely 
hollow: M i they are words without meaning, without 
any semantic reference, and serve a purpose only as a 
technique oi presentation. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
taik with meaning about rights, bo th  in the form of pre- 
scriptions and assertions.’4411 we adopt this perspective, 
institutional facts are not partially constructed by lan- 
guage: they simply do not exist. And believing in their 
existence would show, lollowing Ross: M l a consider- 
able structural resemblance to primitive magic thought 
concerning the invocation oi supernatural powcrs which 
in turn are converted into factual effects. Nor can we 
deny the possibility that this resemblance is rooted in a 
tradition vvhich, bound  u p  with language and its power 
over thought, is an age-old legacy from the infancy of 
our civilization.’45 And that would be so, not only for 
people w ho share com m on beliels about such supposed 
institutional facts and socially accept thern, bu t also for 
scientists and philosophers who claim they are making 
true statements about them.
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Accordingly, the term s which, in Searle’s op in ion , 
w ou ld  refer to institutional facts w ou ld  be b u t  void 
words, w ithout any semantic reference.
Hic Rhodus, hic saita.
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DEMOCRACY AND 
THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS
I. Defining the notion of democracy
The task of defining the notion of dem ocracy is con fronted w ith three logical and m ethodological prob- 
lems:
(i) The m ethodological problem s of real definitions in 
general. Il we have a class of objects w hich are interest- 
ing for research in a certain field we m ay try to specify 
the essential or defining features of ali objects of this class. 
The m ethodological peculiarity oi this task arises from 
the fact that the class oi objects w hose essential features 
are sought are noi given ostensibly, but the objects are 
determ ined as m em bers of the class by a set of com m on 
criteria defining the class-m em bership. Generally speak- 
ing, the search for essential features in order to arrive at a 
so-called real definition iscircu lar.1 Only a constructivist 
approach can be successful. In our case of defining the 
notion of dem ocracy we cannot start vvith a list of the 
main -  or ali -  dem ocratic States and look for their com ­
mon characteristics because the m em bership  in the list 
m ust be justified by the criteria of subsum ing  an object 
under the notion of dem ocracy
From  this consideration  it follows that we cannot
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arrive at an appropriate definition of democracy by an 
empirical analysis oi a class oi actual States, bu t that we 
should introduce the notion of democracy through a 
suitable conceptual convention.
(ii) A m odern  Society and  a m odern  State are very 
complex entities. To characterise them  as democratic, 
less democratic  or undem ocratic  is a qualification de- 
penden t not only on one simple quality. It seems, on 
the contrary, that the democratic character of a ruling 
system -  or the degree of its democratic character -  
depends  on a plurality of leatures. Figuratively speak- 
ing, we can say that the characteristic of being derr.o- 
cratic is not only a feature oi different degrees but, so to 
speak, a multi-climensional feature. This m eans that the 
characterisation oi a ruling system as more or less demo­
cratic is an evaluation of its character in different re- 
spects. Therelore it would  not be justtfied to rank cif- 
ferent States as democratic  in different degrees on one 
line ot intensity.
(iii) The notion oi democracy and the characterisation 
of being democratic or undemocratic often plays the role 
oi a recommendation or ot a criticism, more than a purely 
descriptive characterisation oi the institutional reality oi 
the State. Democracy is olten used as the expression of a 
political ideal which is defined only approximately, and 
in more or less figurative terms. Social philosophy has 
the task ot specifying the essential leatures oi the ruling 
in society and in the State which could satisfy the ideal 
purposes oi the democratic rule.
II. The basic ideas of democratic ruling
The difficulties w ith  the defin ition  of the notion of 
democracy imply that it w ould  be lutile to try to present 
an exact defin it ion  of democracy. W hat we can do 
instead is to explain the main ideas and intentions that
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lie at the  basis of d em o crac y  as the w a tc h w o rd  oi the 
political p ro g ra m m e  called  d em o cra t ic  fo rm  oi li le.
L inco lns  fam ous  fo rm ula  m ay  in so m e w ay ske tch  
the d irec tion  of these  ideals: 'D e m o c ra cy  is the govern-  
m e n t  of the peop le ,  by the  peop le ,  a n d  for the  p eo p le . ’ 
N o b o d y  really believes tha t  L incolns  fo rm u la  consti-  
tu tes  a defin ition  of d em o c ra c y  or  an a p p ro p r ia te  de- 
sc r ip t ion  of the d em ocra tic  State or  tha t  it defines g u id e - 
Iines for the o rgan iza tion  of d em o cra t ic  life. The for­
m u la  expresses  im plic i tly  tha t  in  the  d em o cra t ic  con- 
cep t ion  the State is no t the  d o m in iu m  of an y  ru le r  o r  of 
any inst i tu t ion  vvhether p rofane or  sacred .  But the  es- 
sential qu es t io n  h o w  the collective will of the peop le  is 
e s tab l ished  rem ains  u n answ ered .
A s truc tu ra l  analysis of  the will fo rm a t io n  of a co llec­
tive sh o w s  tha t  this  p rocess  is always c o m p o s e d  of two 
parts: (i) the p roposa l  of an  ac tion  p ro g ra m m e ; a n d  (ii) 
the assen t or  rejection  of the p roposa l  by  a collective 
vote. Additionally , rules m u s t  be e s tab l ished  def in ing  
the p ro c e d u re  of v o t in g .2
The e lab o ra t io n  of an ac t ion  p ro g ra m m e  is alvvays a 
p ro d u c t  of the ideas of lead ing  persona li t ie s  a n d  never  
the resull  of a gen u in e ly  collective process. O n ly  inter- 
personal  co n su l ta t io n s  are k in d  of t r an sp e rso n a l  proc- 
esses in g ene ra t ing  political ac tion  p ro g ra m m e s .  But, 
in d e ed ,  even  in these p rocesses  elites genera lly  take the 
essential role. VVe can see tha t  the in te llec tua l  lead ing  
function  is no t collective in the  s tric tes t sense ,  b u t  only  
o p e n  to a bit of collective in te rac t ion .
In the practice of polit ical parties  -  even  of  d e m o ­
cratic s o c ie t i e s -  the ideal of o p e n n e ss  often  is not m u c h  
s tronger  th a n  in churches .  The  c o n c e p t io n  of the le ad ­
ing persona li t ies  is not su b jec ted  to critical cons idera -  
t ions (cf. the  idea of party  d isc ip line) .
D em ocracy  accep ts  in p r inc ip le  the  n o t io n  that p o ­
litical ac tion  a n d  dem o cra t ic  ru l in g  s h o u ld  serve peo- 
p le s  in terest,  yet the dec is ion  on w h a t  is peop les '  inter-
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est is a m atter oi s tandpoints  and  largely diverges be- 
tween classes of the people and am ong political par- 
ties.
The general framev/ork oi democratic  ideas does not 
unambiguously determine w hat is democratic, but there 
remains a broad iield of open  questions w hich  can be 
decided in different ways.
III. A formal or material 
characterisation of democracy?
There is a s trong tendency in the theory of dem ocracy 
to characterise democracy by formal criteria or to State 
a single pu rpose  tor dem ocra tic  ruling, nam ely  the 
maximisation ot freedom m Society.3 1 dou b t  vvhether 
these tendencies are sound.
The majority principle, the existence of dillerent con- 
current parties, the periodicity of elections are exam- 
ples of the formal characteristics oi democratic  ruling. 
But our historical experience shows that the formal prin- 
ciples of dem ocracy can easily be transform ed or mis- 
used in such a way that very undemocratic  structures 
may be introduced. Dictatorship, lor example, can be 
in troduced  by majority vote, d iscrim ination  against 
minorities can be the elfect ot a majority decision, etc. 
Therefore the conclusion, that purely formal criteria 
cannot guarantee democratic forms oi life, seenis justi- 
lied to me.
li is tem pting  to hold that the essential pu rpose  of 
democracy is only the maximisation of freedom. Free­
dom  as the ideal oi liberal democracy is of course not 
unrestricted, but limited by the condition that the same 
treedom must be guaranteed to ali people.4 But the prob- 
lems of freedom are in fact m uch  deeper. Freedom  as a 
political postulate is not one single idea, bu t a rather 
com plex cluster oi dilferent and  often divergent claims,
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so that the postulate to maximise freedom w ith in  the 
lim its of the same freedom for ali other people is not a 
clear nor even a consistent idea.
The freedom of conscience, for example, is a nearly 
umversally accepted right in our cultural sphere. Yet 
the actual content oi religious norms may be in conllict 
w ith other postulates oi freedom. A person who de- 
cides to leave a religious community can be threatened 
w ith death penalty, the position of genders may be rather 
unequal, marriage with persons of another faith may 
be forbidden, etc. We see that elements of freedom can 
be in flagrant conllict w ith  one another.5
Political aims designated as liberties have, of course, 
a strong suggestive power -  tor example, the liberties 
established in the European Union: liberty of residence, 
of goods traffic, of capital and of Services. But, in my 
opinion, we should carefully analyse the social and eco- 
nomic effects of these liberties and not take only an 
emotional standpoint on these liberties.
Neither formal criteria alone nor a single universal 
ideal -  namely the ideal of maximising freedom -  can 
establish or safeguard the democratic form oi li te. De- 
mocracy is based both on certain formal principles and 
on a class of material principles essential for the demo­
cratic style ot li le.
The necessity oi this dual basis of democracy in for- 
mal and material principles is shown i n te r  al ia  by con- 
sidering the role oi human rights in the democratic State.
There is not a pre-established harmony between the 
ideals of human rights and the content of democratic 
majority decisions. If we conceive democratic decision 
making as a decision by majority vote, there is no guar- 
antee that the decisions w ill be in accordance w ith  hu­
man right principles. Majority groups w ill perhaps ac- 
cept discrim ination in their lavour or even processes of 
expulsion oi minorities in order to estahlish national 
(or ecclesiastical or other ideological) imperia (cf. the
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ideas of “Grofideutschland”, “Large Serbia”, “theocratic 
sociely”, etc.). Even genocide may be a result oi a for- 
mally democratic majority vote.
Therefore, we have to find a theoretically and practi- 
cally acceptable solution for the possible conflicts be- 
tween free democratic majority decisions and the pro- 
tection of human rights.
I shall try to lind an answer to this vexing problem 
from the standpoint oi the neo-institutionalist theory 
oi institutions combined with the ideas oi discursive 
democracy.
IV Neo-institutionalism  and democracy 
as an institution
The democratic State is an institution with a specific 
character. It is the fundamental thesis of the neo- 
institutionalist conception of institutions that every ins­
titution is buiit on the basis of certain idees d ire c tr ice s , 
which is a ciass of practical information determining 
the vvork oi function to be achieved by the institution 
and the value standards to be applied in the instituti­
on .0
We hold that democratic systems are characterised 
by two defining elements: Firstly, by rules of collective 
will formation mirroring the prevailing will oi the peo- 
ple and by rules of checking democratic ruling; and 
secondly, by an open class of leading ideas expressing 
the material principles of democracy.
The explanatory principle of the democratic Society 
follows our general theory of institutions, and is of 
course not a mere a d  hoc construction. I belteve that 
through this approach we can properly characterise the 
relation between the material principles of democracy, 
this means in te r  a lia  the binding nature of human rights, 
and the autonomy of democratic wtll iormation.
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Democratic will formation is in principle autonomous 
to the etlect that by using due processes of will forma­
tion which are established in the Society under consid- 
eration accepted valuations and consented political 
measures are valid. But the processes of democratic will 
formation are by no means arbitrary, but subjected to 
argumentation. There are different levels of argumenta- 
tion and different social processes of justifying value 
standards, fixed purposes and decisions on how to act.
In democratic societies there is a class of principles 
which are considered as essential to democratic life and 
which are therefore binding restrictions for possible 
democratic decisions. The situation leads to the follow- 
ing effect: The class ot democratic leading ideas is not 
closed and not fixed once and for ali. It is subject to 
social discourses, and therefore also subject to a kind 
of development. We can call the results of these dis­
courses the humanisation of the principles and ideals 
of democracy. But, on the other hand, the actual con- 
ception of general democratic ideas is binding and there­
fore means a postulated restriction on permissible will 
formation in democratic processes.
At first sight it seems to he an insoluable conflict: (i) 
Democratic will formation is autonomous and the de­
cisions obtained in due processes are valid. (ii) Demo­
cratic decision, will formation in legal or political is- 
sues, is bound to he justified by actual democratic prin­
ciples acknovvledged as idccs d irec tr ice s  of the demo­
cratic system.
I believe that this conflict is in fact only apparent, 
but in reality a specific feature of democratic life in vvhich 
processes of discourses take place on different levels 
and are realised by different persons or parts of society. 
The discourses on democratic principles and human 
rights take place so to speak in theoretical and moral 
discourses; argumentation about specific political meas­
ures or on legal decisions concern given problem situ-
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ations and  m ust be justified both  by considering ihe 
usefulness an d  effectively of the choices  a n d  dec is ions  
as well as the  postulates of democratic  ideas w hich  ex- 
clude some possible, b u t  morally o r  politically iinper- 
missible Solutions.
V The idea of discursive democracy
The system of multilevel discourses is typical for m odern  
democratic  life and  the source of a discoursive dynam- 
ism. This is, in my opinion, a usetul process with a 
tendency  tow ards deve lop ing  dem ocratic  ideas and 
applying them in practice, but it does not provide an 
effective guarantee that democratic  leading ideas will 
always be realised in political practice.
The institutionalist view that 1 tried to expose dem- 
onstrates that democratic  life is connected  as well in 
theory as in practice with discourses. 1 recall president 
T.G. Masaryks saying that ‘Democracy is d iscussion’ 
w hich concerns this feature of m odern  democracy. In 
contem porary  political philosophy, there are two rather 
different conceptions oi discursive democracy, the con- 
ception o f ju rgen  Haberm as and my less optimistie and 
more critical view.
Haberm as and I share some opinions and tenden- 
cies. We are both  convinced that democracy m ust be 
developed as an open  Society in which political and 
ideological discourses have an essential influence on 
public affairs. We both plead for hum an  rights and so­
cial justice and for the active participation oi the peo- 
ple in controlIing political issues. But our  philosophi- 
cal backgrounds are quite different, a fact vvhich im- 
plies im portan t dilferences in our conception of discur­
sive democracy.
Haberm ass teaching is rooted in his discourse p h i­
losophy, a methodological conception which 1 regard
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as fundamentally misleading.7
Discourse philosophy is a philosophical doctrine 
elahorated by Habermas and Kari-Otto Apel. Its central 
theses are:
1. Rationality is conceived of as a collective process. 
Discursive rationality is put in opposition to the indi- 
vidual -  solipsistic thought in Apel s terminology8 -  and 
only those views are rational which are achieved by 
universal consensus in (ideal) interpersonal discourses.
But I am convinced that argumentation is quite in- 
dependent of the individual or collective process of ar- 
guing. The validity oi an argumentation is determined 
only by the logical relations and by the methods oi 
empirical testing, but not by collective processes and 
consensus.
2. Ideal discourses which are defined as free oi power 
relations (hcrrschaftsfrei), open to everybody concerned, 
and unlimited in time, are unrealisable. The essentiat 
point herrschaftsfrei is neither given in any society nor 
decisive to the result of the discourse.9 Therefore the 
notion oi ideal discourses is an inappropriate idealisa- 
tion. Actual discourses should not be judged by the 
criterion oi similarity to this ideal, but subjected to criti- 
cism concerning the actual dangers oi mistakes and 
shortcomings. VVe need an appropriate organisation oi 
places ior open discussion and critical analyses of eristic 
features oi argumentations.
3. Habermas’s notion ot the so-called ‘consensus theory 
of truth is not well founded and leads our endeavour in 
a lalse direction.10 Truth, in the sense oi Habermass con- 
cept, is defined as the quality oi a thesis vvhich is ac- 
cepted by universal consensus in an ideal discourse. There 
are at least the lollovving objections against the consen­
sus theory of truth: (i) There is no valid transition from 
the subjective opinions oi the participants in discourses 
to objective validity (vvhich is supposed in the notion of 
truth). (ii) Truth is here delined as a limit of argumenta-
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tive processes. The notion of such a limit is meaningful 
only if the steps of such discourses w ould  necessarily 
approach just one thesis. But in laet there is no guaran- 
tee that the steps of discourses will come ahvays closer 
to just one limit. Therefore the introduction of such a 
limit-entity is logically not justified.
4. The collectivistic view on rationality and  the aim 
to achieve a consensus leads research in a false direc- 
tion. It is not the d iscussion of effective m ethods  of 
enqu iry  and  argum enta t ion  that are sought, bu t  the 
m ethods of gaining assent. This is detrim ental to both  
the natural Sciences as well as political discourses.
5. Habermas defines good argum ents as those which 
evoke assent in a given aud ien ce11 and in do ine  so heO  (_>
mixes up two different things: the real validity of argu­
m ents and the convincing effect of an argumentation. 
There may be valid argum ents which do not convince 
the present audience, and invalid (deceptive) arguments 
may have convincing effects. To understand  the essen- 
tial difference between good (valid) argum ents and  ef­
fective argum ents -  in the sense of actually evoking 
convictions and assent -  is essential for the construc- 
tion of a reasonable theory of argum enta tion .12
6. C oncerning practical questions consensus is not a 
proof that the accepted solution is in f act correct or the 
best one. Consensus is only a sign of a democratically 
accepted view and therefore an appropriate  hasis for 
actual action, but not a proof that the decision is the 
best solution in an objective sense.
7. Discourse philosophy presupposes  that there are 
some im m anent suppositions of every Communication, 
namely truthfulness and the readiness -  and du ty  -  to 
defend every thesis that we com m unicate . But to teli 
som ething does not imply the duty  to defend the thesis 
in discourses, and we often believe and com m unicate  
in fact theses that we are not vvilling or able to defend 
discursively.
224
D e MOCRACY AND THEORY O F  IN ST1TU TIO N S
It is a consequence of discourse-philosophical views 
that Habermas is optimistie and presupposes that dis- 
courses will lead to good Solutions of democratic  rul- 
ing. He defines legitimacy and the acceptability of legal 
rules by the communicative procedure by which they 
are -  or could be -  established. ‘AH persons w hich form 
the legal com m unity  are entitled to test as participants 
of rational discourses vvhether the no rm  u n d e r  consid- 
eration will find or could find assent in the class of per­
sons which could be concerned by it.’ ‘And on the post- 
traditional level of justification only such a law is legiti- 
mate that could be accepted by ali m em bers  of the legal 
com m unity  in a discoursive process of formation oi 
opinion and will.’13
In my opinion, Haberm ass conception of legitimacy 
is neither clear nor useful. Is legitimacy bound  to as­
sent in a real discourse or is it sufficient that we can 
presuppose that assent could be achieved? Every po- 
litical system declares itself and its laws to be legiti- 
mate. 1 vvonder whether it is appropria te  to restrict le­
gitimacy to the existence or possibility of discursive 
assent, because often in political reality historical rights 
or actual facticity justify validity. It w ou ld  be an illu- 
sion to declare ali laws which are not justified by dis­
cursive assent to be illegitimate. 11 we take peace and 
peaceful evolution as the most im portant political ideal 
then we have to start from the actual political situation 
and we m ust acknovvledge existing legal relations as 
p r im a  fa c ie  legitimate. Such a view allows, of course, 
the struggle for a more democratic political system, but 
not simply by defining the actual political State as vvholly 
illegitimate.
Habermas believes -  w ithout a convincing reason -  
that hum an  rights wi 11 he established automatically by 
the democratic procedures of will fo rm ation .14 Yet a 
majority can be reached in decisions which  essentially 
contradict some hum an right principles, such as a ma-
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jority may vote for discriminating measures.
Haberm as does not have a clear s tandpoin t against 
the doctrine of natural law. This becomes evident, for 
instance, in the following quotation: ‘[...] a legal order 
can be legitimate only if it does not contradict moral 
principles.’15 Such a thesis, w hich is reminiscent of a 
natural law position, is hardly compatible w ith  Haber- 
rnass subsequent theses, namely ihat moral principles 
have no  hierarchical preference over law, and that au- 
tonom ous morality stands to positive law in the rela- 
tion of a supplem ent.16 To be ubergeordnet or ‘hierarchic- 
ally stronger means just to have the capacity to exclude 
the validity of another norm: here the capacity of mo- 
rality to exclude the validity of law. In my opinion, 
morality and law are com plem entary  just insofar that 
they both  motivate the behaviour of people in society, 
bu t not in the sense that morality is able to supplem ent 
missing legal rules.
Haberm ass discourse philosophical consequences in 
his theory of democracy are not convincing to me. Some 
examples of his problematic theses are:
(i) Practical questions can be judgecl impartially and 
decided rationally (ibicl., 140).
As the solution of practical problems depends  essen- 
tially on value s tandards and preferences (which, of 
course, can be divergent) there is not a unique and im- 
partial rational solution of ali practical questions.
(ii) Ali norm s of action (moral or legal norm s) are 
valid that can be agreed upon  by ali persons potentially 
affected that participate in rational discourses ( ib id . , 
138).
The class of ali persons potentially affected by an 
enactm ent is controversial in principle (e.g., future gen- 
erations may have a justified interest in our actual deci- 
sions regarding our econom ic activities, bu t they can- 
not be participants in our rational discourses). There is 
no good reason for the supposition  that universal agree-
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m ent will be reached on a proposed enactment.
(iii) Every attempt l o  arrive at an agreement on va- 
lidity claims is a rational discourse if it takes place un- 
der the conditions of Communication vvithin a public 
realm established by illocutionary duties which makes 
possible free discussion about topics and  contributions, 
information and reasons (ibid. 138 f.).
Rational discourse cannot be detined by formal pro- 
cedural rules alone; it depends on appropriate  meth- 
ods of argumentation and on effective m ethods  of en- 
quiry, an d  in the realm of practical philosophy also on 
accepted value standards and preferences.
(iv) In moral discourses, the rule of argumentation 
has the lorm oi the rule of universalisation (ibid., 140).
The principle of universalisation is, of course, nei- 
ther uniquely determ ined (it is not stated vvhich ele- 
m ents  shall be subject to universalisation) nor is it suf- 
ficient by itself to underp in  ali moral a rgum enta t ion .17
(v) Principles of democracy and of morality can be 
distinguished on the levels of external and internal con- 
siderations (1992, 142).
In my opinion it is not very illuminating to back up 
the distinction between morality and law by the old 
idea that in morality only innervievvs are relevant, while 
in law only external views are applied.
(vi) O n the basis of rational morality (Vernunftmoral) 
the individual tests the validity oi norm s u n d e r  the pre­
supposition  that they will be in fact fulfilled by every- 
body (ibid., 148).
Such a contrary-to-fact supposition  -  it is also held 
by other authors -  is neither necessary nor  useful. In 
arguing for rules and for the acceptance of moral p rin­
ciples we should take a realistic position.
It is a dangerous illusion to conceive of social dis­
courses as processes in vvhich ali persons play the same 
role. A realistic sociological view on the social proc­
esses of argumentation and of producing  convictions is
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not shaped by such a conception oi equality.
Haberm ass supposition restricts his analysis in such 
a way that the most im portan t problems are not ana- 
lysed; in the first place the role of elites; and secondly, 
the multiplicity of dangers which can destroy the value 
oi democratic processes (e.g., deceptive propaganda, 
slogans or the use oi marketing-like m ethods in politi- 
cal practice).
li I in terpret Habermas correctly he conceives legal 
processes -  such as a lawsuit -  as discursive processes. 
But in fact these argum entations are not orientated to 
fincl tru th  or practical principles, but to arrange and  to 
balance interests. Discourses, and  discourses of a spe- 
cific form, are only a part of legal procedures.
VI. My conception of discursive dernocracy
In my conception of discursive dernocracy, discourses 
are useful herm eneutic  tools which give us the oppor- 
tunity of melioration of public affairs, bu t they define 
neither tru th  nor correctness nor  value optimisation.
Essential to democratic life is that discourses should  
take place on diflerent levels: as the preparation  and 
critical checking ot public action, as the w ork  of the 
mass media and -  last, but not least -  of the social Sci­
ences.
In my conception oi discursive dernocracy there is 
no place lor the romantic optim ism  that holds that col- 
lective discourses automatically imply justice and  pros- 
perity and the freedom oi people. O n  the contrary, 1 
believe that dernocracy is always in danger, and there - 
fore we m ust discuss political problems, fight lor the 
realisation oi the social p resuppositions ot an open S o ­
ciety and criticise deceptive argumentations.
We actually live in an information society vvhere eve- 
rybody has broad  access to in form ation .18 But there is
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also a n o th e r  side of th e  In fo rm a tion  Society, n am e ly  
nearly  u n l im ite d  possibilities o f  in d o c tr in a t io n  a n d  a 
d a n g e ro u s  concen tra t ion  of  the m ass  m ed ia  in to  few 
han d s .  Tliis may becom e d a n g e ro u s  for the realisa tion  
of  an  o p e n  Society precisely in b o rd e r l in e  s ituations.
T here  are im por tan t  possibilities for the d ev e lo p m e n t  
of universal political c o n c e p t io n s  a n d  a universal moral 
cu l tu re .  But dem ocracy  also m ean s  the  right of differ- 
e n t ia t io n  an d  freedom  in the  sense of c h o o s in g  a spe- 
cific l i les ty le . ly In this  respec t  the re  are m a n y  o p e n  
q u e s t io n s  in the E u ro p e a n  political reality.
Let m e co n c lu d e  with the  fo llow ing rem ark : The ac- 
tual reality oi the E u ropean  U n io n  s h o u ld  be ana lysed  
f rom the po in t  of view of an  in s t i tu t iona l a n d  d iscur-  
sive c o n c e p t io n  of d e m o c ra c y  F rom  th is  analysis  im ­
p o r ta n t  reform ative ideas co u ld  be derived .
Notes
1 Cf. W einberger 1989, p. 364.
2 W einherger 1979.
3 Kelsen 1929.
4 Kant 1956.
5 W einberger 1978.
6 H auriou 1965.
7 Habermas 1981; Apel 1973; W einberger 1996.
8 The term  “solipsistic” is here not appropriate. The thesis of 
solipsism  concerns another problem , namely the epistem ic 
vievv that only my own experience is possible and that there 
is no way to obtain intersubjective know ledge. Cf. Weinber- 
ger 1992a, p. 258, fn. 8.
9 Dissidents vvere able ti) argue convincingly and to develop 
reasonable views in a society of strongideological oppression.
10 Cf H aberm as 1973; W einberger 1996; ibid 1992a, esp. pp. 
257 and 260 s.
11 Haberm as 1973, where the au thor defines the quality of 
argum ents as the ‘povver to reach consensus tn discourse’.
12 W einberger 1995.
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13 Hahermas 1992, p. 134 and 169.
14 There is a tension betvveen lacticity and validity, peoples 
souvereignty and hum an righis, but Habermas believes 
witbout strong argument that 'the normative content of 
human rights leave its mark on the realisation of peoples 
souvereignty’ ( '[D]er normative Gehalt der Menschenrechte 
geht vielmehr in den Modus des Vollzugs der Völkssouverän- 
ttät selber ein.’) F a k t iz i tä t  u n d  G e ltung ,  p. 131.
15 Habermas 1992, p. 137.
16 Habermas, loc. cit., p. 137.
17 Weinberger 1992b, esp. pp. 244-246.
18 Weinberger 1998.
19 Rescher 1993.
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